Arsenii YATSENIUK: “Any talk of neutrality is nonsense”

Mr. Yatseniuk, I personally heard you say on a visit to the West that political parties should not raise the problem of NATO and the Russian language during the current political campaign. It truly looks as though the main political forces have really ignored these two topics until now. Why do you think the Party of Regions chose to disregard this taboo?

“I was sure they would not raise this topic. Moreover, I was told that spin doctors on all sides had advised against this for the simple reason that this could deepen the rift in Ukraine. Life does not end with the elections. Both the opposition and the government should join forces with regard to national interests. They can argue about certain issues, for example, tax rates or what Kyiv should look like. This is just an example. As for national priorities, there can be no differing viewpoints inside the country.”

Did the parties agree to place the subjects of NATO and the Russian language under taboo?

“As far as I know, the main political players broached this issue a few times. It is true that this kind of agreement was reached at the level of spin doctors. I am worried that these sensitive issues have been raised again. I actually thought we had grown out of all this.”

But why did the Party of Regions raise this issue?

“Why? I think this is about electoral ratings — to boost them. I see no other reason. Because there’s nothing to say about NATO: very few people have any idea of what it is. And there’s nothing to say about the Russian language because it is not at all the target of oppression or debate in Ukrainian society. This is a matter for discussion by a small group of politicians who in the last 15 years have been defending either the Soviet Union, the Russian language, or God knows what.”

Are there are any leaders in the Party of Regions who are aware that this subject can damage Ukraine’s national security?

“Unfortunately, few politicians think in terms of ‘damage to national interests.’ Most of them have a different thing on their minds — how many additional percentage points they will gain. In other words, they are only looking down at their feet instead of looking at least one step ahead.”

Then maybe the whole issue is the rules of the game. Is it possible to establish the rules of the game in Ukraine so that all the players will observe them?

“I think the rules of the game have begun to establish themselves on their own. You know why? There has been a very dramatic decrease in interest in political events on the part of the electorate and society as a whole. But the proportion of the protest electorate and the undecideds has fundamentally increased. This means that none of the political force dominates in Ukrainian society. We are gradually moving toward what is typical of democracies. For example, in the United States, where I have a lot of acquaintances, including people with higher education, not all of them can immediately give the correct answer to the question ‘What is NATO?’ And when someone asks them to name their governor, they say they’re not interested. This means a loss of interest in political events and processes, while emphasis is being put on economic and social aspects. So, sooner or later political players will have to change the rules of the game for election campaigns primarily at the demand of ordinary people.”

When and how can people exert influence?

“People can simply exert influence through the results of an election. In other words, this is an instrument for influencing politicians. If the support rating of all the political forces is low, if the percentage of undecideds is very high, and if there is a sizable protest electorate, this means the people are expecting something new. This also means that all the current political parties and leaders — and I can say this frankly — will vanish in five to ten years. In the next five years we will see a conceptual change in the Ukrainian political elite.”

In other words, we should wait for young people. But are there no new political elites among the current political forces?

“There are some slow shifts. The young are raising their head. Today’s politicians are people who began working in the 1990s. So in the next elections, five years from now, you will see people who began working in the 2000s. This will be a new generation of Ukrainian politicians. This is also a very serious warning to the current politicians. Before entering politics, you should think how you will be leaving it.”

Are you planning to quit politics?

“I have a very easy attitude to this. I have experience in both the private and public sectors. So, if necessary, I will return to the private sector. But I will not be willing to return to the private sector if Ukraine stays the same as it is now. In other words, I am prepared to fight — not for myself but for my children, parents, friends, and those who support me.”

And what political force suits you the most in order to wage this struggle?

“I do not think this kind of political force exists today. This is a key instrument and a problem that arose during the election campaign debate. I don’t belong to any party. I still don’t have a membership card, and I will not sign any membership application until I see a party with an ideology that suits me. There is nothing to rely on. I’ve been to the regions on an election tour, and I saw that only about two percent of active individuals are party members. This is the potential that I think can form a really new political force with new ideas. As a rule, all ideas are old. The key question is whether you can implement these ideas and have a vision of the proper mechanism to do this. So you need an idea, a team, mechanisms, and ability.”

