Serhiy Parashyn
Volodymyr Bronnykov
Serhiy Parashyn’s dismissal as director of the Chornobyl nuclear power plant was an event transcending ministerial squabbles or political preferences. It was a clear case illustrating the legal, professional, and cultural degradation in Ukraine. Both Mr. Parashyn and Volodymyr Bronnykov, fired a year ago as director the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, were invited by The Day in an attempt to ascertain precisely how the legal and cultural crisis of our society could affect nuclear safety.
The Day: Did you expect that your letter to the President would result in your retirement?
Serhiy Parashyn: The crux of the matter is that a company was formed which is unable to operate, not at this stage. It is generating 45% of Ukraine’s electricity and has a staff of 50,000. Its enterprises are scattered across Ukraine, including 14 currently operating nuclear power units, and the containment at Chornobyl (locally known as the sarcophagus). All this is supposed to be managed from the head office in Kyiv, and the whole thing is supposed to be a single enterprise. Some of the administrative functions that cannot be normally discharged by the power stations are delegated to the central authority. For example, purchasing fuel ($350 million annually) must be done by a central company. In fact, the initial project stipulated this and provided for the stations to retain independent legal status. At present, these stations no longer exist as independent entities. Instead, there is one giant company, Enerhoatom. And the plant directors have already stopped being directors, albeit retaining the title, but they are really just straw-bosses of workshops or subdivisions. The administration is in Kyiv and the workshops strewn across Ukraine.
Volodymyr Bronnykov: I would like to stress that we are talking about an industry which is placed under rigid government control everywhere in the world. It is not a market one in the usual sense. Every nuclear power station must be an enterprise built and run in keeping with international standards. It has to operate under a special license, according to the Ukrainian law On Nuclear Regulation. Any new structure in this industry must be created in conformity with relevant national legislation and international law. In other words, merging or splitting nuclear generating companies is not as simple as it might appear.
The Day: The way things are now, who is to assume responsibility for nuclear safety?
S. P.: This is the main question. There are licensing rules, like getting a license to run a nuclear power station. Previously, every such station had to get this license independently. Now that they are stripped of their legal entity status, they can’t do this. A station can no longer make certain decisions, although it is still held responsible for their consequences. Can the company Enerhoatom receive a license? Theoretically, all this giant structure can be regulated, all the required documents can be collected, but in practice, I think it impossible.
The Day: How does Enerhoatom’s guiding role affect the performance of plant managers?
S. P.: I won’t speak for other managers. Suffice it to say that I’m the third to have been fired. All the others have been retired for different reasons. Personally, I see this as unqualified direct interference in the stations’ work. Take Chornobyl. I tried to run the station, and someone else was always second-guessing me. The personnel wondered whether I was boss or not. There are 250 persons holding executive posts in the new company and everyone wants to be boss. In my case, decisions started getting made over my head, and I couldn’t keep track of what was going on upstairs. My subordinates were confused and began asking questions. Preparing our message to the President, we hired lawyers to carry out an expert examination of Enerhoatom’s formation. Their findings showed that there were problems. Some could be solved and some require legislation. We had what I still believe was a constructive proposal. Let the company stay, and let the stations retain their legal entity status. The company would receive the license, and we would continue to work. However, the minister and his deputies did not want to make any decisions themselves.
The Day: And the answer to your letter was that you were fired?
S. P.: The document ordering my dismissal is remarkable for its utter legal nihilism. It refers to my “groundless accusations of transgressions of the nuclear laws” and “flagrant violations of labor discipline...” In other words, either the company management doesn’t know what it’s talking about, having never read a single law on nuclear regulation and still trying to run 14 nuclear power units, or they’re deceiving the President. I told the President they were violating the law and misleading public opinion. Here the issue of principle is that if the document ordering my dismissal was signed April 30, almost on the 12th anniversary of the Chornobyl disaster, and if the manager of that very station turns to the President and the latter fires him in response, the whole situation points to a disastrous condition in nuclear safety. If it’s really that bad, the logical thing would seem to close down all 14 power units lest the incompetent company leadership lay their hands on them.
The Day: Would you please comment on the President’s words that you ought to have been fired long ago, because you became so engrossed in the election campaign and because the money received for electricity was being spent for some other purposes, going into someone’s pocket?
S. P.: All I can say is I hope the President is misinformed. As for my participation in the election campaign, I did it because I am a citizen of Ukraine, and I acted in accordance with the law.
V. B.: At that time he was organizing the most difficult repair on Power Unit 3 and prepared it for startup. I am a professional, and you can take my word on it that no one could have done this phoning instructions. The President must have relied on information from people who hadn’t done a single repair in their life.
