The policy of revenge and punishment

Head of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) in London, consultant to NATO on Ukraine, James SHERR is well known both in Ukraine and in the expert circles worldwide. Hopefully, the Ukrainian parliament, government, and their advisors will pay enough attention to the opinion of the British expert.

Mr.Sherr, considering latest event: USA intention to push reset button on relation with Russia, Sarkozy’s and Merkel’s statements in Munich about need of engagement with Russia, talk about Europeanization of NATO — from one side; and, from the other, the Ukraine-Russian gas conflict and the creation by Russia Rapid Forces of ODKB (CSTO): does not all this mean that Ukraine will be left in a grey zone?

“Ukrainians have been asking this question for almost twenty years. There are obvious reasons for asking it now, but the future is still wide open. Yes, the Obama administration wants, as Biden said, to ‘press the reset button’ on relations with Russia and explore important areas of cooperation. And they are absolutely right. But they have been equally emphatic that they will not accept new spheres of influence in Europe. The Secretary General of NATO has more then once confirmed the Bucharest formula since the Russo-Georgia conflict took place. The United Kingdom has also done so, as have a number of other allies. Anyone knows that there are allies who take a different view, but this was true even before the Bucharest summit. In my view, the key factor that will decide Ukraine’s future is Ukraine itself. It will be decided not by what Ukraine wishes, but by what it does or doesn’t do. I see no risk that Ukraine will be abandoned. But there is every risk that it will be sidelined because of the harm it is doing to itself and the imperviousness of its leadership to warnings or help.”

But has the creation by Russia of ODKB Rapid Deployment Forces and might the decision to remove the US airbase from Manas influence the aim of Scheffer and Obama to fundamentally strengthen the relationship between Russia and the West?

“The Russian leadership knows that the Obama administration has begun the process of formulating its policies towards Russia and its neighbours, particularly Ukraine and Georgia, in concrete terms. Naturally, it wants to influence these discussions. Moscow knows perfectly well that some are urging the new administration to adopt a neo-Realist approach: to seek a grand bargain with Russia and, in exchange, shelve plans for future NATO enlargement and tacitly concede Russia’s right to some form of ‘privileged’ interest in Ukraine, Moldova and South Caucasus. Others in the administration adamantly reject this approach. But on both sides of this argument, people will be influenced by what Ukraine is doing to help itself.

“My suspicion is that the decision about the base in Kyrgistan is a way of influencing this discussion: a way of reminding Washington that in Afghanistan Russia can be helpful or cause trouble. The withdrawal of these basing privileges has been under discussion for years. But the base is still there. The decision to close it — which is not the same as closing it — looks like a ‘bargaining chip’. Incidentally, the threat to deploy Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad when Bush was in power (which never made the slightest sense in military terms) was similar. It was designed to raise the temperature, to extract a concrete concession merely by making a threat. Now that Obama is determined to lower the temperature, the threat, in all its emptiness, has been withdrawn, and Russia’s gesture will become a further argument for those who are against deploying US missile defences in Central Europe.

“But the issue of strengthening the military component of ODKB and, in particular, establishing Rapid Deployment Forces has a different strategic purpose. Russia can no longer take for granted its monopsomy, тits buyer’s monopoly, of gas from Central Asia. This is less because there is a real risk that the West will succeed in building pipelines across the Caspian than because of the enormous demands of Chinese and Indian markets and Japan’s as well. And although China is vastly more prudent than Russia, it is even more methodical, and it is clearly expanding its influence in Central Asia. Moscow knows that the main concern for Central Asian regimes remains internal security. By building up the rapid reaction components of ODKB, Russia is underscoring the role it plays in providing internal security and reminding the local players that it can damage their security if its interests are not taken into account.”

Does it mean that all the energy resources of this region would be under Russian control?

“Who can say? But that’s what Russia wants, and they are finding this more difficult. I suspect that Russia will take all necessary steps to maintain the influence that they have enjoyed so far.”

Continuing on the energy topic, do you think that Europe learnt the right lessons from recent gas conflict?

