The Aquarium was the nickname of the old military intelligence building in Moscow. On September 7, 1992, President Leonid Kravchuk signed an edict setting up the Strategic Military Intelligence Department at the Defense Ministry of Ukraine. A year later it was reorganized: Defense Ministry intelligence strategists and experts from the intelligence department of the General Staff were united into the Chief Military Intelligence Department.
Today, CMID is expected to supply the needs of both the Defense Ministry and the General Staff. When GS was headed by Anatoly Lopata and DM by the civilian Valery Shmarov, word had it that the General Staff wanted to enhance control over military intelligence. As a result, the secret service could finally be oriented toward the military sphere. In simple words, every spy would be ordered to count enemy tanks and missiles. On the other hand, armaments or troop deployments meant specific military-political or military-economic approaches on the part of certain countries, so the Defense Ministry’s military intelligence, and the Ukrainian leadership had to consider everything at greater length and depth, processing firsthand information, analyzing every step and its consequences, leaving the General Staff relatively in the background.
Under the circumstances some considered it best to return to the old pattern when the Defense Ministry and General Staff each had their own intelligence services. However, that pattern had its shortcomings. As it is, military intelligence is controlled according to a document delimiting the Defense Ministry’s and General Staff’s authority. The General Staff is responsible for assigning tasks to its subordinate staffs, keeping them supplied with intelligence, and assessing other countries’ armed forces. The Defense Ministry, in turn, determines military intelligence priorities and oversees their implementation.
Most of this has already been done for Defense and its Minister, since there is a special President-approved intelligence program. Since last year, there has been a separate budget expense item meant for the Defense Ministry, Border Guards, and the Interior Ministry’s criminal investigation department, as well as for the central authority coordinating their efforts (SBU is the only exception, persisting in its opposition to this scheme). CMID officials claim they never have pay arrears. Considering the overall financial situation in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, this is evidence of CMID’s elite status, and that its performance must be kept at a level making up for manpower reductions and other numerous problems haunting the military.
After General Ihor Smeshko replaced Oleksandr Skipalsky as head of military intelligence last year, the DM intelligence people felt sure that the political leadership would from now on place special emphasis on the military special service. The newly appointed general also headed the President’s Intelligence Committee (formed in 1993). As such, he was responsible for coordinating the efforts of all the special services, lest they cross each other’s path. But then there was a major personnel cleanup at SBU, somewhat altering the military’s plans. Today, the Committee is headed by ex-SBU Chief Volodymyr Radchenko, with Ihor Smeshko his second-in-command. However, these replacements are an echo of basic transformations in the SBU leadership, rather than a sign of certain new approaches to the intelligence agencies’ orientation. An interesting detail: Mr. Radchenko is also Deputy to NSDC Chairman Volodymyr Horbulin. In a word, it is safe to assume that today’s head of the Intelligence Committee does wield as much power as did Ihor Smeshko, reporting directly to the President.
And yet all these changes affected perhaps only the brass’s plans. The situation at CMID has remained the same. Military intelligence is doing its best to evolve. Currently it includes divisions responsible for strategic missions abroad, an information and analysis division, electronic reconnaissance and intelligence gathering division, and of course, personnel. The Armed Forces Academy operates the Institute for Military Diplomatic Service, mainly training military intelligence personnel. Its people “in the know” say they have never been involved in any clandestine missions involving violence, and that they never meddle in politics. No one as yet has been burned. Well, it might be entirely out of character to say anything otherwise. When asked how they manage to have their agents work only for Ukraine, without playing double, an CMID official said that (a) they were careful in selecting personnel, (b) their personnel was well socially protected, their including families, and (c) their internal security was adequately effective.
Previously military intelligence officers sometimes applied for transfer to the SBU. However, the brass has never admitted to any rivalry between SBU and Defense intelligence. And both secret services are invariably opposed to the idea of their merger, because each has specific tasks explained by the needs of their “consumers.” Whatever their views, the Ukrainian taxpayer should, of course, seek further democratization of control over their activities. For the time being, the system of checks in the life of the Ukrainian special services hinges on the executive branch. The law on Ukraine’s foreign intelligence, the need in which has been discussed for over a year, is still to be enacted. There is a draft and it is anyone’s guess whether the new Parliament will want to make basic changes there — like controlling the appointment of commanding officers or monitoring the budget. Hence, efforts will have to be made to achieve a golden mean between effective control of the clandestine agencies and their effective performance.