The impression is that in the next five to ten years we will have either stagnation or a tug-of-war between political forces.

“Things are looking up a bit. There are at least some rules of the political game. In my view, even the fact that we switched from the first-past-the-post to the proportional-representation system is a positive thing. Moreover, I think early elections are an even more positive thing because these are the challenges and tests that strengthen the body politic, and society becomes stronger and acquires additional experience.”

PACE rapporteur Hanne Severinsen told The Day that our proportional system is of little use because people cannot vote for or against a specific person. She advocates open lists, which is the case in her own country.

“I am also for open lists, but I categorically oppose returning to the first-past-the-post system because that would eliminate the process of political struggle. It would be a struggle of personalities, not of political ideas and political parties.”

Let’s go back to the NATO issue. Naturally, the situation is very complicated. Just a little over 20 percent of the population supports Ukraine’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Under these circumstances, what kind of relationship do you think Ukraine should establish with the alliance?

“A calm one, without too much fuss. I personally think that the program of public information about the North Atlantic alliance is not very effective because we have been adding fuel to the fire by saying at every step that we will join NATO the day after tomorrow, if not tomorrow. We have given an additional card to NATO opponents but have done very little to really join. There’s still a very long way to go. It would be good at least to join the Membership Action Plan (MAP). We should tell the people that this in no way forces us to join the alliance one day. For example, Croatia has been fulfilling its MAP for the last nine years. In other words, it is a very long way from the membership plan to membership. The MAP is no more than an intensified version of cooperation.”

Does Ukraine need a MAP?

“I think so because a MAP is a more concretized plan that is designed to replace the annual Target Plan. In fact it is a ‘target plan plus.’ But nobody points this out.”

Unlike the Target Plan, it also calls for certain commitments on the part of NATO.

“You know, it contains no clear-cut commitments. Paradoxically, the MAP clearly states that joining this plan does not mean that the alliance commits itself to admitting a country. Again, nobody is spotlighting this. In other words, first, the MAP is not NATO membership, and, second, the MAP is not a guarantee of entry but merely an intensified version of cooperation.”

Ukraine tried to join the MAP during Kuchma’s presidency, and there was a formal chance to do this at the NATO summit in Istanbul. Could joining the MAP have helped Ukraine ensure its national security, considering that our relations with Russia were marred by the Tuzla incident?

“I would not overestimate the significance of Tuzla. I believe the Tuzla question came up because the Russians were building a dike to dissolve this island and, as a result, get the upper hand at the Azov Sea negotiations.

“Speaking of national security in broader terms, it should be noted that there is no classical form of neutrality in today’s world. This is what some political forces are trying to draw us into. A very good example of this is Switzerland, which is always depicted as a showpiece neutral country. I want to remind you that during World War II not only Switzerland but also Belgium and the Netherlands were neutral. However, this did not prevent Nazi tanks from invading and occupying Belgium in spite of its neutral status. Switzerland? Since both the Nazis and the communists kept their money in that country’s banks, neither side wanted to occupy it.

“Look at what is going on in Switzerland now. There is a universal conscription in the country, everybody owns a rifle or a submachine-gun, a gas mask, and some military gear at home. This requires heavy state funding. Furthermore, Switzerland is a party to NATO’s Partnership for Peace program and member of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, also a NATO body.

“This is why all this talk of neutrality is, pardon the word, nonsense. Besides, none of Ukraine’s applicable documents, including the Constitution, contains the world ‘neutrality.’ The 1990 Declaration on National Sovereignty provided for the possibility to explore the question of neutrality in the future. Later, in 1993, following geopolitical changes in Europe, the Verkhovna Rada radically changed this by passing ‘The Main Directions of Ukraine’s Foreign Policy,’ which was aimed at Ukraine’s membership in European security associations based on existing international institutions, such as the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe), NACC (North Atlantic Cooperation Council), NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), and WEU (Western European Union). Therefore, any talk of Ukraine’s neutral status is nothing but political blackmail and speculation.”

