Yevhen Marchuk, People's Deputy of Ukraine
The coming third millennium brings with it a crucial turning point in international
politics. It is, above all, a psychological turning point. It is now perfectly
clear that the postwar world order has broken down. Neither the degree
of complexity of common human problems, the nature of the world economy,
the line-up of world leaders, the number of independent states, nor the
shape of regional alliances, conform to what existed after the war. A great
number of quantitative changes that have taken place over the past fifty
plus years have brought about profound qualitative changes. Ukraine is
searching for its place in a changed world, and the world is pondering
its definition for Ukraine. The success of these quests depends on the
degree to which both sides will be able to assess each other accurately
and adequately.
OUR INTERESTS ARE WHERE WE HAVE MARKETS
The disastrous state of the Ukrainian economy fundamentally narrows
the space within which Ukrainian politicians can identify Ukraine's top-priority
national interests. It is quite obvious that today our main interests do
not lie in the plane of political declarations and abstract search of identity.
We will have to discard political passions, historical negativism, the
stereotypes of public consciousness, and other quasi-emotional factors.
Once, the USSR's foreign political stand was considered very politicized,
which inflicted tremendous losses on the Soviet economy. I dare say that
today's Ukrainian foreign policy is no less politicized, thus causing no
less a loss. We remember what such mistakes led to in the USSR. If a country
is not guided by common sense, it destroys itself. This is obvious.
Why do I call for temporarily refraining from abstractly seeking an
identity? Because all those pretty cultural and historical theories crash
upon impact with economic realities. We are not the Soviet Union, for it
does not exist either politically or economically. We are not Russia, which
we feel very acutely each time we discuss natural gas debts or Russian
customs duties on Ukrainian imports. We are not Europe, which we are immediately
aware of at the very faintest attempt to break into European markets. We
might want to consider ourselves part of something. Our identity has already
been predetermined for the next few decades: we are Ukraine, independent
and neutral. Neither foreign nor domestic circumstances will allow us to
upset the status quo. We must determine our strategic interests, proceeding
from this.
Our true interests cannot possibly fully coincide today with either
Europe's, America's, or Russia's, but they could have much in common with
each.
Ukraine has now wound up in critical dependence on the favorable attitudes
of international financial organizations. It is doubly dependent: first,
we are not yet in a position to forego financial aid, and secondly, we
need the political support of well-established financial organizations,
without which no investors will ever come to Ukraine. The Ukrainian economy
has been so damaged by failed managerial experiments and half-reforms that,
unless invested in, the country will be doomed to backwardness and miserable
popular living standards. The international financial structures are controlled
by the West, and this means that the Western vector in Kyiv's foreign policy
will be on the agenda for a long time.
On the other hand, Russia does not have free financial resources, and
the Russian investor will not be able to have a decisive impact on the
Ukrainian economy's revival. However, what is obvious is the dramatic dependence
of Ukrainian well-being on economic ties and trade relations with Russia.
For example, despite the financial crisis, Russia consumed 23% of Ukrainian
exports in 1998.
Ukraine's dependence on Russian fuel is also common knowledge. We often
have no option but to pay for them on a barter basis. It is hard to imagine
Ukraine switching over to alternative sources of energy, if we bear in
mind that the share of barter is negligible in the trade with advanced-market
partners. For instance, while the share of Russia in Ukraine's barter operations
in the first six months of 1998 was 61.2%, that of the US was 0.1%, and
even that of Turkey was only 0.4%. And, to sum up the year 1998, Russian
goods accounted for 68.8% of Ukraine's commodity imports.
Moreover, Russia is the main consumer of the products of those Ukrainian
industries which determine, to a large extent, whether or not Ukraine will
be an industrial power. In the first nine months of 1998, Russia bought
48% of Ukraine's mechanical engineering exports, 16% of its ferrous metallurgy
products, 15% of its chemicals, etc.
Thus it absolutely clear Ukraine cannot flout her economic ties with
Russia to the same extent that it is not yet in a position to avoid financial
dependency on the West. This predetermines Ukraine's behavior on the international
arena: to categorically dissociate itself from any strategic or situational
versions of Russian-American confrontation and to define its foreign policy
priorities exclusively by the desire to meet its own economic requirements.
