The end of the new Parliament's first session gave ground for numerous comments and forecasts. The Current situation is as follows – a Speaker has been elected, Parliament is adjusting, the fractions are learning how to work both “inside” and “outside” of the strict party framework, and the party-fraction principal has demonstrated certain advantages (taking into account the number of decisions made during the Speaker's election).
For those interested in political intrigues is important to realize that the Speaker shows loyalty to the executive which, in turn, pays in the same coin. The government has a “historical chance” to find a common language with Verkhovna Rada, said the President at last Friday's Cabinet meeting. Officials not able to do so will be dismissed, the Prime Minister added. But this honeymoon will not last long, analysts believe. The Speaker is not the Parliament's chief and cannot always guarantee its loyalty. They think the 1999 budget may become the first stumbling-block for the authorities. At any rate, the session's main result is that it has outlined the starting position, providing a basis for prognoses covering various time spans.
The first obvious conclusion is that despite the fractions' party membership the main watershed in Parliament is not so much ideology as their attitude toward the executive or, more precisely, the President. There are plenty of examples here, starting with a Speaker called by his fraction colleague Oleksandr Moroz “a nonpolitical figure” and “party non-engaged” (in spite of having a Peasant Party membership card in his pocket).
Or just take, for example, the temporary alliance of four fractions which called themselves Right-Centrist before the Speaker was elected and with some becoming Left-Centrists afterward. But the most evident example is a presence of five social-democratic fractions out of the total eight in Parliament. And these five differ not so much in their views as in their background, that of their leaders, and, once again, their attitude toward the President. Hence, despite the seemingly non-ideological orientation of the Verkhovna Rada, it does have a general line which can be drawn much closer to the Left. However, this “line” will act not on its own but depending on the current relationship between the two branches: ideology will not as much influence fractions' conduct as will political moments which can be adjusted to ideology.
The government seems to have found a common language with Parliament: it floods the latter with bills. Vyacheslav Chornovil even thinks this is a diversion (according to Interfax-Ukraine) substantiating this view with the fact of receiving tens bills a day from the government. From now on, Verkhovna Rada will be guilty of not having time to deliberate them on time. Such a practice is likely to last as long as it is inconvenient for Parliament as a whole but convenient for every single fraction or group because it would be possible for them to launch numerous political auctions on this basis. This becomes especially clear if one recalls that, on the one hand, the government does not have its own fraction in Parliament (the NDP for many reasons cannot be considered as such), and, on the other hand, a single government policy and general line simply does not exist. Thus, the results of deliberation of the overwhelming bills' majority are hardly predictable because there will be many more participants in the political horse-trading than could have seemed at first sight.
Today we already can speak tentatively of some changes that are likely to happen this fall in Verkhovna Rada. First of all, two groups - of entrepreneurs and independents, who will work within a common ideological Left-Center framework but in political one will adhere to armed neutrality toward the President - can be formed as a result of the structuring in Parliament. Probably, the Progressive Socialists Party fraction will break up, but this is unlikely to have serious consequences either politically or ideologically. By fall, Oleksandr Moroz believes, a Peasant Party fraction will also take shape, and the Presidential Administration will do its best to make this happen. Although the former Speaker thinks this will not hamper the Socialist and Peasant Parties' further cooperation, with the joint faction split the Peasants could reap political dividends from neutrality toward the President. And this is exactly what the Administration needs.
In fact, the main Administration task is to defend Kuchma from having to face a more or less strong competitor in the 1999 election. It is clear that this task is closely bound up with how the executive works with Parliament so as to preclude the unification of all Kuchma's opponents. In this regard Moroz made a remarkable statement having said that he supports establishing a Left-Centrist force include socialists, peasants, SDPU(u), Hromada, and the Greens in the Parliament while also bringing in the SDPU, Party of Justice, and Labor Party outside it. Such a composition is unlikely ever to arise, but even if it someday did it is unlikely to name a joint candidate. However, the issue is otherwise. Oleksandr Moroz said an interesting thing: the Administration can agree to introduce some changes in the Constitution should a real challenger to Kuchma arise, meaning changes toward the parliamentary model with government being appointed by Parliament.
Having launched this thesis into the political beau monde, Oleksandr Moroz himself hardly suspects that he has laid a time bomb. Indeed, as of today the Socialists, Communists, and Hromada support a parliamentary republic. Should they be jointed by some pro-presidential forces the issue would be settled. And then the presidential candidates would be taken hostages – regardless of when such changes are adopted (they will go into effect one year after being voted for) they will change the situation dramatically – it is one thing is to be a real President and another thing is to be a nominal one. Oleksandr Moroz told whom he thinks may be real candidates: Symonenko (will be proposed by the CPU Congress in December), Vitrenko, and Marchuk. Lazarenko will not run because it will be difficult for him “to rid himself of accusations.” Moroz did not list himself among the candidates. One may think Moroz in this way warned all those interested that the Socialists and Hromada not to play presidential games but at the same time all others should be aware of the fact that there may be some obstacles on their way to the presidential chair. This is quite a serious statement. Presumably, the constitutional-interparty intrigue will be the main political ingredient in the nearest future and it may continue on the eve of the presidential election.
Photo by Valery Miloserdov, The Day:
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