“An allied threat”

These days three years ago, the Ukrainian Armed Forces were fighting to liberate Ukrainian cities of the Donbas from the Russian and collaborator forces. The Ukrainian troops had already come close to the regional capitals of Donetsk and Luhansk, but still failed at liberating them. It was those days that the turning point effectively occurred. Russian troops had been present in the territory of Ukraine before, but after the Kremlin-occupied territories started facing the “threat” of liberation, additional Russian units openly crossed our border and stopped the advance of Ukrainian troops. Then there was the Ilovaisk encirclement on Independence Day – a tragedy that finally broke, mainly psychologically, the Armed Forces and volunteer units. There were significant losses, both in personnel and armament and equipment. Of course, the other side suffered losses which were just as high if not higher. However, it was then that the active hostilities were stopped and the Minsk Protocol, which was unfavorable for Ukraine, was signed. Some experts and soldiers have stressed that the Ukrainian military and political leadership needed to choose another tactic, and instead of splitting up the Ukrainian forces which were anyway too few to encircle Donetsk and Luhansk, they had to squeeze out the enemy troops.

The truth of the matter will hopefully be clarified in the course of time. Today, let us draw our readers’ attention to the fact that the threat from the north-east and even the north remains just as dangerous as it was three years ago. On the one hand, Russian troops still remain in Crimea and parts of the Donbas, as well as in the Russian territory adjacent to the borders of Ukraine. On the other hand, the major Russian-Belarusian military exercise Zapad 2017 is planned for September in the territory of the Union State. “It will be a grand exercise stretching from the Kola Peninsula to Voronezh and involving all military components, even the Military Space Forces,” former Chief of the Security Service of Ukraine Ihor Smeshko said during a meeting with Den’s Summer School of Journalism students. “This exercise aims, first of all, to test the nerves of Ukraine and our northwestern neighbors. It is intended to demonstrate military force for both domestic consumption and the Western world.”

“The number of troops, the exercise venue, and the list of units to be deployed have not been disclosed. If this is a defensive exercise, then these parameters should be made public, as the Vienna Document requires it,” former First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Ihor Kabanenko continued on the topic at the same meeting. “It should be noted that the problem of this exercise arose quite far back in time after the Russian General Staff started planning to use a huge number of railway platforms for deployment of Russian troops in Belarus, calling for over 4,000 railway cars and platforms. Such an amount can move a whole army over a long distance. As for Ukraine’s role during the Zapad 2017 exercise, there is a threat of it allowing an offensive army grouping to form close to our northern border, a kind of force concentration hanging over from the north from Chernihiv to Kovel. Various scenarios can unfold, and I hope that the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is analyzing the situation and taking appropriate measures. We remember how events developed in 2014, when Russian troops stood near Chernihiv as if poised in the direction of Kyiv. In my opinion, Ukraine should be ready to respond adequately.”

The latest news say that Russian President Vladimir Putin submitted to the State Duma on August 10 a federal bill entitled “On Ratification of the Protocol on Amendments and Additions to the Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus on Joint Protection of the External Border of the Union State Airspace and the Creation of a Joint Regional Air Defense System of the Russian Federation and Republic of Belarus, Signed on February 3, 2009.”

The protocol itself, which is mentioned in the bill, was signed on November 2, 2016 in Minsk. It refines the terms of the Agreement and inserts amendments relating to the organizational structure of the Russian Armed Forces and the procedures for the use of weapons and military equipment by air defense duty officers as they perform joint combat missions.

However, the bill itself was submitted to parliament just a month before a joint exercise is to start in Belarus, proving the link existing between these matters.

This detail was highlighted, in particular, by representative of Ukraine in the security issues working group of the Trilateral Contact Group Yevhen Marchuk, who posted on Facebook: “Notice the following: the protocol was drafted on February 3, 2009 (four years before the war!), signed on November 2, 2016 in Minsk (in the third year of the war) and submitted to the State Duma for ratification only on August 10, 2017 (in the fourth year of the war and a month before a major Russian-Belarusian military exercise is to start in the territory of Belarus). Do you think this reflects just the slow-moving Russian bureaucracy? For those who do not know it yet, the air defense of the Union State includes not only air defense missiles, but also fighter aircraft, powerful early detection radars, and some elements of the Russian Armed Forces’ Air Space Force. This is just the beginning of our analysis. Let us recall where President Alexander Lukashenko recently had a friendly state visit and what nice pro-Ukrainian statements he made during it. We should not lower our guard. We know that the ‘external border of the Union State’ runs along the Belarusian-Ukrainian international border as well.”

COMMENTARY

Victor MARTINOVICH, Belarusian political analyst, author:

“I believe that Alexander Lukashenko is not an idiot. Till now, he has quite competently exposed threats to his person, even where they were absent but could have emerged in theory. The presence of a large contingent of the Russian armed forces in Belarus calls into question Lukashenko’s monopoly of power. He is used to being the supreme authority in his country. They even limit issuance of hunting weapons licenses to people, so as not to increase the number of weapons at the disposal of the population. So, I doubt that Lukashenko will allow the Russian contingent to remain here as he embarks on a demilitarization effort. A temporary reconciliation with the West suggests that Lukashenko is trying to hedge his bets by looking beyond the Russian Federation. He does not need Russia as the only partner, because it may never leave Belarus in such a case. The Union State project is currently being considered by both parties as obsolete. What we are seeing on Putin’s side is another big project, called the Eurasian Economic Union. Putin, of course, seeks to gradually restore the Soviet Union based on Eurasian treaties. We, for example, take part in the Customs Union. There is a package of documents signed within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which includes Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. However, laws and treaties are in effect in Belarus only as long as they do not scare Lukashenko.

“Of course, I am concerned about the joint exercises being held by the Russian Federation and Belarus, in which one can discern anti-Western intentions. Still, Lukashenko is alive, healthy, and very cunning. It encourages me. Lukashenko is so firmly in control of the situation in the country that he needs to invent threats. When we had protests in the spring, the criminal cases against so-called patriots were just fabricated outright. That is, they invented charges against people in question to keep others in fear. There is another point to it. According to my personal observations, Putin is more popular than Lukashenko among the Belarusian security forces. I believe that Lukashenko is aware of this and draws conclusions accordingly. Given this, it is unlikely, as I said before, that he will allow the Russian troops to remain on our soil.”