For example, the USA's principal strategic ally, Canada, manages to hold
a stand contrary to Washington's policies on a number of foreign policy
issues (e.g., relations with Cuba and Iran) if this is dictated by its
national interests.
I favor geopolitical centrism without extremism, provocations, deviations,
and tilts, for a tilted poise has a detrimental effect on the economy and,
hence, on the social situation. When a high-placed Ukrainian politician,
largely responsible for the making of security policy, suddenly starts
to cajole NATO into remaining open and conducting a "second wave" of expansion,
I do not consider this the most well-balanced act. Then we hear Mr. Luzhkov's
irritating statements on the return of the Crimea. The situation is getting
worse. The point is almost any worsening of international relations tells
on the level of economic contacts. Who suffers from this is not the high
official who makes statements but the rank and file citizen, if I may say
so. For we lose market share and jobs. Alas, Ukrainian foreign policy is
often as detached from the true interests of citizens as the domestic policy
is.
BRIDGE TO ILLUSION
One of the dangerous mistakes is pursuing a wait-and-see policy and
toying with the idea of being a bridge, buffer, link, etc., between West
and East (Russia, the CIS), instead of an active, often conflict-prone,
search for ways to enter the world market and the molding of a corresponding
foreign political strategy.
History will never present us a geoeconomic magic carpet.
First, as Poland integrates into the European Union and Belarus
into the Union of Russia and Belarus, the borders of the EU and the Russian
economic space will be crossing without any intermediate links. This means
the role of the intermediary services of a third party will be brought
to a minimum.
Secondly, the degree of direct contacts between the leaders of
Western Europe and Russia, both on the bilateral and the collective European
levels, is so high that it is hard even hypothetically to imagine a situation
when appeals to Ukraine as a go-between could be effective.
Thirdly, the increasing multifaceted cooperation of Russia with
territorial state entities of the Euro-Arctic region (Denmark, Sweden,
Norway, Iceland, Finland, Greenland, the Бland and Faroe Islands) enabled
the Northern Council, which held its fiftieth jubilee session on November
9-12, 1998, to come to the conclusion that it is the Northern dimension
that plays the role of "a bridge-builder and a linking element in the dialogue
and cooperation between the rest of Europe and Russia." And let us recall
that Finland coped very well with this role even when the USSR existed.
Fourthly, in the opinion of high-placed members of the US Administration
(in particular, Richard Morningstar), "the key role... of a geographic
and commercial bridge between the Caspian region and Europe" is being assigned
to Turkey. This disavows the well-known pretensions of Ukraine and her
projects to form a "Ukrainian-Transcaucasian axis."
Fifthly, as events of the past few years have shown, in case
serious differences come up between Russia and the US, for example, regarding
NATO expansion, intermediary functions in liquidating the complications
are being performed quite willingly and successfully by France, Germany,
and Italy, let alone the Russia-NATO Council and the Atlantic Alliance's
specialized branches dealing with Russia, and relevant international commissions.
Hence, instead of being a regulated crossroads of commercial, economic,
diplomatic, political, scientific, technological, informational, and other
exchanges along the East-West line, Ukraine is more and more turning, as
a result of its wrong position from the very outset, onto the fringe
of a busy highway, falling by the wayside of trans-European traffic.
REALISTIC PARAMETERS
OF COOPERATION
One should not underrate or overrate the interest in Ukraine of its
partners.
Let us start with the United States. An appraisal by The Wall Street
Journal will help assess the degree of the interest among American
businesspeople in doing business in Ukraine: "weak liquidity and dubious
economic prospects make the (Ukrainian - Author) market unattractive
for the operations of investors, except, of course, for the most daring
ones."
Against many indicators, the Ukrainian economy has been altogether
"denied" market-related progress. For example, Ukraine is missing from
the list of "29 main emerging markets" published by the US Institute of
International Finances in 1997.
Politically, Ukraine does not have more chance to get the US really
interested. What is more, the optimistic assessments of American politicians
runs counter to the pessimism of analysts.
