Imagine a quite ordinary situation. Petro Symonenko, First Secretary of
the CPU, at the Verkhovna Rada rostrum, reading out the Red faction's statement.
Clearly formulated clauses fall on the audience like the final verdict
on the "antipopular regime." The man looks like L'Ami de Peuple
Marat and the Hrach brothers (all three of them). The number one Communist's
severe, condemning speech should make the entire "ruling bourgeois nationalistic
regime" tremble. But then suddenly the presiding member presses the bell.
Very courteously (the Communist faction is considered the largest and most
disciplined faction, no denying it) he says to Comrade Symonenko, "Petro
Mykolayovych, please remember the time limit." And the hero is suddenly
subdued, hastily, almost humbly, he asks for another minute, a few seconds,
and then hurries his tyrant-toppling expose to its end. A scene every so
often repeated in Parliament of the past and current convocation. Cutting
off live transmission sharply narrowed the circle of those closely following
parliamentary life. Too bad, for such vignettes clearly outline Petro Symonenko's
profile as one of the leading presidential candidates.
The August 1991 ban on the Communist Party found him holding the post
of second secretary, Donetsk oblast committee of the CPU/CPSU. There are
a number of versions (among them quite anecdotal) of how a "second echelon"
Communist came to be the leader of the "new" Communist Party of Ukraine.
Most likely, two factors played the crucial role: (a) after the August
crisis his older comrades (e.g., Stanislav Hurenko) preferred to keep a
low profile, and (b) his Donbas origin (Donbas being considered the Communist
base in Ukraine).
The CPU was legalized in July 1993, but as a new party and Symonenko
became First Secretary of its Central Committee. It was officially registered
in October. The next parliamentary elections (March-April 1994) was a Communist
success. After receiving about 90 seats they could formed the legislature's
largest faction. Aware of his own remarkably insignificant merits in the
process, the CPU leader decided to take no risks and shortly after being
registered as a presidential candidate withdrew in favor of the more experienced
and popular Socialist Oleksandr Moroz. However, the turnout showed that
the voters were neither Red nor even Pink at that time. And so the main
intrigue centered on the Communists' relationships with two leading candidates,
Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma. Formally, CPU backed Comrade Moroz in
the first round (although, for example, the Crimean Republican Committee
called on the voters to support Leonid Kuchma). A CPU plenum between the
first and second rounds made a stab at a compromise, whereby the Communists
would not support Leonid Kravchuk and every party member was free to vote
for or against Leonid Kuchma. Needless to say, this compromise was a very
tangible asset helping propel the creator of today's "antipopular regime"
to the top.
As soon as Leonid Kuchma became President, the Red leader declared that
his party would support any and all of his reforms provided they were aimed
at the people's welfare and did not conflict with the party's ideological
and political guidelines. The first conflict took place in the fall of
1994, albeit not on ideological grounds. First it looked almost idyllic:
October 19, 1994, Verkhovna Rada adopted its resolution On the Report of
the President of Ukraine On the Guidelines of the Economic and Social Policy,
Leonid Kuchma's legendary radical market reform presentation. Quite a number
of Communists voted for the resolution "as a whole," approving "the main
clauses of the report." It was a barter deal. On October 18, part of the
pro-Kuchma Interregional Deputy Group supported a resolution repealing
preceding Parliament's ban on the CPU. A decision to annul the ban was
soon put to the vote soon but did not pass. It was perhaps the first time
Kuchma's administration used the Communists and then turned its back on
them.
In November of that year, the CPU Central Committee passed a resolution
declaring the party's opposition to the President's so-called new course.
A remarkable detail is that in his speech Petro Symonenko noted that the
Communists were prepared to support Leonid Kuchma provided he "takes measures
to save the country from economic catastrophe, slow down the production
decline, root out corruption, and combat mounting crime." On December 7,
1994, he even spoke approvingly of the President's bill on power, which
would later serve as the basis of the Constitutional Agreement. In his
words, "it is a promising bill... I support the clause about strengthening
the executive branch..." A week later, however, Symonenko published the
article "The End of Power of the People" (Holos Ukrayiny, December
14, 1994), viciously attacking that same brauch. It seems to me that on
this particular occasion the CPU leader demonstrated important traits,
such as indecisiveness, inconsistency, and secret faith in backstage compromises.
