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Where there is no law, but every man does what is right in his own eyes, there is the least of real liberty
Henry M. Robert

INTERACTION OF THE BRANCHES A long-term compromise or calm before the storm?

13 November, 2012 - 00:00

The confrontation between the Administration of President Leonid Kuchma and the former (thirteenth) Verkhovna Rada was a major negative factor of political life in our country for four years.

The whole point of the conflict was the fact that the Presidential Administration regularly promoted various ideas aimed mainly at augmenting presidential power (and consequently diminishing that of Parliament), simultaneously trying to reduce the President's responsibility to a minimum. Among such initiatives there were the bill on power and presidential draft of the new Constitution; the package of presidential edicts aimed at restructuring the system of executive power (of December 14, 1996 On the Structure of the Presidential Administration, On the Presidential Administration, On the Cabinet of Ministers), etc. A number of these actions bore an openly confrontational character (edicts on conducting a vote of confidence in state power (May 1995), referendum on the new Constitution (June 1996), the budget and tax crisis of 1997, numerous attempts to unseat Verkhovna Rada Speaker Oleksandr Moroz etc.).

Parliament in turn blocked the most radical attempts to change the existing balance of power, and in most cases managed through compromise to preserve the status-quo.

As a result of this never-ending sumo on the carpet of Pechersk Hill (which they euphemistically called “confrontation of the branches”), nominal political stability was preserved at the expense of the socioeconomic situation, which worsened drastically. Ukraine approached the very brink of financial and economic crisis.

The first two months of new Verkhovna Rada's activity were marked by the same confrontation between Parliament and the Presidential Administration, which ended in the President's complete rout: the Left majority, with certain reservations made, and being labeled Left-Center for the purpose, came to power in Parliament. The defeat of the presidential People's Democratic Party and Rukh, the forces most loyal to the President in Verkhovna Rada, managed to get only consolation prizes, witl the Communists and Hromada (which the Presidential Administration fears even more than the Communists) taking the key strategic committees. One can hardly call the results of the two-months Speaker’s saga sensational, as it merely confirms the results of the parliamentary elections. But what followed was quite unexpected.

As we know, the President and those around him used the parliamentary crisis to completely discredit the legislature. Leonid Kuchma himself repeatedly spoke of the “concealed dirty bargaining” in Verkhovna Rada and of the People’s Deputies’ inability to elect their Speaker as a “problem of national security.” Referring to the obstructionism of the previous Parliament and the current one’s inability to act, the President, in his address to the nation on June 18 declared the necessity of his signing the first set of “vital edicts” in the sphere of economic reforms. This decree-signing activity by the head of the state lasted even after the Speaker of Verkhovna Rada, his deputies, and committee chairs were elected. Politically we should note that a number of these presidential edicts violate the Constitution and laws of Ukraine. For example, tax law (and some of the edicts dealt with taxes) according to the Constitution is within the exclusive competence of Verkhovna Rada. And as to the Constitutional provision stipulating that the President is entitled to sign edicts on economic issues not regulated by the current legislation (paragraph 4, chapter 15), which was used by the head of the state as his argument, it does not apply because most of the decrees dealt with issues addressed in effective legislation.

It would seem that such gross violations of parliamentary prerogatives ought to have met resolute resistance from the Solons, but it did not. While there were numerous very resolute statements by Communist, Socialist, and Hromada People’s Deputies, they were never embodied in Verkhovna Rada decisions, and most of the presidential edicts met no opposition in Parliament.

The session ended peacefully, with deputies accepting for granted that some of the edicts de facto became enacted (due to the fact that thirty days provided by Constitution for their consideration are over), and the rest of them can be addressed after the vacations, during the next session in September (in the first ten days of September as newly-elected Speaker Tkachenko decisively put it).

It should be noted that the Speaker made much effort in order to postpone discussion of the most controversial edicts. Mr. Tkachenko’s position can be best described as a “demonstrative demonstration” of his outstretched hand to foster cooperation between the branches of power. Can one assume that all the battles between them have finally come to an end, and we have quite a new situation in political life of Ukraine – friendly and constructive cooperation between the President and Parliament aimed at getting the country out of crisis?

There are various expert estimates about the economic viability of the decrees signed. It is acknowledged that most of them (except a few populist ones) can have some positive effect. But there are a number of points, on which most of the experts agree between themselves.

First, it is widely believed that the main reason for signing the edicts was to meet the demands of international financial institutions, which are prerequisites for granting loans to Ukraine (first of all the EFF loan by the IMF).

Secondly, one can hardly expect any positive results from the edicts’ implementation being seen even next year, not to speak of the current one.

The decision on the EFF loan will be made in August. Thus, on the one hand, Parliament, leaving legislative support of the presidential decrees hanging in midair” gives the IMF a chance to help reform in our country, but on the other hand, it assumes no responsibility whatsoever. The statement by Oleksandr Tkachenko during his meeting with IMF mission officials on 27 July, that Parliament will try its best to bring Ukraine’s legislative framework into compliance with international standards, is to be treated the same way – as a demonstration of good will without any real guarantees being provided. There is no doubt that all representatives of the political elite are interested in getting the IMF loan for the country. The agro-industrial complex, which has been lobbied by the new Speaker for quite some time, is in the same, or even bigger need, of urgent loans, as other spheres of the economy. The question is not actually how far Mr. Tkachenko ready to go in cooperating with the executive or in demonstrating signs of good will; it is more about how long such cooperation can last, for the life of this Parliament, until the formal start of the presidential campaign, or will it end even earlier?

One of the most important political consequences of today’s “unity” of Mr. Tkachenko and the President might be the fact that such a unity questions the very principle, which since the beginning of 1995 was defined as the basic one in Leonid Kuchma’s presidential campaign, namely the scheme of “the reform-minded President and conservative Communist-dominated Parliament which is constantly blocking his efforts”. Look, what confrontation are we talking about when Verkhovna Rada quite loyally reacts to the President’s “reformist” actions?! For a massive campaign which is being prepared by the Kuchma team, the fact that Parliament canceled some of the stipulations in the government’s decree on establishing the Naftohaz Ukrainy (Oil & Gas of Ukraine) national joint-stock company, is not a crucial one. But, according to some political scientists, such a decision by Verkhovna Rada could substantially limit the financial possibilities of the current President election campaign.

The accumulation of negative results caused by the financial and economic activity of the government, according to some experts’ estimates, led to a situation where a financial crisis in Ukraine is inevitable. Ukraine’s commitments in domestic government bonds and interest payments of interest rate on foreign loans have reached such peaks that no new loans can radically change the situation. The fact that Ukraine’s credit rating has been steadily declining for the last several months is another indication of what people really believe our country’s capabilities to be. The IMF decision to provide a loan can postpone the crisis for only a short time.

Thus, when teams of potential candidates for the presidency draw up in battle formation, there will be a classic “revolutionary situation” in this country. And it looks that it will be then (and only then) necessary for Oleksandr Tkachenko to decide whether it is worth it for him to continue “constructive cooperation” or if it is better to blame President Kuchma who did not manage to use it to rescue the country.

 

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