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Where there is no law, but every man does what is right in his own eyes, there is the least of real liberty
Henry M. Robert

At the Start of the Presidential Marathon

13 November, 2012 - 00:00

The two-month organizational-administrative marathon is over in Parliament, which has also completed the first round of preparations for the presidential elections scheduled for next October. The Speaker's saga proved to have engaged practically all the politicians who in some measure or other who made their intention to run for presidency clear as well as those considered more or less realistic potential contenders. They are all now at the starting line from which they will set off on a race seeking the country's highest political trophy. Obviously, here each contender's position with regard to all the others will have a major impact on the campaign's outcome.

It is common knowledge that President Kuchma's resolve to prevent the Socialist Oleksandr Moroz from getting reelected as Speaker was one of the main factos determining the jerky course of the Speaker's election saga, the more so that Comrade Moroz is viewed by many as the most probable presidential candidate to unite the Left. In this sense Oleksandr Tkachenko getting the Speaker's seat can be regarded as the Presidential Administration's victory with many reservations. Oleksandr Moroz wanted to be reelected but was not, meaning that he lost a number of advantages, among them his constant presence on the air during the regular broadcasts and telecasts of legislative sessions, his name being constantly mentioned in media reports (mainly in the TV news). Most importantly, he is no longer in direct control over the parliamentary bureaucracy, and the latter provided a broad range of institutional possibilities. At the same time, he remains a key political figure in his firm position as leader of the Left and the embodiment of their victory at the parliamentary elections. In this capacity he is still to be viewed as a major presidential contender on the Left. His current post as head of the parliamentary agrarian policy and land relations committee does not look very promising as a presidential marathon starting point, but only outwardly, because it could well turn the link uniting the Socialists and the Agrarians, enhancing their traditional ties or renewing them if one were to believe the rumors about a Moroz-Tkachenko conflict.

Considering that relations between the former and current Speaker are exceptionally significant in light of the coming presidential campaign, this topic deserves separate note. Until very recently one of the axioms of Ukrainian politics read that Oleksandr Tkachenko would provide reliable support for any important initiative shown by Oleksandr Moroz. However, Moroz's ambivalent stand in the first round of the Speaker elections (June 18, with 148 ayes) could seriously damage their partnership. Alas, petty betrayals in Ukrainian politics have long become a matter of course and here Oleksandr Tkachenko is regarded as a rare exception from the rule; his response to every such treacherous act is very hazardous to one's health. The reader should be reminded of his inveterate stand against Leonid Kravchuk after his sudden forced retirement as Minister of Agriculture in 1992. On the other hand, the new Speaker's attitude to the next presidential campaign is impossible to predict. Mr. Tkachenko's current position opens a broad range of opportunities in terms of influencing the situation, so much so that expecting him to have made his choice would be tantamount to considering him prone to rash decisions. Most likely, the new Speaker will first watch the election process closely and will, of course, have the presence of mind not to get involved with any of the presidential contenders at this stage.

Another problem facing the Left in terms of the future campaign is the Progressive Socialists' independent position. Natalia Vitrenko has long announced her intention to vie in the 1999 elections. Considering her aggressive disposition and popularity with the executive (meaning that she will have few if any problems getting air time and print space), Ms. Vitrenko may well become a thorn in the side of any traditionally Leftist (e.g., CPU, SPU or Agrarian) candidate, Petro Symonenko and Oleksandr Moroz included. However, at the early stage of presidential campaign the Progressive Socialist leader made what I personally consider a very bad mistake, refusing to head the social policy and labor committee. She said she did not want to supervise a "low-profile" committee (she found the economic policy committee more attractive), thus being able to proudly dissociate herself from the parliamentary leadership. This looked like a very impressive tactical maneuver at first, but strategically it was a fallback, of course. The committee's social orientation would provide propaganda and self-advertisement opportunities far wider than its stated social range, let alone direct impact on efforts to change Ukrainian social policy, something this country needs so badly.

As a result, the social policy and labor committee was headed by another, Yevhen Marchuk, the SDPU(u) leader who also let it known that he will vie in the presidential campaign. For an ex-chief of the secret police heading the national security and defense committee would perhaps look more in character, but the current disastrous socioeconomic situation makes the social committee a body of major importance (plus the attendant opportunities mentioned above). Also, one has to bear in mind that the United Social Democrats exerted a commendable effort in the latest election campaign, which makes this party quite eligible in this domain.

Hromada leader Pavlo Lazarenko remains the proverbial dark horse in the presidential race. He is still to fulfill his promise to reveal his plans with regard to October 1999 (which he said he would do as soon as the parliamentary vote returns had been summed up). It is quite possible that Mr. Lazarenko is content with his affiliates heading a number of key committees (including those responsible for the budget and combating organized crime). It is also possible, however, that he had to make adjustments in his plans in light of the Speaker's election, because Mr. Tkachenko's appointment meant an end to Mr. Lazarenko's long mulled-over idea of cardinal changes in the Constitution in the habitual Speaker Moroz – Premier Lazarenko vein.

The key position on the presidential starting line is, of course, occupied by President Leonid Kuchma. Despite all shortcomings, his team has a number of attainments to its name, primarily by weakening Oleksandr Moroz's position as his No. 1 adversary. As for Mr. Kuchma's prospects, they are anything but cloudless. Of course, he is more in the limelight than any other Ukrainian politician, but it hard to judge whether this publicity works for or against him under the circumstances. The NDP, his party of power, suffered a devastating fiasco in the past elections. The Right Center coalition fell apart in Parliament. All this testifies that the executive is steadily losing control over political processes in Ukraine, literally with each passing day. The presidential campaign that will be held for a year against the sinister backdrop of the increasing economic and sociopolitical crisis can hardly be described as good advertising. In the end much will depend on the recently proclaimed "next round of reforms" – and not on the results stated by the President in his carefully edited speeches, but on those actually felt by the Ukrainian electorate.

Photo by Valery Miloserdov:

President Kuchma expects that in the 1999 campaign he will be able portray himself as a reformer facing a leftist opponent. Maybe so, even without Kuchma's taking part

 

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