Kremlin chose the right time to hit Ukraine

Writing a newspaper/magazine article, one has to bear in mind the reader’s likely response that may often turn out to be negative. This brings to mind my Facebook pen pal in Kyiv. Recently he wrote: “They will eliminate Putin and this will be the end of aggressive Russia. It’s not an evil empire, rather an operetta one inhabited by jackasses.”

I can’t blame the author for his choice of words, considering that the man is apparently combat-fatigued, tired of trying to figure out what is actually going on apart from the politicians’ phraseology, being unable to lead a normal life, let alone make plans. What we are witness to is not a nightmare but sober reality that poses clear and present danger to our nation, something our current generation may well have to live with for years to come, being denied the possibility of peaceful progress – the way it happened in Moldova and Georgia when Vladimir Putin was riding his desk at St. Petersburg Mayor’s Office.

This Facebook quote remarkably coincides with the tone and content of Putin’s speech about the annexation of Crimea (“remarkably” seems to be an obsolete adverb in the current political lexicon; our latter-day history is packed with such remarkable coincidences). What he had to say boiled down to his allegedly sole decision made on the spur of the moment. In fact, all those “state-of-the-art” liberals spoke about the spare-of-the-moment aspect last year, although any unbiased observer could clearly see that the whole operation had been carefully and professionally planned. Ten years back, the Beslan massacre had its effect on the electoral reforms; it was obviously a preparation stage for the big thing. All they needed was a pretext.

This assumption is corroborated by military experts. Obviously, the separatists in the Donbas and other regions acted according to plans that had been long carefully prepared, even though the result of their operations was not very impressive.

There is yet another, perhaps the most important aspect to Putin’s speech. He portrayed himself as a patron of the unfortunate Crimean population that was threatened by a nationalistic monster. Monster or not, the Kremlin had actually succeeded in playing the role of protector of good against the Ukrainian evil, considering that official Kyiv – and the rest of the population – acted as though they couldn’t care less about losing a sizeable part of their sovereign territory.

One is reminded of Mikhail Bulgakov’s The Heart of a Dog. Shvonder was the only human being around Sharikov who treated him as his equal. A year ago the Kremlin did the same in regard to Crimea while Kyiv remained aloof and simply complied with the EU capitulation requirements. That was the first practical consequence of European association. The Kremlin had played the role of a well-wishing Shvonder.

In fact, after the Maidan all Ukrainians behaved in a manner that suggested the triumph of regionalism over nationalism. A united nation should struggle against an attempt to cut that nation into pieces. What we see and hear now is gloating over the problems of Crimeans and what should be done to separate the Donbas. All this is proof that this nation is still to be formed.

This also means that the Kremlin chose the right time to hit Ukraine, and that Russia’s aggression hasn’t served to bring the Ukrainian nation closer together. Instead, it appears to have consolidated the population of Russia, and that it has stopped the sluggish nation-building process there.

Putin is nothing compared to the strategy those in power in Russia have been implementing since the French Revolution that climaxed in 1848 when Russia was stopped in the course of the Crimean War. The Russian ruling elite (whatever its name over the hundreds of years) has always aimed at preventing the creation of a civic nation. For the European countries, preventing the nation-building process in Russia is a preemptive strategy, a desire to prevent a demonstrative effect from occurring.

This is a constant of Russia’s politics and history, regardless of the ideological format of governance. This is what Russian imperialism (regardless of its current designation: internationalism, nationalism, etc.) is all about. This is the cornerstone of the consensus between those “upstairs” and the man in the street, something that has for centuries served in lieu of social contract in Russia.

Kremlin claims go beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union, extending to Europe. Naturally, what Vladimir Yakunin had to say several days prior to Vladimir Putin’s speech concerning Crimea failed to attract as much public attention. Another reason is that his message addressed the Europeans.

After Yakunin’s speech and many other things, the Kremlin’s strategy became clear: they wanted to be Europe’s Huey Long. Not just Putin but all of Russia, a country that would rely on new reasonable principles. In his speech Putin used a number of political cliches that dated back to Hitler and Mussolini, but which have been persistently used by the Kremlin. The latter claims leadership in the building of a new world order, without the current [internationally accepted] financial and political institutions.

I wonder what will happen to these claims if and when Putin is replaced in his post.

Bad rules of conduct appear to have been formulated for the intelligentsia. Now constantly ridiculing Kremlin is in vogue, while those behind its walls keep reaching their goals in the domestic and foreign political realms, taking advantage of everything that happens.

Who will be blamed for Boris Nemtsov’s assassination is not important (assuming that what happened was another “domestic crime”). The important thing is that I assumed that Nemtsov’s place of last respite was in Putin’s new pantheon, as a champion of the anticorruption campaign. Actually, there were all indications that this would be the case, with the state-run channels commenting on the death of a noted patriot. Simultaneously, however, active – and predictable – efforts were being made to scrub the stables of the political elite. The arrest of the Sakhalin governor was attributed to the All-Russia People’s Front (ONF); its people had allegedly kept a sharp eye on things and spotted the corrupt official, and notified the authorities.

Then why shouldn’t Navalny and the rest of the Opposition join the ranks and uphold the cause of the late Nemtsov?

Everything seems to stand to logic. The external enemy has been identified [in Russia] – even if some keep insisting that the whole thing is propaganda, falsehood – and a great many people representing various communities and structures appear to have accepted the fact of fighting Ukraine and opposing the rest of the [civilized] world as another line of business: small for some and big for others. Struggling up the career ladder is also business in Russia. There is a huge social organism behind the imperial expansion; it is growing stronger by the day, along with that “spiritual unity” and opposition to the [rest of the civilized] world. New interest groups will be formed during the renovation of the elite in that country.

The domestic enemy has also been identified. As three or four hundred years back, this one is a dashing governor, presumptuous lord, embezzler and deceitful man. Considering the number of people involved in/with the Sakhalin governor case, the time of single case investigations is up. In fact, the Serdyukov case has turned into a group one; now they are investigating into a group of criminals who operated on a regional level. This, in turn, opens up horizons for those who will take over their posts. High treason cases remain one-person, for the time being.

Dmitry Shusharin is a Moscow-based historian and political journalist