By Viktor ZAMYATIN, The Day
Minister of Foreign Affairs Borys Tarasiuk turned fifty precisely on New
Year Day (our sincere greetings!). The President decorated the chief of
Ukrainian diplomacy with an order for his achievements.
Mr. Tarasiuk gave as Ukraine's greatest foreign-policy achievements:
improvement of relations with the European Union (EU member-states decided
at their latest summit to work out a Ukrainian strategy, something Kyiv
has long sought), forthcoming consultations about possible formation of
a Ukraine-EU free trade zone, progress in delimitation of the Ukrainian-Russian
land border (which Moscow resisted so long), launching of the so-called
Kharkiv initiative between Ukrainian enterprises and the USA (without any
concrete results for Ukraine visible thus far), and Ukraine's assertion
as a regional leader (which is more of an expectation). True, Mr. Tarasiuk
was quite to the point that, still, last year gave no reason to feel the
satisfaction we had the year before; Ukraine failed to either become an
EU associate member or be invited to the European Conference of EU full
and candidate members; still unresolved with Russia remains the problem
of the foreign property of the former Soviet Union.
We could also add the so-called Iranian contract - not so much for our
surrendering it (Ukraine is not a direct party to it) as the way it was
done, i.e., under the US pressure; and lack of progress in negotiations
with Romania on sharing the maritime economic zone and continental shelf
(diplomats maintain that Bucharest intends to refer the matter to the World
Court). Early last year a great deal was said about intentions of the US
Congress to cut federal aid to Ukraine because US business problems. Ukraine
never saw any qualitative increase in foreign investments, but, instead,
faced a problem with the European Union over the Ukrainian leadership's
immoderate love for Daewoo. There were reports from all over the world
on new anti-dumping court actions against Ukrainian producers - conversely,
nothing is being said now about Ukraine's early membership of the World
Trade Organization (WTO). Admission to WTO requires compliance with its
standards, which the authorities and their cronies are obviously incapable
of.
The victory on the Turkmenistan front in the shape of gas supplies seems
dubious, given the price the consumer will have to pay. There is no tangible
progress in the rivalry over the supply routes of Caspian oil.
A high-placed Ukrainian diplomat considers qualitative increase of contacts
with oft-cited Poland still puny in comparison with Russia's weight in
Ukrainian politics. He maintains that Ukraine may have to pay too high
a price for Russian State Duma's ratification of the Ukrainian-Russian
Treaty by losing its real gains in the Western direction.
What is visible in Ukraine's proclaimed strategic partnership with Russia
and the USA so far boils down to tremendous strategic dependence on Moscow
and Washington, while the "multidirectional" pendulum often swings toward
whomever spoke last to the President. The absence of a European lobby in
government is unlikely to speed up European integration. Ukraine's international
image has also been battered by the Lazarenko case, and in the eyes of
average Westerners this is much more important than all the state's gains
combined.
Perhaps it is impossible to have turned a former Soviet province into
an influential, if only regionally, state in seven years, although there
were some chances and efforts are being made. This may be exemplified by
the informal GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) group. But
the crux of the issue is that, clearly, for a state to stand firmly on
its own two feet on the international arena, for it to be reckoned with
by all - from the USA to a Nigerian tribal chief - each of its citizens
must feel like a human being. The current Ukrainian regime has proved that
this is beyond its capabilities.