Authoritative US international expert J. Krasno opined in October 1998,
to maintain America's US current dominating position in the world, Washington
needs to target its influence (except, naturally, the developed powers
with which the US bases its relations on different principles and conditions)
on the eleven principal states. These states are regarded as leaders in
their regions and they could act as regional transmitters of American foreign
political interests. The list includes Algeria, Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia,
China, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, Turkey, and South Africa.
Ukraine is also missing from an extended summit of the world's major
countries proposed by director of the Harvard Institute of International
Development Jeffrey Sachs. Prof. Sachs advises that the summit develop
a global development strategy. The analyst thinks it possible to supplement
the Big Eight with eight developing countries. He names, in particular,
Brazil, India, South Korea, South Africa, Nigeria, Chile, and Costa Rica.
We may suppose in all probability that the eighth member of the "world
elite club" is understood to be the unnamed China, without which the whole
idea becomes senseless, but not our country.
The European Union is another pole of global economic and political
might on which Ukraine pins its aspirations and hopes. Europe regards
the European former Soviet republics as part of the European historical,
cultural, and partially its economic space. A united Europe is moving toward
the CIS borders and is not at all indifferent to what kind of market there
will be here.
Europe is also worried over the possible destabilization of situation
in CIS European republics based on regional, ethnic, and economic issues.
While the US will regard such a development as a vague factor subject to
correction from the viewpoint of American global strategy, the EU will
see it as a dangerous hotbed of tension on its eastern borders requiring
broad and effective involvement.
Yet, in the West European direction too, we can only mention the existence
of a hypothetical level of relations, rather than of stable variants of
cooperation.
Like the US, EU member-states do not consider Ukraine as a source of
fuel supplies, a highly competitive market (on which the developed industrial
powers could sell a wide range of their goods), or an object of large-scale
investment. The Ukrainian industries capable of putting out world-standard
products (mainly, defense production, instrument- and machine-building,
metallurgy, chemistry, etc., or other, but unsophisticated, items) are
regarded in the West as competitive with their own national production.
Hence, the low level of imports by Germany and Italy, the main consumers
of Ukrainian products. According to the State Statistics Committee, in
1998 their shares in Ukraine's export accounted for 5.1% and 4.4% respectively.
Our movement forward toward Europe is hampered by the fact that we often
try to bring the progress of transformation into line with that in Russia.
But Ukraine needs to be much more resolute, for example, in attracting
foreign investment and combating corruption. For we are potentially a less
attractive partner than Russia. For the same reason, incidentally, we should
on no account move westward, ignoring the interests of Russia and conflicting
with it. In case of a conflict, we would be supported only with verbal
declarations because relations with Russia are of paramount importance
for Europe.
Russia is also important for the EU because she possesses the world's
largest reserves of natural gas, second largest coal resources and eighth
largest oil deposits; it is also at present the world's first exporter
of gas and second supplier of oil. Out of Russia's overall foreign trade
turnover, Western Europe accounts for 35-40%, while the other CIS countries
for 25%, and China, the US, and Japan 3-6% each. Russia has now become
the fifth largest importer and sixth largest exporter on the EU market.
The European Union accounts for almost half total foreign investment in
Russia.
In addition, according to Western experts, trade between Russia and
the EU only makes up a third of the level expected given Russia's total
GNP and proximity to EU markets. Even Russia's current economic hardship
is not regarded in the European Union as a motive for folding up business
operations with the Russian Federation.
In a regional dimension, Russia is still considered by Western Europe
as the only guarantor of political stability in the CIS and an irreplaceable
element linking the European and Asian (first of all, Chinese) economic
systems into a single whole.
The European Union assigns Russia the special role of counterweight
to the US, reducing US and NATO influence in favor of European defense
structures to be created. Such a division of roles largely relieves the
West European states of such a burden.
Given the EU's specific interest in Russia, Ukraine is considered de
facto by the European Union as a country in the Russian sphere of influence.
