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Where there is no law, but every man does what is right in his own eyes, there is the least of real liberty
Henry M. Robert

TO LOVE THE DRAGON What can help Leonid Kuchma get reelected?

13 November, 2012 - 00:00

“As a rule Caesars are killed by friends, because they are enemies”

Stanislaw Jerzy Lec,

UNCOMBED THOUGHTS

Over the past several months political life in Ukraine has been marked by a series of “epochal events” – parliamentary elections, Cabinet shuffles, the two-month Speaker saga, and the spate of edict creation from the Presidential Administration. Another process has been underway which is so drawn out it is no longer regarded as news: replacement of the heads of regional and district state administrations. It started early this April and the only difference to date is that in April-May edicts replacing them were issued a package a day and now an edict appears perhaps once a week. Probably because few are left to be fired and spotting them is getting increasingly troublesome.

This administrative carousel fits into the overall “epochal” pattern, allowing one to discern its common denominator, which dampens the epochal atmosphere considerably. This denominator is simple, really: the Presidential Administration is getting prepared for the 1999 race.

At the beginning of the administrative cleanup, President Kuchma explained the need to take such “severe measures” by the inability of governors and “administrators operating on a regional and city scope” to cope with economic and social problems. “They proved ineffective, so we will thank them and look for replacements,” he declared at a Cabinet session on April 9. And shortly afterward he revealed what was actually behind this headhunting – precisely at a meeting with the Dnipropetrovsk oblast leadership, April 11. Regrettably, Mr. Kuchma said, Governor Viktor Zabara (fired shortly previously) “did not measure up” to the situation, meaning primarily preparations for the election campaign. Indeed, in the context of parliamentary elections local authorities’ guilt toward the executive was immense: the NDP roster headed by Premier Pustovoitenko hardly cleared the 4% hurdle and the President’s second favorite, the Agrarians, had to step down. The Dnipropetrovsk Governor’s guilt, he said, was aggravated by the fact that the election campaign in the oblast “was left in the hands of a single political force, the Regional Council, Hromada, and its leader Pavlo Lazarenko.” However, the feud between the Chief Executive and the ex-Premier was a minor stroke of the brush in the general picture of “rigid cadre measures,” as the cleanup enveloped practically all regions.

The architects of this total rotation must consider the replacements capable of organizing and most importantly winning the presidential race. Suppose we try to analyze how motivated is the presidential team to bet on administrative control.

1.

What forces can the President count on in the 1999 marathon? Under the circumstances he cannot seriously consider the electorate’s “natural” affinity. In 1994, he was mainly backed by southeastern constituencies where people trusted his program with its emphasis on radical economic reforms while retaining government commitments in terms of social protection; effective renewal of contacts with Russia; federal land system; official bilingualism; contractual relations with the Crimea, etc. In the industrial regions the motto, Vote for Kuchma to put your factory to work, was very popular.

Neither the economic, nor political, social, or ideological elements of this program were carried out, so that by the end of 1994 his popularity started on a downward curve (currently registering 12-15% by some estimates). And the “geography of love” for the President underwent radical changes, moving from the east to the west. An unreliable course, considering Leonid Kravchuk’s experience.

During the elections the situation may change drastically. Much will depend on the stand taken by the country’s political elite. There is no direct evidence of its attitude to Mr. Kuchma, and nor could there have been any, but there is information worth considering. Kyiv Center for Political and Conflict Studies (KCPCS), which has for more than two years monitored Ukrainian political ratings, offered an expert examination of the degree and nature of influence exerted by a number of leading newspapers in July and November 1997. July returns pointed to The Day, Zerkalo nedeli (Mirror of the week), Biznes (Business), and Kievskie Vedomosti (Kyiv news). In other words, periodicals openly critical of the powers that be. November results were roughly the same: Zerkalo nedeli, The Day, Kievskie Vedomosti, and Biznes. Remarkably, Nezavisimost (Independence), generally considered closest to the administration, placed 23rd out of 25, which is pretty near the bottom.