But Ukraine is squeezed between two military-political blocs, CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) and NATO. So, taking into account the existing conditions, what is the best way for us to ensure national security? So far, the majority of the population is against NATO membership, and Russia, too, categorically opposes NATO’s eastward expansion.

“At present, it is not within the competence of the public to decide whether or not to join NATO. This is the exclusive competence of the politicians who were elected by the people, who share their political programs. We don’t ask the public about, say, the configuration of a new Ukrainian space rocket or the clauses of a new taxation law. Incidentally, only three countries held referendums on NATO membership — Spain, Slovakia, and Hungary. Spain held its NATO referendum three years after joining merely to confirm this step. In Slovakia, the referendum proved to be invalid because of the very low turnout. So the first postulate is that nobody is dragging anybody by the ears into NATO. The second postulate is that it is a grave mistake to think that NATO is looking forward, non-stop, to the day Ukraine joins the alliance. The third postulate is that the MAP is neither accession to NATO, nor Ukraine’s commitment to join NATO, nor the alliance’s commitment to admit Ukraine. The fourth postulate is that there is no need to poll the public because it still does not know exactly what the alliance is. The fifth postulate is that the present-day alliance is not the alliance that was formed along the fault line of civilizations. Rather than a military bloc it is a sociopolitical bloc, about which we must tell the people and with which we should work. The sixth postulate is that the Target Plan, which the government, incidentally, approved without too much difficulty two months after I assumed this office, is an absolutely normal document that is quite in line with a number of Ukraine’s international commitments, including those in the Ukraine-EU direction. It is aimed at social, economic, legal, and administrative reforms. Military reforms account for a mere 10 percent of the plan. So let us first pass this stretch and only then speak about referendums, memberships, and the like.”

Do you think that Prime Minister Yanukovych made a mistake when he rejected the MAP during his visit to NATO headquarters last September?

“I do not think the coalition would have praised him if he had accepted the MAP. But let’s be frank: he did not reject cooperation with the alliance. In Brussels, Yanukovych did not say a single negative word about Ukraine’s cooperation with NATO. He only said that we are not prepared for the MAP. And, fully aware that he would not receive support from the coalition at the current stage, he decided, without rejecting cooperation with the alliance, to put off the MAP question until later.”

In contrast to the NATO issue, the vast majority of Ukrainians are pinning great hopes on Ukraine joining the European Union. But this year many people, perhaps including you, were disappointed over the scandals caused by the unjustified refusals to issue visas to Ukrainians. Will the agreement on visa facilitation really make it simpler for Ukrainians to get visas?

“Let us say frankly that for some reason this question was almost never raised for 15 years until I became foreign minister (of course, I’m not saying I deserve a medal for this). The point is I knew the real visa situation and made this the subject of a public debate. What is going on now? We have signed a visa facilitation agreement. I am grateful to the European Union for understanding the importance of this matter for Ukrainian society. We need about six months more to ratify and begin to implement this agreement.

“I’d like to emphasize that the visa question will always be a topical issue under any circumstances because Ukraine denies visas to some citizens of certain states. First of all, this is about citizens of third countries. This is a matter of national security and domestic law. On the other hand, much to our regret, Ukrainians also cheat sometimes. Suppose I cite a thousand instances of Ukrainians being denied visas. In response, I am told about instances when Ukrainian citizens have been flatly deceiving an embassy, from submitting forged documents to not knowing the person who invited them. Nevertheless, there is progress in the visa problem. We have opened a call center, to which our citizens are referring their problems and complaints, and we are holding talks with the EU and conducting consular consultations. I can see some headway. The process is underway, but this problem cannot be solved overnight.”

But will Ukraine have to pay too high a price for visa facilitation because it is linked with the readmission agreement, which will take too much effort and expense to implement?

“First of all, we have opted for a two-year period to implement the readmission agreement. Second, under any circumstances, it is our commitment to keep illegal migrants from our borders. After all, readmission is a consequence, not a cause. The fact that people are entering Ukraine illegally is the result of inadequate border security. If we manage to keep them away, nobody will be raising any claims against us. I should also add that we have managed to obtain money from the Europeans. When I was holding talks with the EU, they agreed to give us 30 million euros for 2007. Do you think the Ministry of Internal Affairs has launched at least one project to establish detention centers for illegal migrants? The EU has 30 million euros waiting for us, nine months have gone by, but there is not a single project to build these centers. And everybody is shouting that there is no money.”

