Now we will not talk about the economic aspect of the IMF loan and the government's ability to put it to good use. Now the more interesting question is: what will happen next?
There are a great many questions to be answered as the crisis develops. First, how will the IMF money be used? It is important to get an accurate answer to this question — is the money going to be spent on supporting the hryvnia (the NBU intervention, etc.) or on financing the budget deficit? If domestic government bonds are eventually rejected, how will the budget deficit be financed? Given the new realities, it is also necessary to clarify the volume of state obligations and their payment schedule.
All these questions require immediate answers, but it looks like they are not even being asked — and this is the main political constituent of the crisis. After the IMF decision was made, all political forces seem to have immediately calmed down and relaxed. In all likelihood, the issue of the government's responsibility will not be raised — the Cabinet has overwhelmed Parliament with anti-crisis bills, and over the next several months the question of the government's accountability will be answered in the same way: first adopt our proposals. If we add to this the 1999 budget procedure, which is likely to connect the IMF loan with the budget deficit (and, accordingly, everybody will be told that amending the government budget draft is a sure way to a crisis), we will see rather cloudless prospects for the existence of the current regime. And, finally, the crisis in Russia, contemporaneous with ours, is the best argument in favor of Kuchma and Co. Whatever they say about us having suffered less because we did nothing, these arguments will not reach the electorate tuned into TV and getting information from friends and relatives.






