President Kuchma’s edict appointing Mykola Biloblotsky Acting Mayor of Odesa has not as yet caused a serious political scandal. Still, the gravity of the Chief Executive’s act is such that scandal is imminent.
Now that the Yalta situation has been repeated in Odesa, it is possible to discuss the President’s planned offensive against local self-government. True, there were objective problems in both cities and it is possible that they warranted the government’s interference, but no line has been drawn where the President can think nothing of violating the Constitution. In a word, what happened in Odesa could well happen in any city of Ukraine.
WHAT HAPPENED?
Formally, the edict is motivated by the implementation of a Kirovohrad Regional Court ruling invalidating the mayor’s election. Mr. Biloblotsky is instructed to work out and within two weeks submit to the City Council proposals concerning “urgent measures to stabilize the socioeconomic situation in the city and organize the operation of city transport,” as well as to assist in the runoff.
Simultaneously with the appointment of Mr. Biloblotsky, Ruslan Bodelan, head of Odesa’s regional state administration, was fired, replaced by his second-in-command Serhiy Hrynyvetsky. In other words, it is possible to suggest that the President settled an old conflict in Odesa very simply, by removing the key personae. However, this solution to the problem cannot but give rise to serious criticism and may well cause subsequent, even bigger problems.
WHAT WAS THE PRESIDENT AFTER?
Presidential Administration Deputy Head Leonid Pidpalov stated that the edict is quite lawful, but there are doubts, big ones. The President cannot appoint city mayors, because they must be elected by the people. Of course, there is the good old “revolutionary expedience” which can justify whatever drastic moves, but lawlessness always begets lawlessness. In this particular case the election of the Mayor of Odesa, to be arranged by Mr. Biloblotsky, may sooner or later be nullified because of the unconstitutional edict. Hence, the question whether the presidentially declared goal of restoring law and order and securing a fair election of the mayor will be achieved remains open.
Also, supposing that the President actually wants a runoff, not the “fair election” (which Mr. Hurvyts must have frustrated, even if inadvertently), his edict has already done everything to get the old mayor reelected. Needless to say, the edict gave Mr. Hurvyts the extra edge as a champion of Odesa local rights. On the other hand, his adversary, Bodelan, was defeated, not destroyed. His post went to Hrynyvetsky, his faithful comrade in arms. And the Chairman of the Regional Council is also one of his men. So, in case Mr. Hurvyts or one of his protОgОes gets the upper hand, the city-region confrontation may well resume, except with a different cast. The law, however, says that persons because of whom elections are proclaimed invalid have no right to figure in a runoff. Knowing Eduard Hurvyts’s abilities, it is quite possible that he will find a way out. His greatest advantage is that the runoff will be supervised by the same election committee, so any registration tricks are unlikely. Finally, the ex-Mayor may withdraw and publicly support another candidate.
It is true that making Eduard Hurvyts step down will reduce his influence in Odesa considerably. Things like the “Hurvyts phenomenon” are based on a combination of business, personal contacts, and formal power. All three components serve to support one another, but formal power remains at the top of the list. It secures a firm business coalition backing people like Hurvyts (by organizing advantages) and provides necessary contacts. Viewed from this angle, Hurvyts’s star is setting, but this will take some time, so the man is still in a position to give some of his opponents a tough time.
WHAT DID THE PRESIDENT WANT?
The President means one thing and says another. Evidence of this is found primarily in the discrepancy between his methods (after all, the edict really is unconstitutional) and his political objectives. On the face of it, he made a rash decision, because the Odesa scenario was already drawing to a close. The Supreme Court confirmed the illegitimacy of the mayor’s election, and although the City Council called a referendum it could have no legal consequences (like overruling the Supreme Court’s verdict).
In other words, there would be a runoff, with or without Mr. Biloblotsky (whose appointment is certainly unlawful). Perhaps the President should force the City Council to hold new elections, but he could have done it quite lawfully (and the Public Prosecutor’s Office had actually started the required proceedings). All this points to one thing: what the President really wanted was not so much the runoff as getting Odesa under his control. At this point one cannot but be reminded that the only possible reason that could justify such legal radicalism, at least in the Administration’s eyes, is the need to secure Caspian oil transportation. As for the Premier’s repeated rejection of the oil-Odesa-presidential-government connection, this merely serves to corroborate the inference. However, all experts are of the opinion that Ukraine’s participation in the Caspian project is highly questionable. Moreover, the West will have the final say on the matter, and it demands that decorum be observed, meaning that those in power must obey the law, or at least refrain from blatantly breaching the Constitution.
WHAT HAPPENS NEXT?
The next logical step the Administration will take is getting the “correct” election results (in Yalta the trick was pulled off with a virtuoso touch, but Odesa is a much tougher nut to crack). The district election committee must call a runoff within a month, as has been repeatedly stressed by the Presidential Administration. The Premier announced on May 27 that the election campaign had started and that the government was assuming the City Council’s arrears on municipal bonds. If the local administration fails to select the “right” candidate and have this person elected without a hitch, it will find countless legal catches to draw out the procedure. True, in this case the administration will turn out the loser again. First, this will cause irritation in the West, which closely follows Ukrainian self-government. Secondly, the government does have much to offer to win favors with Odesa natives.
SO WHY TROUBLE THE TROUBLE?
There were no extraordinary circumstances warranting the extraordinary manner in which Mr. Biloblotsky received his promotion and it looks very much like his key mission is to keep the situation under control and be on standby.
The most saddening conclusion from the Odesa adventure is that the President, while speaking from rostrums about the danger of legal nihilism, emerges as one of its authors, and the same is true of Lazarenko who tried to “sell” the scenario in Parliament so awkwardly.
From The Day’s files:
Mykola P. Biloblotsky, b. 1943, graduate of the Kherson Agricultural Institute, later of the Higher Party School (1983); member of the Audit Commission, Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine; Minister of Labor; currently Deputy Premier for Social Policy. Appointed by Leonid Kuchma as head of a special commission in Yalta where an Odesa-like maneuver was effectively executed. Cabinet liaison officer with the Left Center parliamentary faction. Observers describe him as an extremely disciplined executor who shows little initiative on his own. Many compare him with Durdynets. From a Ukrainian newspaper: “Former Communist Biloblotsky Fights Unions Over Wages” met with the President’s understanding when sweating over the issue of back wages. Mr. Kuchma was quoted as saying, “I know that Mykola Biloblotsky is trying to do something, but every such effort is blocked by the absence of constructive cooperation with the Ministries of Finance and Economy.”
Photo by Valery Miloserdov, The Day:
Penalty blow







