Islamic community getting Ukrainized, in a way

The Muslim world has always been an important factor in Europe’s domestic policies. This thesis has been confirmed over the past several years in a global context and in terms of Ukrainian realities. Ukraine’s ethnic Islamic community has become an important factor of the confrontation with Russia in Crimea and in the east of this country. Oriental and Islamic studies are doubtlessly becoming strategically important. In Ukraine, these studies are rooted in tradition dating back hundreds of years (there is no need to start from scratch), but there are many aspects still to be researched. More on this in the following interview with Mykhailo YAKUBOVYCH, head of the Islamic Study Center at the Ostroh Academy National University.

We know that Ukraine’s first mosque was built in Ostroh, that it was actually built by Ukrainians, not by the Crimean Khanate or the Ottoman Empire; that the project was initiated and carried out by Konstanty Ostrogski [Kostiantyn of Ostroh], born to an old Ukrainian aristocratic family, a magnate of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania; that he built the mosque for the Tatars in his service. Symbolically, a scholar from Ostroh did the first unabridged Ukrainian translation of the Qur’an from the Arabic. Does this mean that Ostroh is one of Ukraine’s Islamic study centers?

“Historical traditions rooted in Volyn at that distant time (primarily owing to the Ostroh Academy in the 16th-17th centuries, focusing on the Muslim world) are extremely interesting subjects for researchers. We would, of course, like to uphold these traditions. I’m sure that there is a lot of work still to be done there. Last year, the Islamic Study Center opened in Ostroh, largely thanks to Mr. Ihor Pasichnyk. Two international events have been organized since then: a summer Islamic study school and a conference on Turkey-Ukraine relationships that involved members of the Turkish parliament. We have a student exchange program with Turkey and work has started on a project aimed at studying the impact of the [current] military and political crisis on the ethnic Muslim communities of Ukraine. That’s a good beginning. God willing, we will keep making progress.”

A KORAN PAGE REWRITTEN IN 1804 / Photo from the website islam.in.ua

It has been four years since the launch of the first edition of the Qur’an in Ukrainian. How has this publication influenced the Islamic community in Ukraine and Oriental studies in general?

“Recently, the third and fourth editions appeared in print in Turkey and Ukraine. The ethnic Islamic community is getting Ukrainized, in a way. There is an increasing number of Ukrainian Muslims and a number of people representing other ethnic groups who see Ukraine as their fatherland. They are expressly patriotic, taking an interest in the Ukrainian language and culture. Muslims are in the ranks of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and volunteer battalions in Donbas, fighting the enemy shoulder to shoulder with people of other confessions, defending their homeland. Among them are Crimean Tatars, Ukrainians, and people from the Caucasus. Due to various reasons, most ethnic Islamic communities are Russian-speaking, but the status and role of the Ukrainian language have been on an upward curve with each passing year. I can see that my translation [of the Qur’an] is quoted increasingly often. This means that my work found its place – and that’s why I did it in the first place.”

How would you assess Oriental, Arab, and Islamic studies in Ukraine? Is there continuity – I mean tradition – in terms of research, a link with the achievements of the first Ukrainian Orientalists, particularly Ahatanhel Krymsky?

“Frankly speaking, the impression is that our Orientalists – and not only they – are acting on an every-man-for-himself basis. We have no strong professional associations of Orientalists, as is the case in the West, where each annual convention of such associations turns into an exhibit of individual achievements, an exchange of ideas. One ought to bear in mind that Orientalism includes studies of medieval cultural relics of the Middle East and the sociopolitical activities of separate modern Muslim communities. I mean, it is a vast field of endeavor where some can conduct research on subjects that are far removed from those of others, but where there can be a unifying approach, a common denominator of general knowledge – be it Islam, Islamic culture, or the Orient (Buddhism, China), but these are separate topics. In Ukraine, we have separate researchers, rather than schools, and what these researchers do often end when they end; there is no follow-up even in their graduate students’ theses. Regrettably, it is easier to reach an understanding with colleagues abroad than at home. I realized this as an intern in the United States, Germany, Canada, and other countries. This year began tragically for our Orientalist community, with the passing of Roman Hamada, an expert on Iran, thanks to whose translations from the Persian Ukrainians can read Saadi of Shiraz and other Oriental classics. I can’t think of anyone who could measure up to him and keep up the good job in the near future.”