“It’s too early to say. But the EU’s behaviour in this crisis doesn’t suggest that it learnt the lessons of the last one (in 2006).. At that time the EU supported Ukraine. That support pulled Russia back from the brink. By describing the recent crisis as a ‘commercial dispute’ and a ‘bilateral issue’, the Czech EU presidency did some real harm. First, they either misunderstood or chose to misunderstand its character. However such disputes begin, the notion that the parties can disentangle economics, politics and geopolitics is fanciful. Second, by taking this line, the EU for several critical days wrote itself out of the script. Third, this gave a green light to Moscow to do its worst, and that is exactly what happened. The terms of reference swiftly spread from prices and contracts to wider strategic aims: the discreditation of Ukraine as a transit country and the removal of Ukraine’s gas transit system from Ukrainian hands. Of course nobody in Russia would be so clumsy as to try to assume direct control of this system, and no one there has the financial means to run it. But what has now become feasible is a European consortium on Russia’s terms and with Russia’s participation. Such an arrangement could make it impossible for Ukraine to do in future what it so successfully did in January: reverse the flow of the pipeline to supply its own gas to its own customers – in other words, decouple the system from Russia’s. God is in the details! There is a world of difference between joint management of the pipeline by Gazprom and its favoured partners in Europe and the Europeanisation of Ukraine’s gas transit system on a basis that brings Ukraine closer to Europe. Equally, there is a world of difference between opening the energy sector to assistance — and Ukraine’s energy resources to exploitation — by Western governments and investors and ‘privatization’ by ‘insiders’ and shadow structures. The latter would only be a continuation of the malign status quo, which benefits small numbers of people at the expense of the country. The fruit of this malign status quo is a grotesquely opaque, wasteful and unaffordable energy system and extreme dependency on outside resources and failure to develop Ukraine’s resources.

“Ukraine has not helped itself in the latest crisis. Russia communicated its position with energy, self-confidence — and with guile, because its narrative made use of the truth in order to conceal it. Ukraine’s communicated the truth belatedly and by whispers. So as in the Georgian conflict, the Russians knew what they wanted, they knew how to get it, and the other key parties, Ukraine and the EU, found themselves way beyond the curve. But Russia also nearly wrecked its own game when it cut the supply of gas to Europe on 6 January. Just as over Georgia, at a key point in the crisis, emotions took over, and a careful, calculated policy became an exercise in vengefulness and punishment. So by the end, the Russians not only damaged Ukraine’s reputation but their own. Yet why should Moscow care so long as Europe is frightened enough to do what it wants?”

Does this mean that Europe lacks strong leadership and the problem remains, as Kissinger said, that there is no one in Europe to call?

“Where energy policy is concerned, there is still no ‘Europe’. There are EU policy documents and national policies. Some national governments believe there is no problem caused by partnership with Russia that will not be cured by deeper partnership with Russia. But the more serious issue is the absence of people who are prepared to engage with the political dimension of the energy problems we face. And this is even true of some in the ‘new Europe’, i.e., the latest members of the EU. Some of their officials have become so assimilated into the ‘old Europe’ and so intent on assimilation that they have shut the door to their history behind them. The ‘European process’ has created a whole new generation of technocratic officials and administrators who no longer care about anything but economics and business. Many of them have forgotten or wish to forget what relationships east of the Prut are like. And many have also adopted the Maginot line psychology: the belief that ‘Europe’ can insulate itself from non-member states that still suffer from the legacies and burdens which they like to believe they have overcome. Any ordinary intelligent person would see the futility of separating the Russia-Ukraine-Europe energy relationship from the Russia-Ukraine relationship. But this, as a matter of principle, is what many inside the EU tried to do.”

Many in Ukraine believe they have a role to play in the European security and defense structure. This point of view was expressed by Timoshenko in her speech in Munich. Mr.Sherr in your opinion does it make sense for Ukrainian to believe in a structure which does not yet exist?

“It does exist. Look at the role that EU forces now play in Macedonia and Bosnia. Of course, it has a long way to go. Of course, it has not replaced NATO, but that is not its intention.

“The Prime Minister’s comments at Munich were praiseworthy, but they were also far from reality. The reality is that Ukraine’s image and reputation are damaged across Europe. Deeply. Many European governments and millions of ordinary people blame Ukraine for the fact that homes went unheated in winter. They don’t blame Ukraine for poor communication, but for incompetence, chicanery and stealing gas. Their perceptions might be wrong, even fundamentally wrong, but they are a political fact. Ukraine’s most urgent task must be to restore its own credibility: credibility as a partner that can be entrusted with supplying Europe with 40 per cent of the gas that it consumes.

“Ukraine won’t do this until it starts to put its own house in order: first by preventing political divisions from wrecking the country’s national interests and international relationships; second, by modernising the energy sector and confronting the interests of those who obstruct its modernisation; third, by being absolutely honest and professional in explaining the problems it has to face.; and fourth, by creating the conditions that give others an incentive to help. The energy crisis provided the clearest possible demonstration that the country’s political and administrative structures do not work properly. Bureaucracies are sclerotic. Information is kept from people who need it. Responsibility is evaded, initiative is punished. You need to be a detective to know what is decided and by whom. A modern country cannot be run this way. Whatever its deficiencies, the EU is a modern place. If Ukraine wishes to join it or simply be respected by it, it has to change.”

“So this lack also concerns professionalism about European security and defense structure and policy?

“Participation in Europe’s security and defence will not substitute for internal change. Good policy simply cannot be implemented by bad institutions. In the absence of effective institutions, policies are no more than words and phrases. The EU will respond with words and phrases. So will NATO. If Ukraine wants Barrosso or Scheffer to do something rather than just say something, then Ukraine has to do something. And there is no more time to waste.”