On the norms of dissident movement

Some are saying that Ukrainians are too busy now to care about what is going on in other countries. This erroneous presumption does not, luckily, mirror all the sentiments of Ukrainian society and politicians. One cannot possibly ignore the events in Russia and Europe, for they have a direct impact on the Ukrainian situation. However, the adequate knowledge of something may sometimes give way to cliches.

As for Russia, what really matters now is not only the degree and nature of the Kremlin’s interference into Ukrainian affairs, but also a comparison between the civic movement in Ukraine and Russian society.

And, like in the case of the Ukrainian state, which qualitatively differs from the Russian quasi-state model, we must say that there are similar differences in social development.

Let me repeat what I said, one way or another, in my previous publications on this subject. Way back in 2008, when Nemtsov and Milov published an empty report on Putin’s rule, which was then repeatedly republished with some additions, it became clear that while the pro-governmental elite had been and was being updated, the opposition elite was not. Moreover, it does not want to. It tends to hold a monopoly on being oppositional, and its members are used to existing in the conditions of already-apportioned niches, roles, and statuses.

It was not yet too much clear at the time that they were not all the champions of democracy but people of the 1990s, who were accustomed to existing in the conditions of inter-clan strife and serving one oligarch or another. They were opponents of Putin and his inner circle but not at all adversaries, let alone convinced adversaries. In a note dated 2011, an activist describes the way people were co-opted into the opposition elite:

“At a meeting of Moscow activists on October 5, Boris Nemtsov was asked why the leadership of a still unformed coalition included not only him, Kasyanov, and Ryzhkov, but also Milov who was virtually unknown to the masses and had no supporters in the organization. Nemtsov answered that what really mattered was not only the repute of a politician and the number of people he would bring to the future party. Milov and his Democratic Choice will take on 25 percent of expenses on party formation. Four politicians, who represented four organizations, signed an agreement on September 15 to form a coalition. And each of these politicians takes on an equal share of funding.

“It is normal and fair if a shareholding company, not a non-governmental organization, is being established. Is this a political party or a joint-stock company of sorts?”

Milov and Nemtsov were, until they broke up, and still are, individually, the most rabid denunciators of corruption and financial non-transparency among the ruling elite. But neither they nor any other oppositionists have ever said where they take money for their activities. At best, they say a hackneyed phrase about the necessity of financial secrecy in a time of persecutions.

A financial scandal also accompanied the so-called Coordination Council of the Opposition, a stillborn new political entity. Neither the amount of donations nor the way the raised funds were spent has ever been made public.

I have already spoken about disappearance of a democratic opposition and replacement of a democratic discourse by a populist and nationalistic one. This was caused not in the least by such a Russian particularity as the fusion of politics and business and the privatization of not only the authorities, not only the state, but also of civic movements. As for the ruling elite, it is a long- and much-discussed matter. But don’t you dare touch the opposition elite! It is in fact a sacred cow that shows no ability to reflect on things.

Political business is quite a normal thing for spin masters, flacks, journalists, psychologists, lawyers, makeup artists, stylists, bodyguards, and many other professions – but not for politicians. Whenever they do this business, it is called corruption if they are in power or venality if they are in opposition. Their profit is not personal enrichment but an opportunity to boost their status and come to power.

Russia is a different thing: as the opposition stands no chances to come to power by a political way as such, the ruling elite must co-opt it into itself. Participation in political business is a form of this co-optation. What is more, only the authorities can call the tune – directly or indirectly.

This is a framework, the external conditions. But there are also some internal restrictions. Under the influence of spin masters, who work in a market environment, politicians began to fetishize such thing as “agenda.” This is also an instance of substituting market-related thinking for political thinking – a politician in Russia, unlike one in other countries, will not aim to influence the agenda, proceeding from his principles and goals. He will adjust them to circumstances.

But the Russian market is of an administrative and nomenklatura-related nature. It buys and sells statuses and niches as well as uses them as legal tender. I can remember an interview of Indira Gandhi after the elections she lost in the late 1970s. She said she was going to do politics. The interviewer was surprised, for she was no longer holding an office. The answer was simple: doing politics has nothing to do with offices.

This simple answer would not be right, however, in modern-day Russia. Here, the status of an oppositionist and a place in the opposition hierarchy is bestowed by the head of the governmental chain of command, which the oppositional chain fits in with. Those who wish can trace this on the example of Vladimir Ryzhkov whose latest interview (http://www.gazeta.ru/ politics/2014/02/04_a_5881461.shtml? fb_action_ids=766228496738701&fb_ action_types=og.recommends&fb_ source=aggregation&fb_aggregation_id=288381481237582) testifies to complete domestication. And the point is not at all in that he recognizes Putin’s successes and the relatively high living standards of the potential oppositional strata. This calls for a different and very important point to interpret the motivation of political behavior.

The opposition and the government share the view that only a deteriorated material situation and the sagging living standards can cause people to protest. Both the government and the opposition deny society an idealistic motivation.

But it is this motivation that brought people to the Maidan. Yet Ryzhkov puts it all down to a poor economic situation in Ukraine and draws a conclusion that this kind of protest is impossible in Russia, where things are much better.

It is also a brazen and outright lie when Ryzhkov alleges that Putin is “loosening the screws.” This sounds particularly cynical against the background of a trial of participants in Bolotnaya Square protests. The meanness of both the government and the opposition is obvious. The authorities have declared a partial amnesty, leaving in the dock the rank-and-file protesters who insist they are innocent. They are now facing five to six years in prison on the charges which not only are negligible (a defendant pulled a riot policeman by the sleeve and thus caused him unbearable moral anguish), but have never been proved in court. It is all clear as far as the authorities are concerned. But opposition leaders are exhibiting unsportsmanlike behavior.

At the very beginning of the trial, Valeria Novodvorskaya, a veteran anti-Soviet fighter, recalled some moral norms of the dissident movement. If a messenger with banned literature was arrested, responsibility for this was claimed by the senders and recipients of the parcel. This ran absolutely counter to the security services’ and just Soviet idea of human nature.

And the behavior of the current Bolotnaya Square leaders is just in line with this idea. They have set up the defendants and do not even try to defend them. They took part in a recent – miserable and low-key – action in defense of the prisoners, walked down Moscow boulevards, and said very few words. A broken life of several young people is payment for the fact that opposition leaders have received a chance to boost and consolidate their status which quite suits the authorities.

This is the situation in Russia. It has nothing to do with the one in Ukraine. It is a different country, a different society, and different people and citizens. Being aware of this difference is much more important than lengthy rigmaroles about Kyivan Rus’, archeological cultures, and anthropological measurements. What really matters is what is here and now.