She has no opportunities to suggest scenarios, distinct from or more advantageous
than Russian ones, of cooperation with Western Europe and is objectively
less attractive economically. The European Union's priorities in relations
with its neighbors are clearly displayed in the way it admits new
members. The sequence of admission has been distributed among Poland, the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia, and Cyprus, as first-echelon
countries, and Bulgaria, Rumania, Slovakia, Lithuania, and Latvia, as the
second echelon. Ukraine is unable even to force its way to associate membership.
Ukraine will perhaps have to rely on cooperation with large European
corporations.
First, corporations are guided by the considerations of a steady
gain of profits, rather than geoeconomic or geopolitical factors and prospects.
Thus if Ukraine creates better conditions than Russia and her other neighbors,
European multinational corporations are certain to come here.
Secondly, the creation of the European Union and introduction
of the euro are in fact aimed at giving a second wind to the attack tactics
of the Old World in the economic and financial war being waged by the corporations
on the basis of regionalism.
Thirdly, orientation toward cooperation with West European corporations
is also justifiable by the prospect of the further increase of their role
and clout in the European Union. European multinationals could later become
lobbyists for Ukraine in European structures. As the French newspaper Le
Monde Diplomatique noted in July 1998, "even now many firms play a
greater role in international affairs than nations or nationalities."
CAUTIOUS INTEGRATION
Today we must treat very carefully problems of moving either westward
or eastward. Ukrainian politicians, both Right and Left, think it fashionable
to call for immediate integration into certain economic, political, or
even military, structures.
To understand why rapid integration of Ukraine with Russia is quite
dangerous, suffice it to look at Russia's military expenditures provided
for in the 1999 budget. They are three times as high as in Ukraine on a
per capita basis. In case of full-scale integration, Russia is certain
to suggest that this disproportion be rectified. However, the economy of
our country cannot bear such a load.
By far less evident seem to be the shortcomings of hasty integration
with the West (the more so that it so far unrealistic). But these shortcomings
do exist. And they are instructive. Let us take the case of Eastern Europe...
As admits P. Robeiseck, deputy director of the Hamburg-based International
Institute of Politics and Economics, Eastern and Western Europe have displayed
lately much evidence of a "limited compatibility of strategic goals."
Although both parts of the continent pursue many similar goals, they
deal with very few really common, tasks, "while aspiration for increased
well-being, common to the West and the East, divides, rather than unites,
them." First, the East European states require economically a high level
of private consumption to keep their citizens more moderate and restrained.
Secondly, Western entrepreneurs strive to limit the area of industrial
activity in the former socialist countries to the manufacture of primary
and semifinished products. Under these conditions, "a renewed dependence
on the old markets is quite possible," concludes Mr. Robeiseck, "The goods
of the thousands of East European firms are not in demand on Western markets.
Many of them seem simply unable to adjust to the requirements of Western
consumers."
We may conclude that the European economic space has been divided into
a developed industrial center - core states - and a backward periphery.
And the peripheral countries will have to adapt with great difficulty to
the situation, sacrificing their traditionally strong sectors of the economy
and overcoming social conflicts. $350 billion is required to adapt the
economy of Poland alone, which is totally unrealistic in the opinion of
the Vienna-based Institute of Comparative Analysis of the World Economy.
POLICY OF REAL SECURITY
Ukraine's contribution to European security can be scarcely exaggerated.
Ukraine put a decisive end to the huge nuclear and missile capacity it
had inherited from the USSR, and considerably reduced conventional armaments.
But the security guarantees Ukraine got in return have proven illusory.
It is strange that some guarantors of Ukraine's security treat European
security as strong enough for Ukraine to make do without a nuclear potential
but, at the same time, as weak enough to serve their interests, which prompts
them to expand NATO eastward.
In general, is it normal when a military bloc, to which Ukraine is not
a party, acquires an immeasurably greater influence on defending it from
external threats than Ukraine herself?
If we deal here with the formation of an effective collective security
system, then it must not embrace only the NATO states. Ukraine would welcome
revision of the status of West European Union, which would allow the expansion
of precisely this organization to the East. It could be expanded even faster
than the EU and farther than NATO. European countries are objectively not
interested in confrontation with Russia. Russia is aware of this, so it
reacts positively to the expansion of European structures.