The Communists are lucky, not in the sense that they have a capable
leader, but with regard to the current President. Leonid Kuchma's "reform
policy" provided the best conceivable conditions for boosting radical Leftist
sentiments. "Keep protesting and people will rally round you." The Communist
rhetoric echoed by their leader became increasingly radical. In December
1995, Petro Symonenko (together with Heorhy Kriuchkov) wrote: "We are witness
to the Presidential entourage's aggressive desire to impose a Constitution
on society, which is against the people, aimed at establishing an authoritarian,
dictatorial regime..." One major blunder was made on the Constitutional
Night when about 30 Communists voted for the "antipopular" Constitution.
Trying to somehow disengage themselves from that "victory," the Communists
promptly expelled People's Deputy A. Shamarin and two others received reprimands,
with Petro Symonenko attending the execution. Yet this purge left the party's
reputation unaffected, just as the electorate did not respond to the shameful
vote. During the March elections the CPU roster collected 24.68% of the
votes. Together with members elected by majoritarian districts, the Red
faction reached 120 persons. It was then that Petro Symonenko started making
personal plans.
In the course of the drawn-out elections of the Speaker Symonenko's
candidacy was put forward six times. This was preceded by intriguing events.
The Communist leader met with President Kuchma three times between April
13 and May 11. There was vague official information about the need to "discuss
organizational matters" pertaining to the legislature. What the two actually
discussed is anyone's guess. Another detail: at the peak of the Speaker
saga the Presidential Press Secretary O. Maidannyk appeared with a special
statement refuting the media allegation that Leonid Kuchma had agreed to
the Communist leader's election as Speaker. The Presidential Administration's
maniacal determination to prevent Oleksandr Moroz's reelection was rather
fertile soil for a backstage deal. Petro Symonenko's envy of the former
Speaker could well have become the second component of precisely one such
deal (which would be immediately broken).
The fact remains that the Presidential Administration's real game with
the Communist leader began later, when Petro Symonenko was awarded a Prometheus
as Politician of the 1998 in the 1998 Person of the Year Ceremony (generally
believed to have been rigged). Comrade Symonenko had the presence of mind
to avoid the ceremony, yet he did not turn down the trophy. At least some
presidential strategists had something even more effective up their sleeves.
This spring I happened to glance through a project developed by a team
of Moscow experts working for the Kuchma campaign. The document was so
frank and cynically worded that I first thought it smart disinformation.
Subsequent events convinced me I had jumped to the wrong conclusion. The
authors proceed from the fact that the only scenario that can guarantee
Leonid Kuchma success is his getting through to the second round together
with Petro Symonenko. Any other candidate (Yevhen Marchuk, Oleksandr Moroz
or even Oleksandr Tkachenko) getting there would automatically make the
incumbent President lose. (To know this one did not have to invite experts
from Moscow!) However, the specific arrangements offered by the analysts
to signal the Communist leader from a distance are much more interesting.
Their advise was to make the CPU elite believe that Symonenko has a chance
to regularly publish his overstated popularity ratings, stay in the limelight,
and treat him as a serious political figure. Those who watched the big
show of Leonid Kuchma and Petro Symonenko's "fraternization" when receiving
presidential candidates' identity cards and heard the President superfluously
complimenting his "most formidable adversary" could suspect that Mr. Kuchma
had not only read the document but learned it by heart. As for Comrade
Symonenko, he almost melted in the presidential embrace and did not seem
to worry about what he had done wrong to deserve such praise from the embodiment
of the antipopular regime.
In the same way presidential technicians are betting on the CPU elite's
whimsical undercurrents and inner problems, specifically number-two Communist
Adam Mar tyniuk's inflated ambitions. The aggressiveness with which Adam
Ivanovych Martyniuk (known as Saddam Ivanovych) pushed his boss to the
campaign's starting line is sufficient evidence that Comrade Martyniuk
would be content with any outcome of the elections. Moreover, Petro Symonenko's
inevitable defeat would give the Second Secretary a simpler and better
chance to get rid of his superior.
The Communist leader is said to be a charming man in his daily life,
a model family man, an erudite, even an aesthete. But in politics he is
playing the cards dealt him. The number-one Communist is faced with the
choice of continuing to play along with Leonid Kuchma (and assuming personal
responsibility for his reelection) or not. He must have watched the fraternization
show, but he is not likely to change his tactics, which seem to have been
jointly developed and approved. Another point is more interesting: will
the Communists (and one must admit that far from all CPU members are obsessed
hard-liners) allow a sequel to a policy which is increasingly apparent
as leading both Symonenko and the rest of the Party to defeat and a complete
loss of face? It is safe to assume that under the circumstances the man
would like to bring time to a standstill. The time is running short.







