This spring was rich in political events, particularly the miners’ strike and hunger march to Kyiv.
It so happened that this author was directly involved in solving a number of social and political problems resulting from miner strikes in 1989 and 1993.
Comparing past and present events and assessing them politically is anything but easy, because people tend to change with the times, including those working in mine pits and those sitting in plush offices. In this case, I think it worthwhile to analyze what is happening from three main standpoints: the authorities and the miners; miners and the authorities, and the miners and political process.
The first mine strikes took the Soviet authorities completely unawares. How could this be possible with the propaganda machine glorifying the Soviet coal miner as the principal builder of communist paradise and the Party relying on them as its main ally?
Not many know about Joseph Stalin’s inscription on Beria’s memorandum: “Leave the miners alone; they are the cornerstone of the Soviet state.” Or about a personal communication addressed to Zhdanov: “The country needs coal. Our miners work in hazardous conditions. Each miner must be made aware of his personal exploits each time he is brought down the pit, and that the Motherland and Party know and will always remember this. The miners’ labor must be glorified at all costs.”
At a time when national policy was aimed at mass arrests and executions, a certain category of the working masses had to be extolled, not intimidated. It was no coincidence that Soviet citizens fearing purges left everything and signed up as coal miners. One-third of the Donbas miners were people from Western Ukraine. Soviet propaganda followed Stalin’s command and every miner was made to feel a very special citizen. Later this somewhat exaggerated sense of pre-eminence was aptly used by the “democrats” turning coal miners from nationwide heroes into principal rebels.
What, then, was the Soviet rulers’ strategy when first surprised by miners’ strikes? Making certain bureaucrats personally responsible for satisfying their demands, relying on years of organizing experience, carrying out orders sent down from Moscow, and on tremendous material resources made instantly available. It is true that most of the miners’ demands were met, but their campaigns opened the floodgate of social unrest and opposition to the regime which showed themselves years later. It is safe to assume that the Soviet miners were the first to deal a heavy blow to the monolith of Soviet power and the Communist Party regime, causing cracks to run down the walls of the forbidding structure. No matter what our dissident Ukrainian politicians and men of letters say now, there is no way to deny the fact that their actions of protest were minor compared to what our coal miners did.
The second wave of the Ukrainian miners’ tsunami was breasted by Leonid Kravchuk’s team. It came very heavily, miners would overturn cars and street merchant stands, physically assaulting their owners, blocking highways. The situation was fraught with serious political consequences. It was then that Yevhen Zviahilsky stepped in. He made lower-level bureaucrats act promptly and more or less efficiently (perhaps remembering their recent Soviet experiences, fearing retribution), the more so that he still had considerable financial resources (much less, compared to the Soviet period, of course, when Moscow would order supplies from all over one-sixth of the globe). This and Mr. Zviahilsky’s personally effective handling extinguished the fire at an early stage, although the outburst would have its negative effect on Kravchuk’s next campaign. A number of political analysts note that today’s miner strikes constitute a situation considerably more dangerous than ever before, mainly because its consequences are hard to predict.
Attitudes favoring strikes have been nurturing for almost a year and then the strikes assumed a permanent character. How did the authorities respond? Very calmly, unlike the previous two occasions, although one finds it hard to determine where this calmness comes from. Were they absolutely confident of keeping the situation under control? Did they realize the impossibility of meeting most of the strikers’ demands? Did some dullards in the Administration think they have worked it out right and now are raking their brains about what is actually happening?
There could be various answers to any of these questions, but the striking miners have done something that will bring forth sociopolitical effects and one can only reckon with them. Personally, I consider that those in power must have missed the time when the miners’ mood changed.
It so happened that these people, used to being in the “front ranks of building a shining communist future” suddenly found themselves plain ordinary lumpen, realizing that their toil was just another burden on the shrinking national budget.
Would they put up with this dramatic turn in their destiny? My answer is resolutely in the negative. They were frustrated. Now they are burning with revenge. One of them, a former “Meritorious Miner of the USSR,” told me: “No one has been able to bring the Donbas to its knees. No one ever will!”
Those in power do not seem to comprehend that the miners’ hunger march to Kyiv is like a political explosive: people on the march are not simply strikers. They see themselves as folk heroes, called upon to defend for all the downtrodden. They have partaken of the long-forgotten fruit of publicity; they are in the limelight and they enjoy the cheering masses.
In this context one must note the emergence of a political force determined to play a “historic role” in Ukraine, especially now that the next presidential campaign approaches. The last parliamentary elections served as conclusive evidence that there is a certain strong opposition to the existing regime, composed of the Left as well as part of the reformists. Yet, considered as a whole, this position is that same political elite.
By contrast, the appearance of the striking miners in the political arena is a socialist force opposed to this regime, meaning tangible changes in the alignment of forces, symbolizing a truly popular opposition. Now everything depends on its leadership and strategy.
Before long one ought to expect pitched battles between different political forces trying to get this opposition movement under control, or come to terms with it if unable to head it. A very complicated task, because the striking movement is acquiring a new character, meaning changes in leadership, with young extremists taking the lead. The latter are known to be hard to negotiate any deals with.
Another aspect is that the current regime is obviously unable to satisfy the miners’ economic demands, simply because the national purse is empty.
The hunger marchers, after walking hundreds of kilometers, will not return from Kyiv empty-handed. Naturally, they will make political claims, primarily the Cabinet’s retirement (which idea is being supported by numerous political forces). This is, of course, evidence of a new lap in the political race, including the presidential one.
Photo by Leonid Bakka , The Day:
Yesterday they set out, and today they see and feel the capital







