By Serhiy ZGURETS, The Day
Air Defense (AD) is Ukraine's only branch of the armed forces always kept
at combat readiness. And what AD protection capabilities mean in modern
conditions was very vividly demonstrated by the recent war in Iraq and
the current events in Yugoslavia. What, then, does the AD umbrella over
us cost, what guidelines have been chosen to develop the national AD, and
what exactly did Desert Fox teach our generals?
This was the subject of an interview granted to The Day by the
Commanding Officer, Air Defense of Ukraine, Colonel-General Oleksandr
STETSENKO.
HOW AD WAS INTEGRATED
AND WHAT CAME OF IT
"Mr. Stetsenko, I would like to start with foreign policy factors.
Exactly four years have lapsed since Ukraine joined the CIS integrated
AD, and we have heard since then occasionally that this situation runs
counter to our state's nonaligned status. What does the Commander of Ukraine's
AD think about this problem?"
"We cannot say now that Ukraine is part of the CIS integrated AD system.
At least because the document on Ukraine's participation in this system
dated February 10, 1995, bears not only the President's signature but also
a reservation that this agreement is subject to the legislation of Ukraine.
As of today, we treat it as in fact a framework agreement, while relations
between Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Belarus, and other states rest
on a bilateral basis. During this time, we have never funded even one collective
program aimed at updating the integrated AD, be it combat training or expenditures
to keep up the CIS AD Coordination Committee.
"At first, when an integrated CIS AD system was being discussed, we
really hoped it would allow Ukraine to intensify military and technical
cooperation. Moreover, Russia was interested, particularly, in the joint
development of new weapons systems. We, in turn, took the following approach:
Ukrainian factories should take part not only in the development of new
armaments but also in their repairs. We made up a list of enterprises to
be involved in long-term work within the CIS limits taking precisely this
approach. But our proposals were turned down. So within the limits of the
integrated AD system, we also rejected technical cooperation and opted
for the strategy of bilateral contacts."
"Then what is the reason for Ukraine to continue in the CIS AD integrated
system if it now exists only on paper?"
"First of all, it allows us to keep track of the air defense systems
situation in Russia and other CIS states. This is the main thing. The equipment
and weapons of our national AD, in spite of a large number of component
parts produced by our own military-industrial enterprises, were assembled
in Russia. The latter also has the design bureau responsible for modifications
and modernization. This is important for us. Also, speaking of usefulness,
we conduct joint Ukrainian-Russian training of air defense duty forces.
There have been six such training sessions. They were aimed at eliminating
acute or conflict-prone situations and achieving a clear coordination between
the ADs of both countries. For sometimes an aircraft loses its bearings
in the air or communication with the ground or is hijacked, and the AD
of another country can render assistance under various force-majeure circumstances.
But I must also say we conduct such exercises not only with Russia. We
have similar agreements with Belarus, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Rumania,
and Bulgaria. So if their warplane or ours approaches within 25 kilometers
of the border, this should be brought to the neighbor's notice on time
so that it does not scramble its aircraft for an interception mission or
activate any other AD systems."
"But today cooperation with Russia is connected with another circumstance
supposedly of not only a military but also military-political nature. I
mean the use of our two missile early-warning radar facilities, located
in Mukacheve and Sevastopol, in the interests of Russia's nuclear forces
and antimissile umbrella. Is it a sign of Ukraine's involvement in serving
collective interests under the Tashkent Pact?"
"There are lots of various rumors about these facilities. To start with,
the agreement with Russia on the use of missile early-warning radar and
the control over outer space was signed by the first President of Ukraine
as far back as July 6, 1992. Under the agreement, our state undertook to
fully finance the early-warning facilities stationed in Ukraine. At the
time, the Soviet Union had already disintegrated, but nuclear weapons still
remained on the territory of four republics. Ukraine had both nuclear missiles
and control posts. Early-warning stations are of crucial importance for
the effective functioning of nuclear forces, so we had to quickly determine
the legal framework for the work of these facilities in those far-from-simple
conditions.
"But later on, when the decision was finally made to proclaim Ukraine
a nuclear-free state and the nuclear warheads were taken to Russia, the
early-warning radar systems worked and still work primarily in the interests
of Russia. This was why we held intensive talks with Russia in 1993-1994.
It was agreed that, from January 1, 1994 to January 1, 1996, when we still
had warheads, Russia and Ukraine would share equally the radar's cost.
The radar cost an annual $1.5 million to maintain. The new agreement on
the early-warning radar, which we signed with Russia on February 28, 1997,
and which was recently ratified on the third attempt by the State Duma
and is still to be ratified by our Verkhovna Rada, envisages that all expenses
for the supply of spare parts to and repairs of the radar are to be fully
borne by Russia. Ukraine maintains only the personnel. However, now we
proposing that Ukraine should be compensated even for these expenditures."