S. P.: This is another evidence that the President is misinformed. In my case the simplest reason for dismissal would have been too much downtime. But let me try to analyze the whole situation. I have always struggled for increased and effective demand for electricity, but we have always been forced to resort to markdowns and put up with all kinds of middlemen. The government decided that even the most liquid enterprises should have a 30% markdown. In our case this reduction was to be made up for by what was termed the station’s “economic activities.” Under Control and Audit Department regulations any inspector could throw the book at us for inflicting grievous material damage on the state. What was happening could only be described as organized nonpayment and the main result was that the stations were deeply in debt and still had to find the money to pay wages. The managers had no alternative but to work with middlemen. And the way out was easy: cut the electricity bills by that same 30% and make everyone pay. By lowering tariffs we would get our money and pay our debts.
The Day: And what would happen to the intermediaries?
V. B.: First they divided solvent industries among the stations metallurgy, chemicals, and so on. With the appearance of Enerhoatom all these highly liquid enterprises went to the national company which is using funds received from them to buy energy. Thus, the stations now have to somehow scrape up 15% to pay wages; they have to sell electricity to farmers in return for bad grain and then try to sell it. We can’t do this, because we weren’t trained to sell grain.
The Day: In whose interest is all this?
S. P.: The part of the electrical energy connected with fuel is given to company management. Then it tries to use it get some kind of turnover in order to receive fuel. I don’t know the exact figures. All I know is that it’s over $300 million a year. The rest is at the stations’ disposal, for the purposes mentioned. So far the company does not control all the electricity turnover. Obviously, a perfectly normal company.
The Day: Does this mean that Ukraine’s nuclear power industry has been infiltrated by the rackets and station managers are hostages in the struggle to act as middleman?
S. P.: I think there’s every indication that it is.
The Day: You were actually accused of theft. How do you respond?
S. P.: I wouldn’t even consider the idea of money going into someone’s pocket, since the Chornobyl station has not been generating for the past nine months.
The Day: And the far-reaching consequences of your dismissal, considering that your replacement will find himself in the same situation?
S. P.: Why take such risks ignoring basic nuclear safety rules? The only reason is super-profit. Here and now. How can one allow this in Ukraine after the Chornobyl disaster? The things that happening point to certain irreversible processes underway. They are evidence of serious failures by our country’s leadership.
The Day: Why should Volodymyr Horbulin refer to Nihmatulin’s appointment as very timely and very correct?
V. B.: He must have convinced Mr. Horbulin that he knows something about nuclear power engineering.
The Day: Will you sue the President for saying that you should have been fired long ago?
S. P.: I don’t want to now. I don’t want to drive him into a corner, for he could make an even bigger mess. I could sue the company for illegal dismissal, and this is an alternative. But I don’t need reinstatement now. The important thing is to show that basic principles of the nuclear power industry are being ignored. I am a professional and won’t put up with it. Putting up with this would mean betraying my professional ethics. At the time of the nuclear disaster I was secretary of the local Party cell. They asked me, “Why didn’t you do anything? Safety regulations were transgressed and this caused the catastrophe.” Of course, what happened then and what’s going on now aren’t comparable, but one thing they have in common is nihilism. At the time they breached the power unit’s operating procedures and in a way that’s what they’re doing now, except that now we’re talking about 15 power units. Sounds like science fiction. Hard to believe, let alone comprehend.
The Day: We have on more than one occasion heard about Chornobyl’s “special status.” What is it all about?
S. P.: This special status means that the West has decided to close it down, and Ukraine is throwing a monkey wrench in the works. For example, EBRD echoed the concern of bankers from various countries visiting Kyiv and suggests that the Prime Minister postpone the power unit’s startup. Here one can choose between two potions. First, of course, is a gesture if goodwill. You are asked a favor. Why not? But this would mean admitting that the station is dangerous. Starting it up means that the government is convinced that the station is safe and sound. So we put off startup. What does this mean? We care little for the people living near the station, but we respect the wishes of our guests. When I informed the personnel April 26 everyone was amazed. This is what we call politicking.
V. B.: They accuse Mr. Parashyn of opposing the station’s closure. He is all for closing it but in a civilized manner. In our parlance we call it removal from service. This is much more complex than just driving in the rods, stopping the reaction and generation.
The Day: Are there any plans for international nuclear waste burials in the zone?
S. P.: No. There will be temporary burials only and no waste from abroad is expected. Here we will deposit only reactor waste and disaster debris. These burials are meant for 50-100 years.
The Day: 50-100 years. Quite some perspective. What about now?
S. P.: The tragedy of nuclear power engineering is that it seems to live in the present only, thinking a week ahead at best. A station manager wracks his brain about how to pay his people their wages. All this results in distorted ideas of tasks and objectives.
Worst of all, there are no guidelines to overcome the disaster’s consequences, not even at the parliamentary level. The main thing about Chornobyl is generally considered its aftereffects. Among the biggest problems is where to get the money to pay those crippled by the disaster. The main conclusion? Learning to live in these conditions, relying on no one’s help. People resettling in the restricted area without authorization seem to have realized that living by the rules is possible and even preferable. That’s one conclusion I have personally arrived at in the tragedy’s aftermath. Another obvious conclusion is to make every effort to prevent its repetition.








