Kuchma and Kuchmism As a Phenomenon

Ten years are a considerable period for a young country, especially when it marks a turning point in both domestic and world history. The Day’ s research center is proud to unveil a new project aimed at thoroughly analyzing these ten years. The commentaries below are the first steps in this direction. What does Kuchma’s presidency mean for Ukraine? What kind of legacy should we disown and what trends should be developed? The following roundtable was attended by our regular contributors and experts: Yevhen HOLOVAKHA, deputy director of the Institute for Social Studies; Andriy YERMOLAIEV, director of the Sophia Social Study Center; Vadym KARASYOV, director of the Institute for Global Strategies, and Volodymyr FESENKO, chairman of the board, Penta Political Study Center.

THE PRINCIPLE OF UNSCRUPULOUSNESS

How would you define Kuchma’s decade in office?

Volodymyr FESENKO: I would suggest two definitions, both of which are quite arbitrary, of course. Kuchma’s era was multifaceted and ambiguous. According to the first definition, it was a period of halftones with gray being the prevalent color. These halftones remind one of Pushkin: semidemocracy, semimarket economy, semimorals, and double standards. This list could be continued. The predominance of gray must have caused the desire for bright colors, and so the Kuchma epoch ended in the Orange Revolution.

The second definition involves a play on words. Kuchma’s sign of the zodiac is Leo and many people in his entourage also had this sign. Why do I mention this? Because since the days of Machiavelli there have been two types of political elite: lions and foxes. In this sense the Kuchma period is marked by lions behaving like foxes and foxes wearing lion masks.

Andriy YERMOLAIEV: Metaphorically speaking, it’s an era of cynical romanticism. As for its essence, I believe Kuchma’s period in office cannot claim epochal status. An epoch is a period of time associated with the building of a nation-state. This period dates back to Soviet times, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the first steps toward independence, and Leonid Kravchuk’s presidency. In this sense Leonid Kuchma’s period is the final and most cynical phase in terms of managing the newly achieved national independence and statehood. Another characteristic is that the Kuchma period is also associated with the completion of the primary accumulation and formation of private national capital. This phase is also rooted in the Soviet period, specifically the perestroika campaign, when the first echelon of large private capital was formed, the first cooperatives appeared, and party functionaries used party funds to start a business. The first years of independence saw the formation of echeloned risk (speculative) capital, while the Kuchma period saw the final legitimization of this capital when it became target-oriented, when sectoral interests emerged, along with the mechanisms and rights of the political lobby. This becomes the conditional formation of what we would later call a regime.

The final stage of Kuchma’s presidency is the functioning of his administration as a regime, with a clear-cut hierarchy, conditional division of labor, echeloned elite that actually ran the state, and clearly outlined spheres of this elite’s business and political interests. If one were to characterize the statehood of that period, I’d call it an anticrisis one, where the anticrisis policy was primarily geared to prevent any external threats while ignoring the mounting internal ones. It’s true that Ukraine hasn’t experienced any cataclysms, such as those suffered by most of the other former Soviet republics, particularly ethnic conflicts and formidable social rifts. Another thing is what instruments were used by the Ukrainian government to ward off such conflicts. Another characteristic of Ukrainian statehood during this period is the very tangible impact of outside forces. Here, such techniques as joint ownership of the economy were employed. Consider this metaphor: Leonid Kuchma’s regime actually set up a secret joint venture with big Russian business, but this is yet to be ascertained by economists and political scientists. Quite often external threats were neutralized by considerable foreign political concessions (e.g., the nuclear nonproliferation treaty — Ed.). Let me conclude with my opening statement: the end of the Kuchma regime marks the end of the first stage of the national revolution. Now we can only talk of entering the next phase where we have to solve most other tasks of this national democratic revolution, which were faced by most of the former Soviet republics after the union’s collapse. As head of state, Leonid Kuchma proved incompetent in that he was unable to designate or solve any tasks during this second phase. The latter started being implemented by his political enemies. Herein lies the intrigue of the transition period.

V.F.: The reason must be that the requirements were too much for him; he couldn’t measure up during his second term in office. That’s the problem with the year 1999. He couldn’t upgrade himself. What made them bring out Viktor Yushchenko? Hence another definition: an era marked by ill-used or wasted time.

A.Ye.: Leonid Kuchma came to power in conditions of revolt and stepped down in conditions of revolt, although this time it was kept civilized, more rational, and it had better prospects.

