Ukraine and European Security: First Change for the Better?

Some years ago the issue of how to get out of the gray security zone was discussed in Ukraine. That is, how to get rid us of our vagueness and not turn into a banal buffer between the West and Russia. Since then something has happened in the world. Ukraine has gotten a charter with NATO which is readily cited by representatives of the West, but which actually does not commit anybody to anything. The West now demonstrates solidarity bombing objects in Yugoslavia and now provides grounds for doubts about this very solidarity (the European Defense Initiative). Moscow behaved not quite comprehensibly, at first cutting its links with NATO and then stating it did not exclude possibility of entering the alliance. And only Ukraine remained in the role of spectator.

Until now it looked like the European Defense Initiative, sired by France and Britain, is understood differently by its parents. And on the whole it is meant for domestic use in West Europe regardless of whether it is to become an appendage to NATO or to develop into something independent. One can here recall that there are countries in Europe that belong to the European Union, but do not belong to NATO and vice versa, and also there are some that do not belong to either of these structures. And if Ukraine is to join them, this will happen not very soon. One can recall that until now all speculations about Ukraine’s possible participation in forming an all-European defense structure were restricted to banal and formal ascertaining of its importance and its success in peacekeeping operations.

This is why, indeed, the results of a meeting between Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Anatoly Zlenko and senior representative of the EU on matters of foreign policy and safety Javier Solana, after which it was declared that Ukraine may become associated into European policy of safety and defense, may be seen as encouraging. Our gray zone notwithstanding, the very fundamental principles seem to be changing little by little. At any case, nobody is openly pushing aside the thesis of Defense Minister Oleksandr Kuzmuk that Ukraine could take part in creating a European rapid reaction corps. The question about relations with NATO, about subordination, would be something quite different. However, should the answer to this question be positive, one would have to settle the financial issue about maintaining Ukraine’s contingent, but only after the approval of a political decision of principle concerning whether Ukraine still remains in Europe and can be admitted to some aspects of European policy. In case this policy is European in reality. The fact that this issue is to be discussed during Solana’s visit to Kyiv is not a bad sign. Especially against the background of Ukraine’s situation not improving much during last year, and that the image of the country seems to have a long way to go before even becoming only neutral. At the same time, it is also too early to rejoice, for the resolution is far from being approved, and even in case this intention becomes reality, this will be just one more small step onward. It will merely mean that the West for Ukraine is not limited with Washington, the IMF, and NATO, and that for the West not only Russia exists to the East. For the simple reason that after that the talks about a gray zone might become a bit less relevant, and the talks about the meaning of Ukraine might just finally become a fact. And in addition, Ukraine will at last obtain its first incentive for its real integration into Europe. Simultaneously, one need not forget about the sad fate of our An-70 airplane.