President Boris Yeltsin made one of the most crucial decisions of his
political career, dismissing Premier Yevgeny Primakov and appointing Interior
Minister Sergei Stepashin (only recently made First Vice Premier) Acting
Premier shortly before the Duma's vote on impeachment.
Hardly an unexpected decision, as the possibility was discussed for
several weeks beforehand. Even before Stepashin's promotion as First Deputy
Premier analysts suggested that the Russian President would not come out
with a new candidate to head the government before the parliamentary elections.
Instead, they believed, he would appoint an acting Premier from among Primakov's
first deputies. At the time, however, Boris Yeltsin did not have an adequately
convenient and, most importantly, loyal figure on hand. Stepashin's appointment
helped clarify the situation, yet even the day before President Yeltsin's
decision, word spread that Rail Transport Minister Nikolai Aksenenko was
the most likely replacement. Practically as soon as Primakov stepped down
Aksenenko (known for his administrative talent, often called Russia's "last
oligarch" because of the railroad capital turnover) was made First Vice
Premier. Some believe that he will take charge of government agencies hitherto
within the province of Primakov's second in command, Communist Yuri Masliukov,
known mostly for his intractability during talks with international financial
institutions. From now on Aksenenko will have to come up with decisions
Mr. Yeltsin will consider necessary from Russia's economic point of view.
In any case, Primakov's retirement is explained by the President referring
to purely economic reasons and the impossibility of putting off the most
vital decisions in the economic sphere any longer. However, Mr. Yeltsin
never enlarged on these decisions.
The economic factors of the President's decision are obvious. Primakov's
Cabinet, with the economic sector entrusted to the former Soviet Gosplan
[State Planning Committee] Chairman, was apparently in no hurry to carry
out any tangible reform or take any risks. Primakov and his deputies thought
it best to bide their time and stay out of the Duma's bad books. Meanwhile,
after the Cabinet agreed to a number of IMF loan conditions, confrontation
with Parliament became imminent; the lower house was supposed to make changes
in the law for which the Communists would be unlikely to collect the required
votes, not only prior to the elections, but also under any other favorable
conditions. It became anyone's guess whether Primakov would be able to
push the bills through the Duma, for they would cause the Cabinet to lose
Duma support. Boris Yeltsin refused to wait for Parliament readings of
the IMF bills or impeachment vote. The very date of the President's decision
is evidence that his main reasoning is political.
And the reasons for Mr. Yeltsin's ire are also clear. For almost nine
months of his tenure Primakov made no steps to become one of the President's
men. He preferred to play his own game (and he played it rather well),
saying now and then that he was supported by the President and Duma. He
was Mr. Yeltsin's first Premier to offer his own plan for political accord,
with one of the clauses (effectively torpedoed by the President and Duma)
geared to guarantee Primakov's office until the presidential elections.
He was also the first in his post to try to control top-level cadre reshuffling
single-handedly. Among other things, he warned the President that he would
resign if his two most odious deputies, Yuri Masliukov and Gennady Kulik,
were dismissed. Primakov was not afraid to show irritation at Yeltsin's
most important orders. The President was not likely to forget or forgive
Primakov's remark, "We don't need impeachment today," when meeting with
Duma faction leaders, just as he was not likely to miss the Premier's satisfied
expression after the Council of the Federation again refused to allow the
firing of General Prosecutor Yuri Skuratov. As for Primakov keeping practically
silent on the subject of impeachment at another meeting with Duma leaders,
the President was hardly interested, because he had made up his mind, so
that now, without power and supporting party structures, Primakov will
quickly become another respectable has-been.
And his replacement is also quite significant. Nine months of pensioners
in office (as Primakov's Cabinet was often referred to) led to the birth
of a child of Russia's economic and political incapacity. The inevitable
new round of the crisis and open confrontation between the branches of
power (for how else is one to regard the impeachment project?) may well
have prompted Mr. Yeltsin to conceive the idea of a loyal general at the
head of the government. By way of historical analogy, another general,
Wojciech Jaruzelski, headed the Polish government in a similar situation
when the country had to brace itself for further economic calamities, when
the upper echelons were unable to retain control and made a number of concessions
with the opposition (some totally unexpected by the latter), whereby it
came to power. Another thing is that in today's Russia the situation may
not lead in the direction of military and security ministries and agencies,
rather it may serve to enhance regional leaders which, in turn, may prompt
the Kremlin to turn to those very military and security ministries and
agencies as the only chance to turn the tables. Yet under conditions of
permanent economic instability high-ranking military officials are not
the best support, as again evidenced by General Jaruzelski in Poland. There
is also a purely Russian factor: Stepashin is not only a Colonel General,
but also one of Yeltsin's men. In addition, he is known to have been on
quite good terms with Boris Berezovsky, although not as good as Berezovsky
and Nikolai Aksenenko (known as Berezovsky's man). Boris Yeltsin's cadre
decisions show precisely who in his entourage has got the upper hand, as
further evidenced by the retirement of Oleg Sisuyev, First Deputy Head
of the Presidential Administration. Despite the fact that Sisuyev declared
that "there are no indispensable premiers and this is also true of Yevgeny
Primakov" in a recent interview with the magazine Kommersant-Vlast,
he was known (unlike Aleksandr Voloshin, his boss, also rubbing shoulders
with Berezovsky) for being prepared to cooperate with the Premier and come
to terms with him. Sisuyev's retirement, of course, does not mean the end
to the cadre saga. Russia is entering a new period of unforeseeable developments
and quite foreseeable instability, although what "stability" there has
been in the last couple of months was quite illusory.
FROM THE DAY'S FILES
Aleksandr Stepashin,
born 1952 in Port Arthur. Graduate of the Soviet Naval Academy (1973),
Humanities Military Academy (1981). Held a commanding post in the Interior
Ministry's troops (1973-1990). Was sent on a number of missions to "hotbeds"
- e.g., Baku, Fergana, Nagorny Karabakh, and Sukhumi. Appointed Deputy
Head of the Federal Security Agency (AFB) of the RSFSR (1991), then Head
of AFB in St. Petersburg and Leningrad oblast.
First Deputy Director of Russia's Federal Counterintelligence Service
(Dec. 1993-March 1994), then Head of FCS (known as FSB).
Played an active part in the "restoration of constitutional order" in
Chechnya. June 30, 1995, was retired because of the Budenovsk incident
(when Shamil Basayev's guerrillas took hostages at the city hospital).
1996: appointed Executive Secretary of Russia's State Commission for
the Settlement of the Chechnya Crisis.
Minister of Justice from July 1997 to March 1998.
Minister of Internal Affairs (March 1998), then again re-appointed to
the post (Sept. 11, 1998).