Vadym KARASYOV: Perhaps this is a problem that addresses not so much Kuchma as it does Ukraine, I mean people coming to power in conditions of revolt. Using that lion and fox metaphor, I would rather describe this political epoch, especially its second phase, as one marked by the leftists being oppressed by the lions, considering that the left forces lost much of their influence toward the end of the second phase. This doesn’t have to do with Kuchma as much as it does with the times and practical history since the 1990s. We should perhaps analyze 12 years instead of 10, because Kuchma started [in politics] in 1992, when the red managers’ lobby made him prime minister and did their best to trigger off a crisis that accompanied the 1994 presidential campaign. I would therefore describe these years, by analogy with Soviet history, as an era of mastering “virgin and dependent lands,” because this period saw the building of the Ukrainian nation-state. Even though the Kuchma era had a rather disheartening finale, Ukraine has become a national state over the past 10 years, even if it is not a full democracy or civil society.

However, the fact that historical work continued to build Ukraine politically and economically during these years — alternately despite and thanks to Kuchma’s efforts — should be described as one of the results of this period. During this period recognition of the Ukrainian nation-state above all by the eastern part of this country took place. Naturally, the nation-state idea had long been uppermost in the minds of the people and the political and intellectual elites in western Ukraine. However, during these ten years eastern Ukraine and its industrial elite realized that the only serious resource of economic dominance is the state. From this point of view, the reorientation of eastern Ukraine toward internal, their own, resources was very important (although we now have different concepts of Ukraine and the Ukrainian nation). The emphasis was shifted from the Russian direction and in the direction of domestic resources and mastering Ukraine as an idea unto itself. Let me say again that Ukraine as an idea can be interpreted in a number of ways; I believe that the debate on these concepts continues; it continues being inspired and stimulated, and it will continue during the next presidential campaign, maybe even afterwards, because we still aren’t sure about Ukraine as a postnation in the European Union or as a sovereign state in Eastern Europe, and so on. However, the fact that there is a Ukrainian elite that exists not on the humanitarian, intellectual or dissident level, but one that is rooted in politics, business, perhaps even in geoeconomic interests, remains one of the most tangible results of this decade.

Speaking of the ideology of the political regime in Ukraine during this decade, it conducted an essentially unideological policy. Those at the top used a lot of Euro-Atlantic and European integration rhetoric; most of the people in Kuchma’s entourage, including the head of state, didn’t regard accession to the EU and Euro-Atlantic structures as domestic and foreign political priorities, hence the notorious multivectoral policy that actually had only two projections: the domestic one, aimed at balancing between the rightists and leftists so the regime could remain in the so- called pragmatic unideological center (hence the centrist and unideological parties and political projects). On the other hand, this multivectoral foreign policy was a modern version of the Hetman State: trying to hunt with the hounds and run with the hare in the midst of Russia, Europe, and the United States. However, toward the end of his presidency Leonid Kuchma showed a preference for Russia, for obvious reasons and circumstances. Even so it didn’t contradict the unprincipled stand in Ukraine’s foreign and, most likely, domestic policy, as well as its lack of sound ideology and pragmatism. In this sense the new era is a counterpoint compared to that of Leonid Kuchma; the new government, in contrast, is trying to create an era of what appears to be moral fundamentalism and clearer guidelines for external centers of integration and influence.

THE END OF THE SECOND ERA OF STAGNATION

V.F.: Vadym mentioned a non- ideological, positivistic stand. I would go further and offer another definition of this era: the era of imitation policy. Kuchma, by the same token, could be defined as an outstanding imitator. After all, [he and his regime] imitated democratic progress, European and Euro-Atlantic choice, along with many other things. But the imitation resource remained unutilized until the end of his second term in office.

V.K.: Better to be a great imitator than the Grand Inquisitor. But this is not a problem with Kuchma but the times and Ukraine as such. It was a policy of imitation that lacked an adequate response to challenges rather than a planned strategy.

Larysa IVSHYNA: I think you’ve hit the nail on the head, because in fact we’re trying to analyze a politician acting under certain circumstances. I will take the liberty of reminding all those present that Leonid Kuchma was prime minister when he was elected president. People with enough analytical capacity would know what to expect from him as head of state. We know the old saying that you don’t have to drink the entire sea to know that it’s salty. President Kuchma was launched on the basis of two main slogans: (a) the East and its interests that are still to be fully comprehended, which appear twisted and artificially attached to Ukraine’s domestic life, and (b) the struggle against corruption.

