The Home Stretch
When the day after the elections in 2006 one asked Yulia Tymoshenko if she has already started talks with Yushchenko on coalition of BYuT and Our Ukraine, she said that she slept with the phone, waiting for the call. Today President Yanukovych sleeps with his phone under the pillow. It is time for Jose Barroso and Angela Merkel to call him and remind the EU offer. They shall send a reminder about Vilnius, the real support of International Monetary Fund, as well as the abolition of visas for Ukrainian citizens.
There is something in the psychology of the last moments in negotiations. There shouldn’t be an impression that only Vladimir Putin persuades. Ukrainian public opinion should get a signal that the EU does not abdicate, that it is fighting for the future of this important area of the continent. This emphasis is more important for the Union. The EU must show that it has political goals, that it is not a passive, clerical bulk, but can compete with others.
John Kerry understands this geopolitical competition. During his visit to Warsaw he clearly declared that Ukraine cannot be left alone in difficult times. Radoslaw Sikorski is right that the agreement can be signed a few months later – but we can do it also tomorrow, with the approval of the Member States. The document is prepared, translated and waiting for signatures.
But there is also a political practice: next year will bring elections in the EU. There will be new politicians responsible for the cooperation with Ukraine. Successor of Stefan Fuele can be much less favorable to the countries of the Eastern Partnership. Perhaps it will be a politician from the south of the continent, set on political activity in the Mediterranean. 2015 will be a year of presidential election in Ukraine – nobody will want to get involved in the internal situation in the country, and the signing of the Association Agreement can be interpreted this way. If we will not sign the agreement in Vilnius, the next opportunity will be in 2016. In today’s political environment this moment is distant and uncertain.
Yulia Tymoshenko shows class in her statements. She does not want Ukraine not to sign the AA. She does not give the authorities an excuse that she was the reason for not signing it. That’s why she accepts a compromise worked out by Cox and Kwasniewski. Tymoshenko gives part of her position not because she is afraid of further imprisonment, although not signing the Association Agreement will influence on her personal situation. She gives a signal to the West. The most important game is not negotiating with President Yanukovych and the question of who will be the winner of the political chess game – besides there is still a chance for everyone to proclaim the triumph. The most important are the aim and timing.
With her declarations Tymoshenko creates space for tactical concessions for the West and shows what is the most important strategic goal: the agreement, which establishes new rules both in relations with the EU and in Ukraine itself. And the time between signing and ratification gives additional two years to resolve the problems that remain.
I saw president Yanukovych twice last week. He was tired. Some of his problems are his own fault, but it does not change the fact that he has a difficult decision to make. On the one hand, pressure from the Kremlin – meetings with Vladimir Putin in Minsk, Sochi and Moscow were not easy. It is intresting that none of them took place in Ukraine. On the other hand distance of the European leaders in a crucial moment of the negotiations, despite the EU’s efforts in recent years and months. As if the EU does not understand that the Association Agreement is not a Christmas gift for the Party of Regions, but a real mechanism of modernization for millions of Europeans who live by Dnieper. Giving the European chance to Ukrainians is a moral obligation for everyone who consider himself as an European and has the mechanisms available to the European Union. By the way – if the contract will not be signed in Vilnius, historians will not understand why the EU capitulated on the home stretch, when it was all about the words and interpretations of the document lying on the table. Therefore, we need such activity as Solana’s actions during the Orange Revolution: sometimes one has to go somewhere once again, talk again, show opportunities one more time. However, instead of the effect of the Orange Revolution, we risk the 2008 casus. Partial findings of the NATO summit in Bucharest had a double effect: the Alliance undermined its reputation in the East and gave Russia next months for activity. If today the EU will make a decision in a similar vein and will play for postponement of signing the contract, it will mean well. But the Kremlin may interpret it as a permission for further persuasion. The only way to – at least a partial – rationalization of relations between Moscow and Kyiv is to sign the Association Agreement in Vilnius. Russia is a too serious country to not accept those facts.
Historians will not understand one more thing – why none of the Ukrainian president’s advisors did not get the idea that freedom for Yulia Tymoshenko could be his advantage. Showing that he can afford for such a gesture at a crucial moment in the history of the country could be his asset. Maybe he will do it? I do not know which EU leaders would prefer Yanukovych, Tymoshenko or Tihipko as a president. But I know that in politics there is no place for such sentiments and on home straight of the negotiations only result is important. Polish president calls Viktor Yanukovych from time to time and motivates him. President of Lithuania Dalia Grybauskaite is also active. If there is no one in Brussels or Berlin who is able to call Yanukovych, what kind of politicians are we and what EU do we want to build?
Article expresses personal views of the author
Newspaper output №:
№70, (2013)Section
Day After Day