Why Ukraine needs military reform

A two-day NATO conference, NA TO Transformation: Agenda for the New Century, ended in London on December 9. It dealt with a broad range of issues relating to the Alliance’s further development and European security. The Ukrainian delegation to the representative forum was headed by Defense Minister Yevhen MARCHUK. At a plenary session, Mr. Marchuk delivered a paper, “NATO and Ukraine,” and dwelt on the subject in an interview with the BBC Ukrainian Service. Minister Marchuk believes that the Ukrainian military has no doubts about NATO membership being worthwhile. At the same time, there is growing awareness of the need to prove to NATO partners that existing democratic standards are acceptable to Ukrainians. The Ukrainian Defense Minister, among other things, denied the allegation that Ukraine would like to have nuclear weapons, stressing that such statements by certain Ukrainian politicians should not be seriously considered.

Mr. Marchuk was interviewed by BBC Ukrainian Service correspondent Oleksandr Hryb.

Question : What is the main objective of Ukraine’s military manpower reductions? Do you think the Ukrainian government’s allocations for the military reform scheduled for next year are enough?

Answer: The military reform is aimed primarily at bringing the existing threats and challenges into conformity with the economic capacities and strength of our Armed Forces. First of all, it is necessary to tell the truth; the current economic condition of Ukraine does not allow it to sustain such a large and complex structure and manpower. This makes the Armed Forces and the state suffer. The president instructed us to embark on a new stage in radically reforming the Armed Forces. This program has been prepared and the required estimates made. We are not quite satisfied with the 2004 budget.

PROBLEMS OF FINANCE AND COMBAT PREPAREDNESS

Q: Given such relatively low financing, is it possible to stop the process of the declining preparedness of the Ukrainian army, now that the Ukrainian rocket troops are afraid to make launches and pilots to fly their planes?

A: This situation no longer exists: our pilots are flying 90-100 hours, in the united rapid deployment forces. Aviation Institute graduates have flown 130 hours this year, an unprecedented statistic for our years of independence. There have been successful air defense exercises, although on a Russian firing range (it is huge and there are no risks involved). Financing preparedness presents certain problems, mainly because several years from now (5-7 for some, 10-12 for others) the service life of certain air force and air defense munitions will be over. We still have time to solve this problem, but the problem already exists.

WAR WITH RUSSIA: AN ACT OF SCHIZOPHRENIA

Q: Russian military analysts said back in the 1990s that the Ukrainian army was psychologically unprepared to defend Ukraine in the event of an armed conflict with Russia. What was the situation like when you became Minister of Defense and what effect did Tuzla have?

A: Frankly, I think there are few servicemen capable of picturing themselves at war with Russia for many reasons. First, it would be an act of schizophrenia. On the other hand, even from the point of view of potential on both sides, strictly in practical military terms, this is something hard to imagine.

But I think that the patriotism of the Ukrainian army should not be assessed by trying in terms of whether it is ready to fight the Russians. I can’t imagine anyone, even some paranoiac, planning an armed confrontation with our closest neighbor. At present, the threats and challenges are elsewhere.

Today, the situation on the border between NATO and the other military-political bloc is extremely quiet. Twenty years ago this would have sounded paradoxical. But there are problems on other borders.

NOT TO BECOME A TARGET

Q: Russia’s unfriendly posture in regard to Tuzla and the disparity in the Ukrainian and Russian military potentials brought forth (primarily among journalists) the possibility that Ukraine might lift its nuclear moratorium and return to nuclear weapons. Is this possibility discussed by the military?

A: There are no such discussions. Both professions who understand the problem and especially the military see the very question as ridiculous, to put it mildly. To approach the issue the way some Ukrainian politicians propose, certain questions must be answered. First, which administrative region and its authorities would accept the storage of nuclear munitions? I would like to hear this question answered even before discussing the issue in principle. Second, where will nuclear tests be carried out, on whose territory? Third, where will these nuclear launches be fired from?

There many, many other questions, of which perhaps the most important is whether those trying to debate the issue know that every strategic silo is targeted by two or three strategic missiles on the other side. To put it simply, even when you still don’t have them nuclear weapons are first of all targets for a first strike.

Ukrainian politicians raising this issue are not stating the question seriously, and this gives Ukraine nothing but the grimaces of professionals and, of course, making our Western partners wary.

TERRORISM: MAJOR CHALLENGES AND THREATS

Q: Russia’s new defense doctrine envisions preemptive strikes, even using nuclear weapons, against what we might call problem countries. In addition, Moscow has territorial claims on Ukraine. What do you think the Ukrainian defensive doctrine needs most and lacks at present?

A: The new defense doctrine, its revised version, has been prepared and edited; it will be approved by a presidential edict in a few days.