"That means Russia must pay Ukraine an annual $1.5 million for the
two radar facilities. Yet, Russia has regularly paid an annual $5 million
to Latvia for a similar radar in Skrunda. Why is there such a difference?"
"Russia leased Skrunda as a self-contained military installation, land
inclusive. There were Russian soldiers and guards there. If we had not
had nuclear warheads, we might have followed this way, i.e., lease out
the radar."
"And was there no sense in bargaining later?"
"We could not put forward any conditions, for the fate of our early-warning
stations is sealed by another international treaty, the 1972 US-Soviet
ABM Treaty. After the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine became its legal successor
under the agreement, which states that missile early-warning facilities
may 'be stationed on the periphery of a nation's territory with outward
orientation,' If we had leased out the radar, we would have indirectly
admitted that Ukraine remains part of Russia's national territory. We would
also have automatically been expelled from the ABM Treaty which limits
the abilities of signatories to develop weapons capable of shooting down
incoming ICBMs. Participation in this treaty allows access to all sorts
of information that no one would share with us under any other circumstances:
bases for nuclear arsenals, data on military satellites, and the danger
of terrorist acts using nuclear weapons. This is essential for us. Participation
in the treaty also allows Ukraine to influence the position of the superpowers
when it comes to the development, upgrading, and modernization of ABM systems.
This also opens up prospects to some extent for placing orders with our
defense enterprises."
"If our Parliament does not ratify the agreement with Russia on the
early-warning radar, what might be the consequences?"
"It would change nothing militarily or politically, for the role and
place of the early-warning facilities in Ukraine were determined by the
1992 agreement. The new agreement of 1997 does not impose any limitations
on our side, but it has an important detail: it lays down the amount and
procedure of Russia's compensation for the radar-related expenses borne
by Ukraine. If this agreement did not exist, that would suit Russia just
fine, for Ukraine de jure would have to continue to maintain the radar
at its own expense. Thus ratification of this document is in our national
interests."
HOW OUR S-300 AND AMERICAN PATRIOT FRATERNIZED
"A quite strained dialogue is now going on between Moscow and Washington
about the future of the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to which Ukraine
is also a party. The US wishes to revise the limitations imposed by this
treaty. What is our military servicemen's attitude to the American attempts
to strengthen the antimissile umbrella over their country even, if necessary,
at the expense of revising the ABM Treaty?"
"We would like to see this international document remain unchanged."
"The commander of the Russian Air Force, now also in charge of AD,
has said recently they are developing over-the-horizon radar systems capable
of detecting the launch of enemy missiles at strategic distances. To an
extent this could be viewed as Russia's desire to rid itself in the future
of its dependence on Ukraine or, say, Azerbaijan, a difficult negotiation
partner which also hosts an early-warning radar. Would Ukraine then have
to dismantle the Mukacheve and Sevastopol facilities?"
"This danger does and will exist. These are first-generation radar installations.
The Russian designers have already extended their service life by five
years. Later Russia will service them as long as necessary. But in fact,
our radar evokes growing interest of the US and other states, for they
cover the whole Middle East and North Africa. If Russia stops paying for
our early-warning radar, we do not rule out the possibility of the United
States funding its operation."
"What is the current state of cooperation with the US and NATO in
air defense? For it is thought that representatives of such high-tech services
as the AD and Air Force find it more difficult than those of ground forces
to reach understanding with NATO executives."
"We have moved a proposal that two regiments - ours equipped with the
S-300 anti-aircraft missile system and an American armed with the Patriot
- fraternize and become twin military units, and then carry out joint battlefield
exercises so that the American crews fire our missile system and we their
Patriot. Of course, provided the US finances the exercise."
"But today the Patriot and the S-300 are the main rivals on
the arms market. And there were earlier proposals to hold kind of a duel
between the two systems, the results of which would have an impact on many
promising contracts either for the US or Russia. It seems to be Russia
that first suggested this competition to the US. Then the US wished to
purchase one Russian antiaircraft unit and compare it with their Patriot.
Whose side are we on in this dispute?"
"We are not speaking of a duel between these different weapon systems.
We are speaking about a confidence building measure which would allow AD
representatives of the two countries, Ukraine and the US, to understand
each other better. As to the effectiveness of an antiaircraft missile system,
this depends on the skill of its crew. I know the Patriot and the
S-300 system which our AD troops are also equipped with. And what I prefer
is the S-300. As to probable cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance,
Ukraine maintains, on a bilateral basis, quite active air defense contacts
with both CIS and NATO countries. For example, some Hungarian air defense
experts undergo training in Ukraine. And recently the Ukrainian Ministry
of Defense conducted a conversion course for Turkish officers who studied
the Osa and Kub short-range anti-aircraft missile systems. On the other
hand, we have recently visited some AD bases in Greece."