Can we expect speedy progress on the new enhanced agreement?

“We have a plan that does not envision acquiring EU membership in one year. We are not setting ourselves unachievable goals. We believe that this is really a long-term prospect and a strategic goal. But the path to reach it is very long and difficult. We have identified four priorities: first, trade in commodities; second, trade in services; third, financial flows and capital investments; and fourth, freedom of movement. We have made substantial progress with regard to the fourth priority — freedom of movement — by signing the visa facilitation agreement with the EU. Now we are waiting for it to be ratified. The other priorities are now the subject of talks between four working groups, which are aimed at achieving a new basic agreement with the European Union. Today (this interview was held on Sept. 7 — Ed. ) we had an important conference with our national associations of commodity producers. Together with representatives of the main Ukrainian industries, we are drawing up the key directives that will be taken into account in the negotiations on a free trade area and economic integration with the EU. So we are being very pragmatic and realistic.”

“The president and the prime minister are insisting on including the prospect of Ukraine’s EU membership in the new basic agreement. On the other hand, the European Union is offering us the European Neighborhood Policy. Moreover, EU Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner, who spoke recently about a future partnership, now says that the partnership policy ‘is clearly not for membership.’ What is your attitude to these EU proposals?

“We had a very good discussion with Ms. Ferrero-Waldner. I hold this high-ranking European Commission official in high esteem. My approach to the Neighborhood Policy is quite simple. Since this policy is called the ‘European Neighborhood Policy,’ I said to Ms. Ferrero-Waldner, ‘Either you rename it the ‘European Union Neighborhood Policy’ or, if it remains the ‘European Neighborhood Policy,’ I will give you a big map so that you will know that the center of Europe is in Transcarpathia.’ That’s the first thing. Second, there can only be some kind of politics in the Ukraine-Europe relations if it is a bilateral process, one that involves a ‘small state’ with ‘only’ 47 million residents, a territory larger than France, and a really enormous market. But if it is one-sided politics, it is no politics at all. We did not make a joint decision on the Neighborhood Policy. Thirdly, I am convinced that this policy has very good instruments, while we have a new base agreement as a good instrument. So let us include these good instruments of the Neighborhood Policy into the new basic agreement with the EU. And those states that are really neighbors of Europe can develop their relations with the EU within the framework of the Neighborhood Policy.”

Will our country manage to assert this vision of the development of mutual relations during the Ukraine-EU summit to be held in Kyiv shortly?

“This viewpoint has been repeatedly expressed on the official level. Actually, both the president and the prime minister of Ukraine will be defending this position. I once said that Ukraine’s foreign policy will speak with one voice. And when it does not speak with one voice, we are silent. In general, as you can see (touches wood) there has not been a single scandal in six months. But we all have the same position in this matter.”

Still, is Ukraine capable of using all the existing opportunities to further its interests in our relations with the European Union?

“We will be working to achieve the best result. You should be absolutely aware that everybody — the European Union and Ukraine — is pursuing their own interests here. I consider EU officials extremely professional negotiators. And I would like our side to adopt the same attitude to negotiations and have the same level of skill as the European Commission.”

Ukraine once pinned great hopes on the Yushchenko plan to settle the Transdnistrian crisis, supposedly a test for our country as a regional leader. Why did this plan fizzle?

“This plan will only come to fruition if there is willingness on all sides. But when willingness emerges and then disappears, and somebody tries to hold separate talks outside the plan and outside the prearranged format, it is very difficult to implement the plan, much to our regret. During my tenure as foreign minister, we have made several attempts to renew the 5 + 2 format. I can’t say we have achieved great success in this matter. But we have still managed to keep each of the sides from engaging in separate talks. That’s already a plus.”

Aside from this question, where else can Ukraine lay claim to regional leadership? During this year’s GUAM summit in Baku it was said that Azerbaijan is now the powerhouse of this regional organization. Before that, Tbilisi called Kyiv the powerhouse.”