First and foremost, the military doctrine formulates the challenges and threats proceeding from conditions in today’s world, and it demonstrates every day that the main challenges and threats do not come from frontal attack by a given country or from tank armies, but in fact from terrorism. For this reason the revised wording of the military doctrine focuses what are today the main and most threatening things to Ukraine, the region, and the whole world.

EURO-ATLANTIC PROSPECTS

Q: Until recently, not everybody in either the Ukrainian military and society was convinced that Ukraine needs NATO. When do you think Ukrainian officers and men will be prepared to join NATO?

A: This is for the military least of all a problem, because there is growing understanding in the army that collective security systems are far more effective than everybody for himself, so to speak.

Q: The next year’s Ukraine-NATO cooperation plan envisions not so much the military reform as emphasis on the principles of democracy and freedom of expression. Could we say that the unconsolidated Ukrainian democracy is the biggest obstacle to joining NATO?

A: This is envisioned not only by the next year’s cooperation plan, but also by the Action Plan adopted in Prague last year. It means that we must demonstrate to our NATO partners that we want more than to be a member of that powerful collective security system but that the standards adhered to by the NATO states are acceptable to us, not on paper but in practice.

To make the final conclusion, to be able to enter a prestigious club whose members are serious partners, one must meet their conditions.

The most important thing for us today is convincing opponents in Ukraine that NATO is not talking us into becoming a member, that it is not pushing us toward high living standards, but that we want to live like the NATO countries, in terms of living standard, human rights, environmental protection, and, of course, in terms of defenses, to make them mobile, strong, and financed in full. In other words, our defenses must be in proportion to the economic capabilities of our state.

THE MOSCOW OPTION IS UNREALISTIC

Q: Speaking of political dimensions, the British analyst James Sherr, whom you know of, said in a BBC interview in Kyiv that, should Leonid Kuchma decide to run for president a third time, all hopes for about Euro-Atlantic integration would prove stillborn. You were a presidential candidate in 1999. Do you think the Ukrainian ruling elite can come up with a single presidential candidate, who would be acceptable to the West?

A: My answering this question could be qualified as taking part in the political struggle, and I am not taking part in it, because the Armed Forces and the military must not be politically active in principle.

However, I don’t think that anyone could answer this question now, because there is a bizarre alignment of political forces, with parties coming out in support of the president and then voting in the parliament in an unexpected manner. All this is evidence that what we know as the parliamentary majority and the political forces outside the parliament acting in support of the regime still have to travel the road of consolidation and become aware of their responsibilities in the presidential elections.

There is another side to the issue, as de Gaulle once said: “The opposition is also French, and I am president of all the French.” Therefore, I think that we shouldn’t overdramatize the situation, especially by portraying various results of the elections. The issue is that the this question can’t be answered unequivocally without posing another. Names are not the point; the point is who is campaigning for what and who can do what. If one is campaigning for something, can he do it or not? I think that your question cannot be answered in full now. I think we’ll have to wait until March.

Q: Among Ukrainian journalists it is popular to say that all Russian scenarios eventually come to Ukraine. If we consider the manner in which Putin came to power, with the image of a strong hands and giving the former president’s family guarantees, is there any possibility of such a person becoming president of Ukraine?

A: Today in principle all the figures are known in politics and the parliament who are likely to run for president, and such surprises as happened in Russia are simply impossible for us.

We are a somewhat different state in terms of our political biography and history. I think such a development of events before or during the elections couldn’t happen.

WHO DISLIKES MARCHUK

Q: The Defense Ministry recently made a statement to the effect that your name cannot be mentioned in conjunction with the Honcharov case and thus also with the cassette scandal. Who would to benefit to implicate arms deals or attempts at palace revolutions and why?

A: When you are in charge of something concrete, you can’t help but expose yourself to someone else’s critical assessment that makes it into the press. There is a group of people in Ukraine, including in the parliament, who, as we say, know what I know. Also, it’s true that the documents I presented to the president and on which I reported to the Security Council dealt a serious blow to certain figures.

They lost staggering sums and, to be more precise, they lost the ability to suck gigantic sums out of the state and state resources. It also provoked their displeasure that I had been okayed by the president to direct all resources possessed by the Armed Forces, material assets — above all land plots and improvements, military towns, scrap metal, certain other surplus and sellable material values — to solve the military’s housing problem, meaning above all servicemen and their families without their own places to live.

Those people were accustomed to being free to act however they wanted, and so once again I found myself the target of all kinds of allegations and nonsense. I have been through all this before more than once, including the so-called Turin case, when I was accused of organizing criminal arms trade. Now they are trying to involve me in the Honcharov case. And I know that they also have other things ready.

All this doesn’t shock me in the least, because, unfortunately, this is the stage we’re going through and, unfortunately, there are people, including some in the parliament, who are afraid that their dealings might become more widely known. And the main thing is, they are displeased by my putting an end to the embezzlement of military property, because I believe that it must be used above all for the benefit of the servicemen.