A.Ye.: Combating corruption proved to be a great discovery, especially for political scientists.

V.K.: Today I would call the key technology in politics the presumption of corruption.

Before the 1994 presidential campaign, the overall impression was that the biggest problem with Ukrainian politics was the inadequacy of tasks and those who were supposed to fulfill them. The last decade was controversial rather than civilized in the higher echelons of power. Leonid Kuchma, however, had a retinue that included people, some of whom actually knew what they were doing, and some of them did accomplish certain things. How would you assess the first and second terms of his presidency, considering that they marked different degrees of maturity of this society, and also from the standpoint of adequate or inadequate management of this country?

Yevhen HOLOVAKHA: I’ve heard numerous statements that are correct and which rather accurately assess this era, so I will add only a few touches to this picture. Suppose we start by aphoristically saying that [Kuchma’s] administration succeeded in adapting most of our people to a social order that most of our people disliked. I believe that this was a very significant paradox. Over the last five years our surveys showed that people were actively adjusting themselves to the regime, as evidenced by a number of indices, including service record, social status, and so on. All this happened against the backdrop of a great deal of disillusionment, rejection, and distrust of the government. And there was another paradox. Those who had adjusted best to the existing political system appeared to be most dissatisfied with Leonid Kuchma. We noted this paradox and the depressing surveys showed that it was most apparent among people representing small and medium- sized businesses. Their social status was worlds apart from that of pensioners. Yet pensioners, being the most vulnerable social category, mostly supported Kuchma’s successor, whereas prospering businessmen, people with more or less stable and well-paying jobs, intellectuals, were mostly against the regime.

How would I describe Kuchma’s decade in office? There is no denying that this was a peaceful period in Ukraine’s development. He made it clear that this was one of his greatest accomplishments and I think we should agree with him. There were no interethnic conflicts, and even interconfessional confrontations eventually abated, except for some hotbeds. Some 8 years ago, I said that it would take at least 30 years to secure normal conditions for our development. In this sense we may have lost several years by living in an era of stagnation. What did happen in that period? There was a process of privatization of human minds, when people began to realize that the state, various ideas, and political parties weren’t the main thing, that the main thing was those people’s interests. This was prepared well by the Brezhnev epoch. I believe that Leonid Kuchma gave us another decade of peace and quiet. But in doing so he may also have created social strata that no longer needed this peace and quiet. Of course, we understand only too well that hearing about “all of Ukraine” going to the Maidan is a gross overstatement. There were several hundred thousand people, who were very actively supported by several very influential figures. The others remained passive. Most of them morally supported the oppostion; much was said about this even under Leonid Kuchma and your newspaper; the opposition had this moral support, not the government. It was as though another era of stagnation were drawing to a close.

Mr. Holovakha, would you please specify whether the moral majority stood for the opposition or for reforms and against Leonid Kuchma?

Ye.H.: I absolutely agree with your comparisons concerning the stagnation period. I think that there are no analogs in the sense of social characters and social processes, but in the sense of sentimental tectonics the period of 2003-04 somehow reminds me of 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev was greeted by society. No one knew what he would do next, no one knew his program and his team, but the people eagerly expected changes for the better and this played into his hand. Their expectation lasted for several years and their disillusionment came when they obtained practical results.

FROM KUCHMISM TO YUSHCHENKOISM

L.I.: When you ask the Chinese about the French Revolution, they say it happened only a while ago, so nothing can be said for sure. Apparently we can’t tell at this stage what people will think of the Kuchma period and those who replaced him and his administration. However, speaking of the trends during that period, it’s possible to assume that Kuchma, as an obscure MP who never took the floor at the Verkhovna Rada as prime minister and later as president, suited both the red managers and the nomenklatura, who believed he wouldn’t get in their way, no matter what. But then events took a totally unexpected turn, followed by the crises of that period. Leonid Kuchma could have ended his political career differently than he did in 2004. Here it seems important to point out the catalysts behind those negative trends. What political forces, what political figures, who are still sitting pretty, should be held responsible for these trends? After all, this is another important component of the Kuchma period. Here we’re broaching another extremely sensitive subject: Kuchma and Kuchmism as a phenomenon.

