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Where there is no law, but every man does what is right in his own eyes, there is the least of real liberty
Henry M. Robert

Alexander RAHR: “Geopolitics is not a good word, but it is coming back into fashion”

13 November, 2012 - 00:00

Well-known German political scientist Oleksandr Rahr, expert with the German Society for Foreign Policy Toward the CIS States, is famous for his nontraditional ideas predictions regarding development processes in Ukraine and the West.

What do they say about Ukraine in Europe? How do they estimate the situation and the tendencies? What are your predictions regarding Western policy toward Ukraine?

Few countries of Central and Eastern Europe provoke as much sympathy as Ukraine, despite all its problems. There are a number of reasons for this: on one hand Chornobyl and on the, other the secession of Ukraine meant the USSR was no more, that there was no more Soviet threat. This is the main thing for any European.

I think that sooner or later Ukraine will become part of Europe. Western people have doubts about Russia, but some of them think that without Ukraine it could also become a European country.

Appointing Borys Tarasiuk Foreign Minister was taken positively, as a final effort of the Ukrainian President. The West likes strong and powerful people who can do something. On the other hand, they hope that, in addition to Tarasiuk, a number of other radical young politicians will be appointed to the key positions. The West compares Kuchma’s actions with Yeltsin’s. They say Yeltsin has more power, but Kuchma still can do better with help of decrees. He takes his time, slows things down. The Western mass media often criticizes him for doing so.

What makes Ukraine so attractive to the West?

Ukraine is not as important for the West as Russia, but it is definitely more important than Belarus, Moldova, Bulgaria, or Romania. This is why a great deal of attention is paid Ukraine. The West is mainly interested in stabilizing the situation in the country and the progress of economic reform. Some in the West would even want more strict management of the state for several months or a couple of years in order to do in Ukraine what was done in Poland or Hungary in three years: to push away the opposition, parliament, and other structures. The priority is absolutely clear: to save Ukraine.

I think that, while Ukraine came to its Rubicon in 1994, it is now also coming to a very dangerous point in its history. It doesn’t really matter who will be President. He will have to preserve the country, perhaps by implementing some elements of federalism. The West has not previously supported this, but without such a step Ukrainian reforms seem to be impossible. The West expects the Ukrainian people, elite, and politicians to act like their Russian counterparts did in the presidential elections in 1996.

Then most Russians voted against Communism, and it has been defeated once and for all. The Ukrainian people has not yet given its final word on its past and future.

Why do you think Russia has made its anti-communist choice and Ukraine has not? Why do Western politicians seem inclined to support Kuchma in the coming elections?

The Left as a whole has 40%, which means they dominate Parliament. Of course they won’t be able to change the laws, but they can still do a great deal.

At the same time Kuchma is very well known in the West. They think he is able to unify Eastern and Western Ukraine, that he wants to move Ukraine along the path of reform, and that he can maintain stability. They also think he does not want any conflicts with Russia and is definitely better than somebody whom they do not know. Russia also supports Kuchma. This President has failed in economic reforms, but he has been successful in foreign policy.

You say the Germans are fed up with the old faces in our government. Meanwhile in Russia new pretenders for the highest post in the country are coming out, for instance Lebed. What does Germany think of this?

I recall that when Nemtsov was appointed first deputy Prime Minister, people started talking about him as a possible heir apparent. But people come and go, as his example shows. The Germans know Lebed. I myself invited him there twice when Yeltsin seemed to be dying. At first his was hesitant, cautious, but then he won people over. Lebed showed that he wants to cooperate. He became interesting, stopped hesitating, and many in Germany are more frightened of Luzhkov. During the last two years he has visited all the key countries of the world and met with the elite. I am sure he will have international support in the presidential elections.

Is there any Ukrainian politician of this kind?

Lebed will be able to make use of Western sympathy, because he sought and found it. I think there are high level politicians in Ukraine who also know how to do this. Not without reason do members of the presidential entourage often go abroad. Ukrainian politicians from the so-called opposition also regularly visit Germany. In particular, Yevhen Marchuk has been there two or three times and he has established the same connections as did Lebed. They know him well, and he definitely has the sympathy of the German political elite.

Don’t you have the impression that Russian political elite is against launching reforms in Ukraine, Belarus, and other CIS countries? For this makes their economies an easy target for Russian capital, which is closely connected with the state.

At the current juncture, yes. Moscow certainly wants things to be good for Russian business. Second, Russian politicians are worried that these countries may leave Russia, that they might have presidents who would consistently carry out pro-Western policies. Third, they are afraid, that radical Communists might take over in these countries and begin to unite with Ziuganov.

We live in an era when geopolitics and geostrategy are coming back into fashion. People earlier did not like to use these words, because they were reminiscent of the Hitler period, Yalta, and the division of Europe. Now it is studied in universities and institutes, and concerning Ukraine more and more questions arise. It is often stated that it would be wonderful if in twenty years 80%-90% of the former Soviet republics find their ways as states. And in the coming game of world politics not only Belarus but also Ukraine will be a factor. Ukraine, like for example Azerbaijan, is a chip in the Great Game that now dominates world politics.

What can you say about the project to transport Caspian oil in view of this?