Den recently wrote about your historical feature entitled “Great Volyn and the Muslim Orient,” about Muslim presence in Volyn and the importance of using Muslim sources when studying the history of that Ukrainian region. What were the most significant discoveries you made in the course of your research? How important Muslim sources are for Ukrainian historiography? What are their advantages and limitations compared to other sources?

“There are a number of medieval sources in Arabic and Persian, concerning Rus’. Note that I didn’t say ‘Kyivan Rus’.’ Arab scholars didn’t use the word combination, because they didn’t know it (it originates from modern scholars). They knew Rus’ or Ros’; they knew the region of Kyiv and other cities of Rus’. In the course of research, it transpired that Arab geographers, such as Al-Masudi and Al-Idrisi were quite familiar with [separate] regions of Ukraine, specifically Volyn. Al-Masudi wrote about a ‘vallnana’ Slavic tribe in the 10th century. Whether he referred to Volynians remains to be established, but I’m sure he did). Al-Idrisi believed that Peresopnytsia was the biggest and most important city of the region. Compact Lipka Tatar communities in 16th-century Volyn were also studied, along with their culture, lifestyle, and handwritten literary heritage. I believe it’s time we made translations and published a volume or two of everything the Arab and Persian researchers wrote about Ukraine. Such translations should be based on modern critical treatises and manuscripts in Arabic and Persian. Such translations are found in Poland and Russia. We have none, just some excerpts – and I regret to say that I don’t expect any in the near future. This means that our historians will continue to quote from someone else’s translations that can’t guarantee accuracy. Let me tell you frankly, [doing our own translations] would cost the state peanuts, considering other expenditures. All it takes is putting together a team of several Arabists, giving them a reasonable budget, helping them publish their works while hiring a couple of foreign consultants. However, there is our scholarly bureaucracy. They are prone to refuse to recognize such translations as scholarly works, unlike all those hundreds of MA theses and doctorates that no one but their authors has bothered to read from beginning to end.”

 TATAR TOWER / Photo from the website islam.in.ua

Over the past three years, the public stand taken by a number of Muslims in Ukraine, their patriotism, has won them respect in this country. Do you think that official policy has had anything to do with this positive trend? What are the key factors in the ethnic Muslim community’s integration with Ukrainian society?

“Our state has never actively interfered in the ‘Muslim affairs.’ Under the previous presidents, the Crimean Tatars would be patted on the shoulder, now and then. Some positive and negative decisions would be made. In 2014, the situation changed. Since then, the Crimean Tatar theme has been more or less popular with the media. Here something is being done better than previously, but one ought to bear in mind the threats of migration and terrorism. An absolute majority of the Muslims in Ukraine are tolerant and reasonable individuals. Some of their counterparts abroad have families here, others realize that Ukraine secures the freedom of conscience, and some Muslims have died fighting for Ukraine. Integration takes place where there are no obstacles on both sides, where Muslims understand local realities and meet others halfway; where the state doesn’t prevent them from building mosques, from publishing their literature and adhering to their religion. Problems appear when some Muslim groups prove too nonconformist in their own way (when denying democratic values while enjoying the gains of democracy), or when the state is deliberately throwing monkey wrenches into their works.”

In one of your publications you analyze the problem of the “fragmentation” of Muslim communities and institutions in Ukraine that contrasts with the rigid process of centralization “from above” in the occupied Crimea. This allows Russia to position itself on the international arena as the sole representative of Muslims in Crimea. You believe that stepping up an inner Islamic dialog would be one of the preconditions for resolving the situation, and that Crimean Tatars could play a major role there. Could official policy help consolidate the Muslim community?

“Last year, I took part in a project, as an expert, that ended up with over 30 Islamic organizations in Ukraine signing the Charter of Ukrainian Muslims. It involved the Ummah Clerical Board of Ukrainian Muslims, Clerical Board of Crimean Muslims (based in Kyiv), Association of Ukrainian Muslims, and a number of others. They had young and active leaders who had long been working for the good of Ukraine and to establish a dialog among themselves. Some Muslim structures took an isolationist stand. That was their choice. The state can, of course, meet any of them halfway, but trying to get them unified by acting ‘from above’ just won’t work. Those ‘upstairs’ have to realize that there are many Muslim associations in Ukraine and each requires an individual approach, that each has to be prepared and willing; that there is no way the ‘chosen’ ones will serve their purpose. There is no ‘chief’ Muslim organization here, just as there is no ‘chief’ Muslim. There are various structures, each with its leader. Sometimes there seems to be no such realization.”