V.F.: I suppose we should start by defining Kuchmism.

V.K.: I feel that Kuchmism is over and that Yushchenkoism is underway. No, I’m not being sarcastic. Yushchenko’s ideology today is manifest in this country’s foreign policy, and it may become even more apparent when building a hegemonic party, rather than one that is simply in power, something like the People’s Union “Our Ukraine.” We’ll figure out everything soon enough. Of course, there’ll be different concepts, things will be viewed from different angles, there will be more bright colors and less gray. That’s only natural for an historical process. But we can offer some judgments right now. First, I think that in many respects Leonid Kuchma acted in a state of “weightlessness” in his early years in office. He had to get a foothold to have a more or less controllable administration. True, his foothold proved rather shaky. Later, especially during Kuchma’s second term, this foothold was more like clutching at straws while sinking in a swamp, which finally determined his sad political finale. Speaking of mechanisms of state administration, we find ourselves faced with problems related to this administration’s social, political, and economic basis. It’s true that Kuchma was promoted by the industrial lobby, but it was when the single [Soviet] national economic complex began falling apart, ties with Russian counterparts started to be severed, when privatization began and small and medium businesses started taking shape, when the political system and the economic might of the [red] directors started being destroyed. In this sense he was already getting carte blanche to create vehicles of power that suited him best — or which agreed with his vision of Ukraine.

Leonid Kuchma’s social basis also narrowed in the course of the election campaigns. Economic depression plus a longing for the good old Soviet days, plus an ambiguous foreign political course — all this lowered his ratings. In a year, maybe a year and half, Leonid Kuchma lost the social basis of his political regime. And he had no political basis, nor could he have ever had one by definition because there were two main political parties in Ukraine, the Communists and RUKH, both inherited from the Soviet period, with absolutely nothing in between, where centrist party projects began to materialize only toward the end of his presidency. Thus, the so-called financial and industrial groups, oligarchs, and other political capitalists could form the only possible basis of his power and his mechanisms. By the way, none of them came out of the blue or were inherited by Kuchma from the previous regime; they stemmed from his policies and those of the Verkhovna Rada, also from privatization and other political preferences bestowed on some political or business groups or others, ranging from Lazarenko to the ensuing oligarchic wars. In steering a middle course between them (promoting some, demoting others, crowding out others), one could run the Ukrainian state. Hence the simulated political course, the absence of style and principle, along with all the other “benefits” of what we know as oligarchic capitalism, oligarchic democracy, or political capitalism formed on the basis of exclusive access to state resources, central budget, privatization contracts, and so on, because there were no stable institutions to preserve central power.

L.I.: Excuse me, Mr. Karasyov, some could bank on political parties, of course, but you know only too well about political rifts, particularly in the case of RUKH. What about the 1999 campaign? Comrades Symonenko and Vitrenko weren’t that much of a red threat at the time, were they? Kuchma is responsible for reviving it; in a way, he was an able campaign manager provided he could act backstage, at an obscure level. This technique proved to be effective for a decade.

V.F.: I believe that we’ve just touched on a very important subject. In my opinion, Kuchma was a brilliant tactician and an absolutely incompetent strategist. He was an excellent intuitive; he could always sense what was happening and how he should act under the circumstances. Yet there was no strategy; what strategy he implemented was dictated by others, outside Ukraine, and he and his team took all those bits and pieces to build their structure. The West demanded something and so did Russia. So we must figure out eclectically what originated from where. The main thing was survival and reproduction. On the other hand, we must assess that era objectively. It was a transitional era, so in a way Kuchma and his regime adequately reflected the controversies and problems of the times. Even the numerous deformities of that regime reflect those of the social consciousness during this period. Nevertheless, Kuchma must be credited for preventing trends that might have led to crises and conflicts. We also tend to forget that Ukraine could have followed in Belarus’s footsteps. I’m not saying that preventing this is entirely Kuchma’s doing. But someone else in his place, someone with stronger authoritarian beliefs, could have nipped in the bud Ukraine’s democratic trends, however distorted, and the same is true of promoting a market economy.

V.K.: We couldn’t have had an authoritarian leader because of our landscape and regional peculiarities. If we had had only western Ukraine, we’d have long been in the European Union. Without the west, eastern Ukraine would have long ago become part of Russia. What unites these regions, along with the Crimea, creates a unique situation.

(To be continued)