“This is because Azerbaijan has taken over the GUAM presidency, which is normal. I will say this is good because Azerbaijan is by all accounts a powerhouse. It is a very powerful source of energy. I think GUAM is still important — at the regional level, of course. But what our regional potential depends on exclusively is the power of our state. The more powerful we are the stronger and more independent regional player we will be.”

How should we defend our interests in relations with Russia, which is, on the one hand, an important global and regional player that opposes NATO enlargement and, on the other, a huge market for Ukrainian goods and a source of energy resources?

“One should understand Russia’s role and place not only in the geopolitical and global format but also in our bilateral relations. First, there is an extremely high level of bilateral interdependence between our two countries. They depend on us and we depend on them. I’d like to underline the word ‘bilateral.’ Anyone who thinks that only we depend on Russia is sorely mistaken.

“Second, the complicated process of relations between Kyiv and Moscow did not emerge yesterday or the day before. [Viacheslav] Lypynsky once wrote very aptly that Kyiv bows either to Moscow or to Warsaw. Now we can say: to Moscow or to Brussels. I wish we would cooperate with the former and the latter, not bow to them.

“Neither the European Union nor NATO needs us with a truckload of problems with Russia. Do you know what should be done first in our relations? The level of mutual respect must be raised. Because we have everything else: economic and energy-related interests, close neighborhood, etc. What we lack is respect. But if we and our large neighbor manage to raise the level of mutual trust, there is a chance of success. Relations with Russia are in many respects formed by the domestic political situation. When we are united inside the country, it is far easier to form relations with any partner, including Russia. But once there are internal rifts, this immediately sparks negative consequences in external relations.”

Are you really going to reform the foreign ministry on the pattern of your Canadian counterpart, which performs both foreign policy and external economic functions? Is it worth adapting the Canadian experience to Ukrainian conditions?

“This is an element in the ‘economization’ of foreign policy activities. To carry something out, one should have an instrument. I am sure that, for the time being, we will carry out the economization by first establishing good personal contacts with the Ministry of Economics. We have held a joint conference on the activity of trade and economic missions as part of diplomatic institutions and streamlined the process of mission head appointments and mission funding. We have issued instructions about the protection of Ukrainian businesses and created a center to process queries about WTO membership. We have joined efforts to draft a new energy-related decree and intensified the negotiating process. These are the real things that we have done in the field of economization. This is a new thing. Naturally, no sweeping changes can be made in just four months.

“In general, real changes can only be achieved by means of an institution that has appropriate powers and mechanisms of implementation. We have a lot of ideas, but the mechanisms of implementation in the civil service are so uncertain that if you set one in motion, you will see the results only six months later.”

What do you think of the compliment that Prime Minister Yanukovych paid you at the conference of diplomatic representatives? At the same time he also said that Minister of Defense Anatolii Hrytsenko has an opinion that differs from the government’s 99 percent of the time.

“As a diplomat, I have to maintain good relations with everybody. I cannot even imagine that I might be in conflict with some cabinet ministers while holding the office of foreign minister. If I had the intention of getting embroiled in a conflict inside the cabinet, I would have refused to assume this office. I say this frankly. I did not join the government in order to create scandals in the country. I came so as to be able to travel all over the world and say, even if there is a difficult domestic situation: ‘Look, people, everything is fine in my country.’ This is my job, and I think I have done this as much as I could — from mediating political conflicts to stating in every corner of the world that there is no crisis, but there is political turbulence and misunderstandings among the political forces, which will pass and everything will be all right.

“So I think that if I had opted for a confrontation, even my ministry would not have understood me. And, above all, the president would not have understood me. What he needs is not a foreign minister who gallops on horse wielding a saber but one with an effective foreign policy. I will not say that we have made a major breakthrough in foreign policy. We have not. But I’d like to emphasize that foreign policy is not fireworks. There are no dazzling flashes. Foreign policy is not a show. I have not turned the foreign ministry into a circus or Ukrainian diplomats into showmen, nor have I ever used the ministry to realize any personal political ambitions. Foreign policy should be well-balanced, calm, and predictable. It is better to think twice and even keep silent than to lose your temper too often.”