A gray area in terms of security really does exist, which the case of
Yugoslavia confirms. It is obvious that, were Yugoslavia to pursue a pro-Western
policy, there would be no crisis. For nobody bombs British military facilities
in Ulster or Spanish in the Basque Country, etc. Nobody stations international
military contingents there. And this is quite reasonable.
But also obvious is this: were Yugoslavia a military ally of Russia
(today, military cooperation between the two countries may be only considered
as nominal due to international limitations in force), NATO would not have
dared to punish it the
way it has.
The Kosovo crisis is undoubtedly the result of the geopolitical games
the leading world powers play. It is for this reason that the major Western
media publish so few statements by the leaders of small NATO member-states
and neutral countries on the Kosovo problem.
If one had wished to handle the Kosovo issue reasonably, one could not
have missed an obvious fact: situations that have been forming over ages
cannot be resolved in a few weeks at a negotiation table, with even colossal
pressure from outside. The attitude of most Western countries toward the
Serbs was predetermined from the very outset. A glaring example is the
case of a mass grave of ethnic Albanians, where experts have not yet identified
the guilty, but officials at
once level charges against the Serbs.
I am not going to touch upon the ethical side of the problem. There
are gross violations of human rights in Kosovo, and this must be put an
end to. The only question is how. And whether it is admissible to flout
international law. Incidentally, the ethical implications - in a fit of
frankness - are also being hushed up by some American officials. For instance,
US Deputy Defense Secretary for Political Affairs Walter Slowcomb said
bluntly, addressing the House Armed Forces Committee on March 17: "The
Kosovo conflict jeopardizes our carefully thought-out national interests,
even if we do not take into account our purely human compassion for the
victims of the conflict."
In the conditions of grossly ignoring Serbia's position, flouting the
norms of international law (readiness to occupy a part of Serbian territory
even without UN Security Council consent), and strong-arm pressure, the
support for Serbs will drastically increase in Ukraine. Especially, if
we keep in mind that Serbia is, as well as Ukraine, a predominantly Slavic
and Orthodox country and that Ukraine is under Russia's strong informational
influence. Growth of support for the Serbs will trigger a dramatic rise
of anti-Western sentiments, which under Ukrainian conditions can only mean
strengthening the Left's position on the eve of presidential elections.
Under such circumstances, it will be especially difficult to find arguments
in favor of Ukraine's independent and neutral status. For if the "gray
area" of security has become a reality for Yugoslavia, it could just as
well become a reality for Ukraine.
We have to note that there really exists a millennium bug in world politics.
And this bug consists in a discrepancy between the security structures
and the challenges of time and geopolitical realities. This amounts to
the removal of small and neutral states from the actual solution of security
problems and, in broader terms, of the world order at the turn of the third
millennium as a whole.
SHOULD UKRAINE GET BACK
NUCLEAR WEAPONS?
Today the West underrates very much the danger of anomalous internal
political developments within Ukraine. For example, our President and his
team have overdone it, by trying to create a bipolar system in the elections.
They only help the Left, especially the most radical of them, to score
more points. They think this will raise President Leonid Kuchma's chances
to be reelected. But in the final analysis, under the conditions of dire
poverty of the people and the most acute social problems, the President
could suffer crushing defeat by the Left opposition. There are hundreds
of examples, when "subtle" and "controlled" processes went out of any control
in an unstable country.
What kind of guarantees will the Left be seeking in case they win the
Ukrainian elections? The have demonstrated this by suggesting that Ukraine's
non-nuclear status be revised. This country's non-nuclear status revised,
we will be standing a pace from being involved in a nuclear confrontation.
I do not think either Ukraine or the West need this. Will such a development
serve the cause of peace and stability in Europe? I doubt it.
POSTSCRIPT
NATO Secretary General Javier Solana noted at the ceremony of new members'
admission: "We must increase our cooperation with Ukraine in order to help
this state, which plays an important role, to find its appropriate place
in the new Europe." I think NATO should take the most resolute steps to
convince Ukrainian politicians that the expansion of the alliance is not
aggressive and its transformation is real."
As to the motto for Ukrainian foreign policy, I would choose: "equal
distance, gradualism, and national interests."