"Does this mean our officers can now visit anywhere and see everything?
"The point is not what we see. The point is how and against whom what
we saw will be deployed..."
HOW DESERT FOX TOUCHED UKRAINE
"Has the cruise missile bombardment of Iraq, quite effectively performed
by America and Britain, taught Ukraine anything?"
"We study in detail the experience of that operation. It has all the
signs of a modern war. The US and British military, to win absolute air
superiority during Desert Fox, made almost 650 sorties and launched over
a thousand cruise missiles. Their strikes were first of all aimed at destroying
the air defense network of Iraq, i.e., radar and launch sites. Since the
Iraqi AD were equipped with obsolete AA missile systems and artillery effective
only in daytime, these facilities were being hit at dusk and at night.
And there was nothing at all to counter the cruise missiles. In addition,
Iraq's AD system was not mobile.
"As to conclusions, we can now state that air strike facilities are
capable of fulfilling strategic tasks and contributing to the achievement
of the main objectives of a war, i.e., victory. In this case the air defense
system also assumes a strategic weight and must be regarded as a major
factor in the preservation of a state's sovereignty.
"As of today, we have decided to give the development of Ukrainian AD
top-priority status. It is planned to increase the numerical strength of
this branch as part of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. We are now introducing
on an experimental basis a territorial principle of manning AD units with
conscripts, so that these specialists are then always within reach of their
former commanders. This is cheaper for the state, more convenient, and
will increase combat readiness..."
"Hypothetically, would a cruise missile attack on Ukraine be as disastrous
as it was on Iraq?"
"Our units conduct annual missile launch exercises on the national test
site. We constantly experiment with the deployment of our AD facilities
to achieve the most effective results. By the way, we also fire at targets
similar to cruise missile which are poorly visible on radar screens. It
is more difficult to detect and track them than the American Tomahawks."
"But we fire over the sea. This is simpler, isn't it?"
"Says who? The sea is a mirror for a radio signal. Radar screens look
like milk. I wish you could find a target marker. And our units come back
from tests in high spirits, so to speak. We also fire over the ground.
We also train crews on simulators at a special center. Conditions in the
latter are such that if somebody gets a 'satisfactory' grade, he will fire
at the test site with at least 'good' grade. But, with due account of the
Iraq War experience, the Minister of Defense ordered this year an AD live-ammunition
exercise be held, simulating the repulsing of an all-out cruise missile
attack. It was also decided to reinforce AD supplies, repair defective
equipment and arms, irrespective of any financial constraints. We have
recently held talks with Russia on the resumption of work to modernize
S-300 units, and we are now paying more attention to the development of
mobile AD systems."
"How is the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine going to settle its bills
with Russia? Lack of funds, you know..."
"Russia has incurred a $4.5-million debt for using our missile early
warning radar. We are not after cash, we would be content with spare parts
for our AD systems as payment of this amount. Of course, at the producer's
price, and not three or four times as much, as they sometimes try to do."
"Will this critical dependence of Ukrainian AD on Russia in the modernization
and production of sophisticated antiaircraft missile systems continue?"
"We can make do for a long time with the weapons we already have. As
to new designs, we have recently developed our own artillery-and-missile
system whose performance surpassed those of other short-range weapons now
employed by AD."
"Some of our officials have already said Ukraine will in a couple
of years also have the prototypes of long-range air defense systems, similar
to the mentioned S-300, with a range of about 300 kilometers."
"It won't be so fast. But, owing to a powerful national defense industry
and other circumstances, we have indeed embarked on the road of developing
a system like this. It should incorporate the best features of the S-300
and Buk systems. We are now analysing what we have to make such a system.
We have identified the leading designers in this field. We have a design
bureau capable of making a missile; moreover, S-300 missiles have always
been assembled in Ukraine. We already know who will be in charge of the
radar, automatic control system, and the central computing complex. The
main thing now is to identify a general designer. This must be a heart
able to unite all our capacities into a whole.
"However, developing a modern antiaircraft missile system independently
costs too much. It involves very large expenditures. This is why we will
have to decide in the future where Ukraine should orient itself in this
sphere, either toward Russia or the West, and attract investors."
"From the West or East?"
"From where the money is found. But even with the current arsenal in
its present-day condition, I reiterate, our AD troops are capable of fulfilling
their principal task: to provide a reliable cover for air borders and protect
the sky over Ukraine."








