Ivan Pliushch received 205 votes and his Hromada rival Mykhailo Pavlovsky 70 in the tenth round of the marathon Speaker's election. Time to take stock.
Why did Pliushch fail with the NDP leadership making every effort, the alliance factions agreeing to a single candidate, the freelancers signing up, and the vote being held under strict control? And most importantly, with everyone knowing that the President had no other candidate? Just bad luck? Maybe. There is, however, another explanation. The executive, this Parliament's scarecrow, is a dead duck. If one were to believe what was said from the rostrum about the moral and even material aspect of the campaign to elect the Speaker the President wants, the only question would be whether there is anything the Kuchma people can do at all.
What are the President and NDP after? What is their logic? They do not want a leftist Speaker, yet they vote for a Communist. They want a centrist but can do nothing. The Communists are outraged by attempts to buy them, wholesale and retail, and openly say so, and the Presidential side mumbles something in response. There was whispered word in the corridors of power that NDP's business members were surprised to hear about how much was offered the Left for each vote, saying we paid more, so where is the money? Hearsay, of course, but the Communists cannot be blamed for carelessness when voting. And as for some kind of logic, try and find it.
It would be interesting to ask all those backstage scenario writers if they know that people in the rigidly controlled factions, exposed to the Brodsky syndrome and unable to offer open resistance, invented a very simple technique to neutralize their own forced votes using other members' votes, doing it so they could just wring their hands helplessly afterward: we did as instructed and it somehow didn't work out, by such small margin! Incredible!
NDP ideologues (and maybe someone else from outside) seem to have worked out a very smart plan. They came to terms with Petro Symonenko: first everyone would vote for or against him the way everyone felt, and the same procedure would be applied with regard to Ivan Pliushch. This backfired and the Communist was almost elected (221 ayes), but total absence of control was also vividly demonstrated. After that, aware of the personal interests of some not-so-militant Leninists, they expected to use the same method, launch a quick counteroffensive, and get Ivan Pliushch in the speaker's seat. The counteroffensive was bogged down as a nonaffiliated Deputy named Chernenko suddenly nominated the Peasant Party's Tkachenko. NDP leader Matviyenko hit the roof, accusing the Left of snake-like cunning and Ivan Pliushch, seeing no alternative, withdrew. The whole scheme went down the drain, reminding one of the old truth that the best impromptu is well rehearsed at home. Mr. Moroz's poker face suggested that he preferred his own game and cared little for others'... As in the previous example when the government slipped the noose, tightened it, and then released the condemned.
In the next the loss of tempo and initiative, along with Hromada's usual tactic (they did not withdraw their candidate, so they had to play along) denied Ivan Pliushch the required votes, even though every Group-4 member was under unwavering control.
The conclusion might sound unexpected: if Petro Symonenko and his Communists count on improving their record 221 votes, they will most likely prove wrong. A stroke of luck like this one happens only once — and only because of the adversary's miscalculated the risk. In a word, Communist Symonenko will never get the Speaker's seat, unless the President relieves himself of his chance responsibility and places its burden on the Red's shoulders.
There is also another possibility. The President, now that he has started printing "reformist" edicts, using ready cliches, may have decided that he needs no Speaker, period, and that a legislative headless horseman will do just fine. And there is Serhiy Holovaty's ingenious formula: "The President is issuing edicts not because there is no Speaker. There is no Speaker because the President is issuing edicts." Ingenious as it is, this assumption is questionable. Suppose the President has no other alternative to squeeze the required credits from the dictatorial IMF. If so, it is hard to picture him dragging the edict baggage to the next campaign. The whole thing looks different assuming that there is a mechanism with which to postpone or even cancel the next elections. This seems unlikely. In other words, Mr. Kuchma may act as a tough reformer but only for a short while, until he reaches a certain nearby goal. From then on it is vital that he face obstacles and struggle to surmount them - precisely the role played by Parliament, and there are no grounds whatsoever to expect the Chief Executive to change his orientation.
There is, however, most convincing evidence that the President needs a Speaker and Parliament. The visual aspect of the latest developments in the legislative department. With all due respect to NDP leader Matviyenko, one had the impression that his chair in the presidium was red hot in the last round. He could not sit still for a minute. He would jump up and race into the audience, then outside to confer with the Cabinet's sage coordinator Tolstoukhov, then back, heading for the government box, then outside again, then back... He was eager to carry out the President's instructions and sincerely believed he could do it. Alas! Another sincere NDP stalwart, Taras Stetskiv, told The Day moodily: "We had more absentees than expected." A very bad sign. Serhiy Dovhan's "peasants," after some hesitation, gave themselves up to their own Left, stepping over the President's wishes and post-Tkachenko situation. Hromada, after making its usual fuss, made a move, putting forth its own candidate.
In short, despite constant talk about the wheeling and dealing in the Presidential Administration, the reality proves that, no matter what happens there, nothing works out the way they plan, and that sober ideas are the only stimulant of the parliamentary process, guiding it in a vein wrecking everyone else's scenarios. Sometimes the impression is that the courtyard domino players decided to join a chess club... After all has been said and done, why not assume that, contrary to the parliamentarians' "serious concern" about the President's edict series, there are people in Parliament who, well aware of the outcome, do not mind the "guarantor and reformer" taking the helm of the ship of the state while it sinks.
Photo by Valery Miloserdov,The Day:
Anatoly Matviyenko discovered the presence of leftists







