By Vitaly PORTNYKOV, The Day
Two years ago Russian President Boris Yeltsin appointed his daughter Tatiana
Diachenko his image advisor, thus legitimizing her position in the Kremlin
administration. Since that moment, Ms. Diachenko has been going to work
at the Kremlin, not just to visit her father, although one should admit
that since the last presidential elections very few people have thought
that Ms. Diachenko is a guest in the Kremlin. Such influential publications
as Time, Newsweek, The New York Times, and Kommersant
have written about the anniversary of Ms. Diachenko's image making.
One can already say today that Ms. Diachenko has become the Russian
President's latest, and the most invulnerable favorite. Before her, only
two people, Gennady Burbulis and Aleksandr Korzhakov, exerted such boundless
influence on the head of state. Both of them contrived, thanks to their
personal relationships with Yeltsin, to turn their offices into structures
molding the country's political life (Mr. Burbulis was virtual prime minister,
with the post of state secretary having been devised specially for him.
Under Mr. Korzhakov, the President's security service was converted into
a superministry, only to be disbanded after the downfall of its chief).
After resignation, both of them play no roles in politics, do not meet
Mr. Yeltsin, and have no say in Kremlin decision-making. Ms. Diachenko
differs from the two former presidential favorites by being able to remain
at court under any circumstances, for even if her influence on decision
making should dwindle, she retains the main thing, direct access to the
President. With due account of the head of state's nature, it becomes clear
that, having direct access, one can easily recover lost positions. It is
no accident that those out of office so yearn to see Mr. Yeltsin, being
aware that this is a chance to excuse oneself and an opportunity to present
oneself to the political establishment as a person still able to do what
is necessary.
Ms. Diachenko does not have to face such difficulties. This is why she
cares about making her own image far less than any other political figure.
She does not give interviews, does not have a private spokesperson, and
she can afford not to care about negative assessments by her former and
current colleagues, for this favorite is unchangeable. Who would want to
make such a formidable enemy? Indeed, she is a classic gray cardinal more
than a political figure. Her career as a decision-making figure is sure
to end as soon as the present incumbent's term expires and is sure to continue
while Mr. Yeltsin is still at the helm. So why should one make extra effort?
It is commonly opined that Ms. Diachenko was "discovered" for political
activity by Boris Berezovsky who told her that with her help the opponents
of the then omnipotent Korzhakov-Soskovets grouping would be able to exert
a far stronger influence on Mr. Yeltsin. The results are obvious: Soskovets
and Korzhakov were ousted from the President's entourage, and Mr. Berezovsky
himself always emerged victorious in all the ensuing oligarchic wars and
clashes. Yet, I would not exaggerate his influence on Ms. Diachenko's political
destiny.
The strengthening of the presidential daughter's positions is first
of all connected with Yeltsin's own needs. The head of state approached
the presidential elections as a tired man who had to restrict his activity
due to grave illness, who was unable to perceive the whole range of information
necessary to run the state, but who still could and wanted to rule. Quite
possibly, Yeltsin himself was aware of becoming a man easy to manipulate
in the current situation and preferred that his closest en-tourage should
narrow to include only those people he could trust implicitly, that is,
his kith and kin and "those who joined them." The point is that Yeltsin
perhaps does not think about "those who joined," he does not care much
that somebody might in turn influence his daughter; the main thing is that
he receives information and advice from a person sincerely interested in
him. It is for this reason that no post-Korzhakov politician could wield
as much clout as did the once mighty presidential security chief - neither
Anatoly Chubais, nor Serhiy Kiriyenko, nor Boris Nemtsov, who enjoyed Mr.
Yeltsin's special affection in different periods of his political lifetime,
nor the eternally pro-Yeltsin Viktor Chernomyrdin - no one. In their turn,
the family's friends could occupy or lose high posts (Valentyn Yumashev's
case is the most obvious example): this did not diminish or increase their
clout.
The existence of Ms. Diachenko at the summit of this family pyramid
is quite natural. However, the ever-present contradiction between political
and purely family interests, plus the President's understandable trust
in his daughter, often lead to leapfrog decision making. This leads to
ill-conceived and illogical decisions and the predominance of social climbers
in the court of not Mr. Yeltsin but Ms. Diachenko (a grotesque character
like Roman Abramovich could never pop up next to Yeltsin). Another serious
problem, vividly described by the presidential daughter's favoritism, is
the inability to find a suitable successor to Mr. Yeltsin, for this is
the question of continuity not of a political course but of family interests.
It is for this reason that circles close to the Kremlin have been rife
lately with rumors that the role of successor might be bestowed on the
clearly unelectable, inarticulate, and uncharismatic first deputy premier
Nikolai AksСnenko: he is closer to the family and so looks more acceptable
than any other much stronger and more popular politician. The list of such
examples can be continued: they will stamp the last period in Yeltsin's
presidency as that of family, or, to be more exact, daughterly, favoritism.
INCIDENTALLY
The indefatigable and energetic Boris Berezovsky, after losing the post
of CIS Executive Secretary, continues to visit Kyiv regularly. His plans
clearly outstrip his banal interest in Ukrtelekom: according to well-informed
sources in the Presidential Administration, Mr. Berezovsky seriously intends
to implement in Ukraine a project tentatively called Operation Daughter-2.
At first sight, this is a disgrace for the state and Berezovsky himself:
for, in spite of his repeated expressions of deference to Ukraine and President
Kuchma personally, he took no pains to invent an entirely new plan but
simply tries to plant the already realized Russian scenario in Ukrainian
soil. In the same way, Mr. Kuchma's numerous support teams are painstakingly
(and rather stupidly) putting into practice in Ukraine the Russian election
scenario such that Mr. Kuchma will face only a radical Left opponent.
Berezovsky repeats himself.







