Waiting for Warsaw

The deal at the NATO summit in Warsaw in July is becoming clear. The talk at the GLOBSEC security conference in Bratislava [April 15-17. – Ed.] was that “persistent rotation” is all but agreed upon. That means – a big shift – quite large numbers of US and other foreign troops regularly moving in and out of the frontline states.

Moreover, it looks likely that the headquarters for NATO’s new rapid-reaction force will be based in Poland: not quite a “base,” but still a symbolic and physical reminder of the Alliance’s commitment to territorial defense. (Polish politicians need to grasp that Congress is not going to pay for another full-size permanent overseas base – with the laundromats, schools and Burger Kings that entails – at a time when bases are being closed in jurisdictions whose citizens can vote.)

These are necessary, but not yet sufficient, conditions to allay the region’s security worries. The Kremlin still has two advantages. NATO’s decision-making is too slow. Russia can create chaos – riots, ecological and infrastructure emergencies, problems with transit to Kaliningrad – as a pretext for “humanitarian” intervention. The frontline states invoke the alliance’s Article 5. But the North Atlantic Council might take days to be sufficiently convinced to authorize a military response. By that time it might be too late.

What we need, on top of NATO, is a “coalition of the speedy.” Countries which have the ability to deploy troops quickly to the region should practice doing so on their own, and with each other, alongside – but independently from – NATO’s own efforts. The United States, Britain, the Netherlands and Norway could do this; Germany too, given the hawkish remarks of its defense minister, Ursula von der Leyen at GLOBSEC. Non-NATO Sweden and Finland could also do a lot to bolster their eastern neighbors.

But Russia has another advantage: weight. The Kremlin has the military edge in the Baltic region: more troops, better air defenses and lots of tactical nuclear weapons. This gives it what in military jargon is called “escalation dominance.” In the early stages of a conflict, it can simply raise the stakes; if the “coalition of the speedy” failed to deter an attack, the West would rapidly be dependent on the ultimate nuclear guarantee.

In theory, NATO would not confine its response to Russian aggression in the Baltics to that particular region. If Russia attacks NATO anywhere, NATO attacks Russia everywhere. But the plans for such a comprehensive response do not yet exist. Policymakers in Washington or elsewhere might flinch at starting World War III. Russia knows that – which creates a dangerous temptation to test the West’s resolve.

Luckily, we have a better deterrent than nuclear weapons: money. Russia’s Achilles heel is its dependence on the Western financial system. It uses the capital markets and the payments system, and its elite launders its loot through offshore, and onshore, companies.

What we need to do now is rehearse how to exploit these vulnerabilities. At GLOBSEC, I launched the idea of “financial snap exercises.” The Kremlin holds these intimidating drills with tanks and planes. We would form a transatlantic group of financial regulators, spooks, cops and prosecutors, and ask them to work out what – in an emergency – they could do to quickly freeze and seize Russian assets, and shut Russia out of the world’s financial network, as painfully as possible.

Simply holding such exercises (and leaking a few details) would signal to Russia that we are serious about deterrence. They would also highlight the legal, logistical and other difficulties we might experience in a genuine crisis. Better to solve them in advance. That way we will never need to do them in real life.

Edward Lucas is a Senior Vice President at the Center for European Policy Analysis