Yuri DONSKOY: "Ukraine is content with its role as peacekeeping cannon
fodder"
The Ukrainian peacekeeping contingent of 800 officers and men is preparing
to be dispatched to Kosovo as part of the multinational K-FOR. Last week,
Verkhovna Rada gave its consent, passing the President's bill. The legislature
added another proposal to those of the executive: the Ukrainian military
must not participate in any operations directly threatening human lives.
Ironically, the resolution was passed on July 16, almost exactly seven
years after Ukraine took part in a peacekeeping mission for the first time
(July 15, 1994), sending a unit of 500 to former Yugoslavia. Over the years,
over 8,000 Ukrainian servicemen have acquired peacekeeping experience in
various parts of the globe, with casualties of 18 killed and over 50 wounded,
mainly in the Balkans. And all Ukraine has received in return is perhaps
certain political gains and new experience for its military.
"Can one expect any economic dividends from such peacekeeping missions?"
The Day's Serhiy ZGURETS asked Colonel Yuri Donskoy (retired),
Chairman of the All-Ukrainian Peacekeeping Veterans' Association.
Yu. D.: It is possible, but it takes a different approach to
the planning and organization of every such mission. We all understand
that peacekeeping contingents must pave the way for defending the national,
economic or geopolitical interests. You can rest assured that in the French
sector of Kosovo French firms will get reconstruction contracts. So what
about Ukraine?
Every peacekeeping mission has three components: military, political,
and civilian. As a rule, Ukraine is content with the first two, although
the greatest dividends are received by countries participating in the UN
and OSCE civilian administrations. The latter are actually the leading
structures. Instead of fighting over seats at headquarters and influencing
decisions serving Ukraine's benefit, we are always content with the executor's
role: I would even call it peacekeeping cannon fodder. We form contingents,
place them under the command of colonels sent from backwater provinces,
and say OK boys, go ahead. Every commanding officer is primarily concerned
with keeping his men alive and carrying out orders as best he can. He has
neither the time nor experience for anything else.
In the Defense Ministry, for example, there is a ground forces military
cooperation department. It is actually responsible for our K-FOR peacekeeping
contingent in Bosnia. If send most of our airborne troops to Kosovo they
will be under mobile air command. Of course, neither army nor mobile air
generals have jurisdiction over strategic plans in the national interest
at large.
Our peacekeeping mission in Kosovo must begin in Brussels, with our
representative appearing in Mons and joining the NATO headquarters network
controlling K-FOR. This task must not be assigned our numerically weak
military personnel attached to NATO under the Partnership for Peace program,
for this is a different specialty.
Along with the contingent, a task force should be dispatched to every
hotbed, made up of people from the Foreign Economic, Industrial Policy,
and other "practical" ministries and agencies.
This task force should be coordinated by a special body in Kyiv, acting
under the NDSC or the President. Otherwise all efforts and instructions
from Kyiv will be scattered among ministries and agencies. And we must
concentrate on a region which important for Ukraine not only as a transit
point. A large number of Yugoslav enterprises had close contacts with Ukraine,
and we ought to revive these contacts wherever possible as best we can,
because the European Union in rebuilding Yugoslavia will establish new
cooperative ties. We should fight for a piece of the pie for Ukraine and
do it now, because we need it for construction and industries, as well
as for our arms dealers. UN sanctions against Yugoslavia are lifted, and
there are Soviet arsenals that need repair and modernization. NATO bomb
raids provided its bankers and industrialists with an ideal bridgehead
for investment and the region is doomed to development and prosperity.
We must not miss the opportunity but start now; otherwise our peacekeeping
mission will again turn into simple peacekeeping and nothing more.
The Day: NATO people have on more than one occasion stressed
the desirability of Ukrainian participation in the peacekeeping mission
in Kosovo, hinting even at possible compensation. Does this mean that they
will pay eventually?
Yu. D.: NATO has problems with peacekeeping contingents; the
alliance needs units to which the populace won't be antagonistic. Most
of the units are from countries which only recently sent their warplanes
to bomb Yugoslavia. Incidentally, the United States is in no hurry to deploy
its contingent in full to avoid confrontation.
In this sense, Ukraine is the best option, because unlike Russia it
does not claim geopolitical leadership, as evidenced by Brussels proposing
Kyiv deploy its contingent, say, in Pristina with its ethnically Serbian
population. And I think that they will eventually find the money to compensate
us. After all, every Ukrainian officer and man will cost NATO $500-700,
compared to $5,000 for its own manpower.