Now there a new vector in world politics is really emerging, the Great Game is beginning, which is being played concerning oil and gas extraction and its transportation to Asian and European markets. And four main players are doing their best to gain control over the region’s strategic energy supplies. They are the USA, Russia, China, and European Union. Other countries like Turkey and Iran are also struggling to control the transport corridors. The final decision on who will get richer and who won’t from Caspian oil will be made in the next few months. The Americans have made an absolutely clear choice by choosing Turkey their strategic partner. This bags them two rabbits. First, Turkey is a stabilizing factor in the Islamic world. Secondly, in this way they will force the European Union into accept Turkey as a member. Ukraine loses in this move, as do Romania and Bulgaria also, for they also can expect to lose out, but to a lesser degree. They can continue to expect that some future corridor will be build across their territory. I think that this is a great disillusionment for those Ukrainian politicians, who view Kyiv as America’s main strategic partner in Central and Eastern Europe.

Could the Ukrainian elite’s behavior have influenced this decision?

Your Ukrainian politicians are used to working with other countries. They had luck with Germany, because all German business in Ukraine is insured by the state, so they do not take much risk. With America a strategic mistake was made — they failed to understand that companies play a great strategic role. And a serious conflict arose, which will now be difficult to resolve. Ukraine will have to look more soberly at the situation and understand that they should work with firms just politely as with states.

Do you think that the West provokes anti-western attitudes?

Yes, there were promises, which were not kept, but there are objective reasons why. Many politicians here tried to use Western desire to help in their own purposes and to encourage false euphoria. All the same there are no borders, and when Poland joins EU, it will become more difficult to go there for Ukrainians, Belarus, and Russians. Even the Balts will have to get permission, which will cause offense. But people will continue to travel, and there will not be such a passport regime as there was ten years ago. Let me be somewhat harsh. Ukraine was a part of the Soviet Union. It has its own mentality, which is not much different from the Russian. The elite saw itself, especially the younger generation even in Gorbachev’s time, as a world elite. I see a great difference between Russian and Ukrainian young elite, on the one hand, and the Polish, Hungarian, and Czech elite on the other. They are capable of being servile, humble to the West. They say that they want to learn from us and will take practical steps. Ukrainians and Russians say, no, we want everything right now. This is a great irritation in Amsterdam and Luxembourg, and this irritation is growing. Luxembourg, for example, could block NATO expansion to the East.

Do you notice new tendencies in the Ukrainian attitude toward NATO?

I felt a split in the Ukrainian elite. There is no consensus on whether to join or not to join NATO but at least ten positions. There are very great naive hopes that everything will be fine, say, if we join NATO and the European Union. And if they don’t take us, we’ll go back to Russia. I think this is connected with a lack of information, and this is awful. Simultaneously, the West continues avoiding giving any concrete answer to the question whether Ukraine, Russia, and other CIS countries will be accepted into Europe or not and in general where the border of Europe will be.

Some political scientists say that Ukraine is important as a buffer between Europe and Russia.

This phrase has already caused a stir in Ukraine, but it actually does show what European interests are: that Ukraine should not unite with Russia, that Russia not start to threaten Europe, and that the Communists not win. I think Europe will start paying less attention to Ukraine, because no one thinks Russia can take Ukraine over militarily.

And if not militarily?

This is also a scenario I find hard to imagine, because if Russian capital leaves so will that of other countries. Or so people think. I agree that European capital will be the last to leave. Islamic and American capital will go Only if the Russian army were to enter Ukraine and establish bases here would the West start to worry. The main thing it that there not be a military threat and Ukraine not fall apart, for the whole of Europe would suffer from that.

Which way has Europe chosen?

Schengen Europe is now being formed as an axis. Every two or three years they will accept one or two countries, first from Central Europe and later Eastern Europe. With time, Schengen Europe will control all European processes. Europe will have strict borders, and it will be difficult to enter it. Then there will be an expanded Europe including Greece, Poland, and Finland. This will not mean that Europe will want to forget forever all about problems in the East, but it will want to be cautious in its expansion. Then one will hear the awful word “buffer” along with others. First will be the integration of EU members, then total integration, and later Schengen Europe. Europe will initially get smaller, although no one says so. Schengen Europe will be the main one, even Greece will not be accepted there. Great Britain will be accepted later. This is why NATO is expanding to the East. To at first strengthen the roots of Europe it will be smaller, not bigger, and then gradually it will open up to other countries. However, this opening of Europe will be a great deal more complicated, for there will be strict criteria, especially economic ones. Everything will be decided by economic and not political considerations; bankers and not politicians will decide who to admit and who to not. But, on the other hand, this Europe will become more and more attractive. People will unite not without reason: a market will be created and new resources found.

I think that in the future, say, by 2030, Europe could reach the present borders of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Why not? This organization is a transatlantic society, which includes the European Union. In such a case opportunities would open up for all countries. Some could be admitted in ten years, others in twenty, and still others in thirty. Of that you may be certain.

What has replaced the romanticism of Gorbachev in Europe?

There was no great disillusionment. We are all lucky that the world has taken the path it has. The worst fortune was what happened in the former Yugoslavia. No one expected the collapse of the USSR, and after it the romanticism ended very quickly; people quickly oriented themselves in the new situation and understood that the process will be a long one. I think more countries will be winners than losers. I think that Schengen Europe will also not last forever. I think that sooner or later, in say twenty years everything could be completely different, with leading businessmen from Germany and France coming to Russia and Ukraine, because these countries are perfect markets, and they aren’t going to disappear. And this Europe would be like a museum. I think Eastern Europe has more promising future.

Photo by Volodymyr Rasner, The Day:

Alexander Rahr

 

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