Leonid Kuchma has again become an objective reality, and
no “technology” can change it. The results of the choice Ukrainians have
made will become apparent in the immediate future. If everything remains
the way it is (primarily in the executive vertical), the most likely scenario
will be pessimistic: escalating war with Parliament along with degradation
of the economy and social sphere, in other words, stability of stagnation.
An optimistic scenario requites certain conditions. Society has shown an
inability to change things from below, and now as victor the President’s
responsibility resides in his ability to carry our reform from above on
this, his second try. And here much will depend on his will to curb the
appetites of a staff, which is ready to take the country like conquerors,
and upon the willingness of those in power to enter into a dialogue with
the (especially non-leftist) opposition. Judging by how his electorate
grew in the runoff, it is apparent that many voted not for him but against
Symonenko (and one can also say that many who voted Communist were really
voting against Kuchma). In general, it was a victory against, not for,
something.
So we seem to have cast anchor at long last. The latest
from the CEC: 56% of the votes for Leonid Kuchma and 37% for Petro Symonenko.
And no reefs or shallows that our nameless ship could have encountered
in the second round appeared. The electorate’s activity surpassed its 1994
performance (when 64% of eligible voters went to the polls), and the “frustration
ratio,” with people crossing out the names of both candidates, amounted
to a mere 3% instead of the predicted 10%; in Vinnytsia, Kirovohrad, and
Poltava oblasts the indices evened out after governors were shuffles.
In the end people had to choose the lesser of two evils.
Naturally, the powers that be used all the resources at their disposal:
the state machine, law enforcement, financial and legal levers. Indeed,
one can agree with political analyst Mykola Tomenko who said that “there
was really no election campaign” and blames equally Leonid Kuchma and the
opposition, stressing that the latter turned in a poor performance. Of
course, the opposition has its explanations. One can criticize the people
for failing to live up to its name, and this frustration is understandable,
considering that one-third of the population literally made up of those
in the street poking through garbage cans, confidently voted for another
five years of such life. This author, however, can understand their zombie-like
reaction. A couple of weeks before the election I witnessed the principal
of an elite Kyiv school ask parents tearfully to cast their ballots; if
he didn’t meet the quota sent from above he would be fired.
“If the election campaign were kept in an objective vein,
I don’t think that the current regime would have defeated us that easily,”
Petro Symonenko said, casting his own ballot. Really? His comrade-in-arms
Oleksandr Tkachenko confirmed that “if the Left bloc did not split up it
would collect 60% of the votes and win.”
Then who was there, two years previously, to stop Comrade
Symonenko from initiating a single Left opposition? Maybe if he did the
regime, seeing such a solid Left front, would not risk playing reformer
vs. Red revanche, a very dangerous game for an independent state, because
it might easily have lost it.
And now what? Does this unanimous vote for the European
way of development mean a rapprochement between the people and power as
personified by our reelected President? Not likely. We ground our teeth
and prevented this country from being turned backward. Yet a couple of
days from now, maybe in a month or half a year (as different politicians
forecast) we will discover that the conflict between society and those
in power is not simply still there (and where could it have gone?), but
has also received a fresh painful impetus, because “even now the oligarchs
investing in the elections will start fighting for posts,” maintains Tomenko.
Petro Symonenko has already declared that forces of the
Center and Right Center are responsible for Ukraine’s future by “supporting
the current President and helping strengthen the influence of certain oligarchic
clans.” Perhaps such passing the buck indicates that the CPU needs neither
power nor the attendant responsibility. Maybe that is why the Communists
are in no hurry to chip in the allocation of portfolios in the coalition
government. Now their task is holding fast to their role as advocates of
the party’s “leading political role.” Yet this is not going to be simple,
not the way Comrade Symonenko was promised; he will have to struggle to
head a legitimate people’s opposition, Oleksandr Moroz also being among
the probable contenders for such a role. As for the reelected President,
Mr. Kuchma will have to worry most about keeping this society from being
split now that it is keenly divided into reformers and revanchists. Our
goal is to try to keep track of the results of our deliberate choice. This
is the most difficult task, because no one has yet coped with it effectively.
№42 November 16 1999 «The
Day»
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