There are Chechens and other Muslims from Russia fighting on the Ukrainian side. These people are on wanted lists in their home country. Do you think Ukraine could offer a civilizational alternative to Russian Muslims who are suffering from such severe persecution, with the state combating any noncanonical trends?

“There were attempts to create such an ‘International’ in 2014, but the project was carried out partially, from what I know. Ukraine has actually become this alternative. People fighting in the east often loath publicity, they prefer to remain anonymous. This is a sensitive subject. Publicity could damage them and their close and dear ones in Russia. On the one hand, Ukraine is supposed to welcome volunteers, but on the other hand, some of these volunteers may well turn out to be spies and saboteurs. Only our clandestine agencies know how effectively they are screened. Ukraine needs motivated soldiers – and it has them – but it may also become Russia’s Mexico where Russian criminals will hide under religious slogans. Ukraine must keep its door open for those who have really suffered for their faith. In some Central Asian countries people are thrown behind bars for having made an inappropriate movement when praying (which is regarded as proof of extremism). In Russia, people are persecuted when found in possession of Islamic literature, and so on.”

We often hear about the ambiguity of underfunded and weak Ukrainian foreign policy. Does Ukraine have a clear cut foreign political strategy with regard to the Islamic world, especially in the Middle East and North Africa? What do you think our priorities should be there?

“The answer to the first one is yes and no. I’ve often heard complaints about our visa red tape in the Middle East (although getting a Schengen visa in Ukraine isn’t any easier). We need more image building projects in the Islamic world, just as we have to upgrade information support, so they won’t have to learn about Ukraine from the Arabic version of Russia Today. Two months ago, I wrote an article about Arab media and what they know and say about what’s happening in Ukraine; that their interest leaves much to be desired. This is especially true of Egypt, Lebanon, Syria (I mean Assad’s part of it), and Iran. There are also negative reports that remind one of Russian media. It is necessary to deal with Persian Gulf countries on a broader scale and come up with better arguments. There is progress, too. For example, in Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Turkey. They keep condemning the annexation of Crimea, but I’m wondering who is to be credited for this: Ukraine or its partners across the ocean.”

One of President Donald Trump’s first steps was curbing the influx of Muslim immigrants. Quite a few European countries agree with him, saying they should be banned entry. We also know that various Muslim immigrant integration strategies have been worked out in the West over several decades. Does this latest trend mean that these strategies are ineffective?

“This is the result of rightist populism, to an extent. Perhaps what I’m about to say will sound controversial. Remember what happened in Europe, back in the 1920s-1930s? I mean the Jewish issue. What was the outcome? I might as well remind you that anti-Semitism was widespread not only in Germany at the time, but also in countries that were regarded as more democratic ones.

“The immigrant accommodation resource hasn’t been exhausted. There is also the possibility of migrant-phobia [xenophobia] being even more actively converted into domestic policy; of further restrictions, deportation procedures, you name it. But I don’t think there will be drastic changes. By the way, Muslim ex-immigrants are also susceptible to migrant-phobia. Those who have lived in EU countries for decades and integrated aren’t overly happy to bid welcome to [fellow Muslim] refugees. Be that as it may, I still believe in Europe, that the European governments will pay heed to experts and do not repatriate their immigrants, unless they are proven to be an actual threat.”

The stand of the West in the matter of Islamic extremism has varied in the course of history, ranging from noninterference to direct intervention. In the case of Syria, the West seems to have hesitated for too long and washed its hands of the whole affair. Should there be a uniform strategy and what are the limits of such interventions?

“For those who haven’t been closely following events in Syria, the situation has got so, no one can figure out who is on whose side. I think that, even if bombs were dropped, destroying Assad’s government the way Saddam or Gaddafi were, the war would still be raging. The Middle East is being reformatted on a global scale, with Syria, Libya, and Yemen serving as graphic examples. Old boundaries, set by colonizers, are removed and new ones established, along with those developed by the architects of proxy wars. This strategy could be described as follows: ‘Drop bombs on those who get out of line, supply weapons to virtual democrats, and keep the balance.’ The trouble is that wars have turned into a flywheel of bloody violence, where human lives cost less than a bargaining chip. Let’s face it, both the West and the East are to blame. All those recipes for getting over the crisis look too idealistic. Still, we all want to hope for the best and a bad peace is better than a good war.”