It should be noted, however, that when assessing the nature of influence (unlike its degree) it is not the dubious “impersonality” of the experts which is decisive, but precisely the degree of their bias in summing up. There is little doubt that KCPCS’s board of experts (some 50 Kyiv and regional political analysts and journalists) represented the Ukrainian political Establishment. In other words, their findings showed exactly how the latter treated some or other periodicals, so the high ratings of those in opposition and extremely low standing of the ones supporting the government were quite significant.

2.

During the 1994 presidential elections the national democratic forces influential in Western Ukraine refused to nominate their own candidates and trusted Leonid Kravchuk to “care for and protect the Nation and the State.” Former dissidents backing the former Communist ideological watchdog looked rather paradoxical, but the reason was their hysteria over the Russian threat, and Russia was then personified by Leonid Kuchma. No one knows whether the national democrats will nominate anyone in 1999, but it is highly unlikely that Rukh, having asserted itself as the leading party of this orientation in March, will risk its reputation by publicly supporting the current President.

Elections by party rosters showed that among the variety of political parties only the Communists, Rukh, Socialist-Peasant Bloc, and Progressive Socialists could be regarded as ones (in the sense that they have mass support and can influence their constituencies). All differences among leftist leaders notwithstanding, it is obvious that none of these parties, particularly the PSPU (opposed to Comrades Moroz and Symonenko), can be seriously considered as Leonid Kuchma’s support in the next campaign.

As for the NDP, in which the President seemed to place special hopes, party election results show that its influence can be discussed only in negative terms.

The reader should be reminded that in 1994 Leonid Kuchma received tangible support from business circles. In December 1993, despite President Kravchuk’s counteraction, he was elected President of the Ukrainian Businessmen and Industrialists Association (which would subsequently nominate him for the presidency). However, his four years in office have done little to strengthen ties with domestic business. Characteristically, a number of business structures approached the March campaign by hastily putting together their own parties. Wrong tactic maybe, but it shows that business leaders are sick and tired of playing the Administration’s game with no rules whatever and the chance to do business depends on currying favors with top public servants.

Business people in Ukraine seem to have finally grasped the idea that they need to make their standing nominally stable and that no game can be played without rules, otherwise today’s victory over rivals may well turn into a scandalous bankruptcy tomorrow. Territorial-clannish and financial groups want to legitimate their status, formulate it politically (e.g., convert it into Verkhovna Rada seats). Among other things, this is evidence that they strive to exist independently in a post-Kuchma future. Of course, it is possible that Leonid Kuchma will be supported by businessmen, but only by individuals who remain dependent on the executive, but the idea of a nationwide front, something like “Ukrainian Businessmen for Kuchma,” is not even worth discussing.

3.

There are external factors not be overlooked. Russian President Yeltsin made it perfectly clear that he will back Mr. Kuchma’s candidacy; US Vice President Albert Gore followed suit in a roundabout manner during his recent visit to Ukraine. This, however, strongly reminds one of an advance premium plan.

In view of all this, it is not surprising that the Presidential Administration, unable to count on the electorate or political Establishment, has decided to play its last trump, the right to make cadre decisions. It is anyone’s guess whether the newly appointed administrators will be able to get the local situation under control in the remaining year and a half – and even if they do, whether they will go all the way carrying out the President’s “special commission.” As for the possible consequences of their blitz management for the socioeconomic situation, this topic is best left undiscussed.

Whoever becomes the new President of Ukraine in the fall of 1999 will receive a burdensome legacy: financial crisis, ruined economy, populace on the verge of social outburst, and a vertical chain of command made up of rank-and-file unqualified cadres, the result of a two-year election campaign. Mr. Kuchma could be right in offering to postpone the presidential elections until October 1999 and hold both simultaneously, although now it looks as though the politicians who, agreeing with the President in part, thought it best not to postpone the elections but hold them ahead of term and see if Mr. Kuchma can get reelected this fall.

 

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