Who benefits from the “ceasefire?”

On January 15 parliament approved President Petro Poroshenko’s decree on partial mobilization. This resolution received 268 “yes” votes. Before the voting, National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksandr Turchynov explained the reasons why mobilization and army procurement were on the agenda. It is planned to carry out three “waves” of mobilization. The first will begin on January 20 and last for 90 days, the second for 60 days from April, and the third also for 60 days from June. It is planned to mobilize a total 50,000 people who have undergone military training. Those subject to mobilization are men aged 25 to 60 and women aged 25 to 50, with due account of the military occupational specialty. The mobilized can also gain a military specialty during a 40-day training course. Only after this the mobilized can be sent to the antiterrorist operation (ATO) zone. “No serviceman and no reservist will be mobilized unless they are fully equipped with clothes, footwear, individual safety devices, weapons, etc.” Turchynov assured the MPs.

What are the particularities of the fourth wave of mobilization? Will this solve the Ukrainian army’s problems? How can the Donbas situation evolve in the near future? We discuss this with Valentyn BADRAK, director of the Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies.

“I would distinguish between operational-strategic and strategic matters. If we take the former – operational-strategic level and the necessity to ensure the state’s security at the current stage, when defense forces have just begun to revive in the broad sense of the word and are keeping up high morale, – then it is undoubtedly necessary to give respite to those who have been on the battle field for a long time. It is important to form more powerful reserves because the Kremlin began a subversive phase of the war in early December by trying to spread sabotage and terrorism to Ukraine’s stable regions. All this shows that Putin does not intend to stop the aggression. Taking into account all these factors, we must take steps to strengthen our defense forces in the combat zone and to form reserves. Therefore, mobilization is needed in this context.

“But I am concerned about a different thing. Against the backdrop of operational-strategic goals, no effort has been made so far to solve strategic problems, such as creating the factors that will deter the aggressor and forming a professional army, an army that will, of course, be more expensive for the state than the existing one, but it will form a professional core which will be prepared for longtime hostilities and confrontation. Only a professional army, equipped with up-to-date weapon systems, can do the job. We are still to chart a course towards a professional army. Indeed, it is impossible to form a full-fledged professional army in a year or two, but we should take this course right now in order not only to carry out rotation in the Donbas, but also to grant a different status and different social security provisions to those who are ready to serve in a professional army. It is very important if we take into account that Ukrainian society remains variegated on the whole. Relying on a conscription army and mobilization of a large number of people can only be a temporary measure to solve the problem of this day. But we must not allow this to be Ukraine’s overall strategy in the development of its defense capability.”

How long can we stay in this suspended condition, when we still have an ATO, not a war, when martial law is not imposed in due time, and there is no Supreme Commander’s General Headquarters?

“Taking into account the general strategy and the phenomenon of Russian-Ukrainian relations, when, on the one hand, a war is in progress and, on the other, some economic cooperation continues, I do not think it is advisable to impose martial law today. Martial law should have been imposed somewhere in August. But, as of today, Ukraine has gone through tragedies and lost a considerable number of its military. It is very important now to look not only at the present, but also at the future. If we fail to create adequate factors of deterrence, we will come to a situation when the danger of invasion will be hanging over us like the sword of Damocles for years.

“Defense expenditures have been essentially increased today, but, on the other hand, the orders placed on Ukrainian enterprises can meet the defense forces’ needs by a mere 30 percent. We have not only failed to take a course towards a professional army, we have also failed to create proper conditions for creating strategic components of deterrence. Yes, missiles are being developed, but the defense industry is so much aimed at ‘stopping the gaps’ that there is no evidence of any long-term steps being taken. No strategic-level defense projects have been launched.

“This represents a risk, as Russia is deploying cutting-edge weapon systems in eastern Ukraine and the Kremlin-controlled groups are testing them. The main danger is that Russia has switched to the tactic of a non-contact war. The Ukrainian defense forces have to keep silent here because they are not capable of waging a non-contact war. We are used to third-generation wars, like the one we had last year, when all the hostilities boiled down to clashes between forces and means. Today, the situation is changing to the detriment of Ukraine. The pro-Russian groupings are more and more waging a non-contact war and committing acts of sabotage on the territory of stable regions. On the contrary, the Ukrainian side can only put up a passive defense and is pinning its hopes on diplomatic leverage and Western economic sanctions. This is not sufficient for us to get the upper hand. Therefore, mobilization is needed today. But major problems still remain, and mobilization will in no way solve them.”

If martial law is no longer an issue today, do we need the Supreme Commander’s General Headquarters?

“There can only be a general headquarters if martial law has been imposed. But parliament has not yet adopted amendments to the law ‘On the Legal Regime of Martial Law.’ This makes it impossible to organize a general headquarters. We saw a different thing – a law has enhanced the powers of the National Security and Defense Council (RNBO) and its secretary, which means that the RNBO is supposed to perform the functions of the Supreme Commander’s General Headquarters in peacetime. The very idea of this is good, but it raises a question: what are the legal grounds for mobilization? And there will be more questions of this kind. It is also very important that parliament should prepare a platform for the imposition of martial law, if need be.”

Speaking in parliament, RNBO Secretary Oleksandr Turchynov said there are two likely scenarios of developments: 1) an all-out attack by the Kremlin, and 2) conservation of an in fact “hybrid war.” Which of the two scenarios do you think is more realistic?

“I think the No.2 scenario will be unfurling until a certain stage. And approximately from mid-February onwards, Russian groupings will use the most sophisticated weapons in this ‘hybrid war’ and in fact teach Ukraine to face a non-contact war. In this case we will be running a great risk of losing a lot of our personnel. These intentions of Russia are also aimed at making the conditions of future negotiations better for itself and thus forcing the Ukrainian leadership to agree on more compromises. It is the Kremlin’s minimum plan. And the maximum plan is to rock the boat until the Ukrainians have a critical mass of mistrust towards the current leadership, which will prompt Russia to launch a large-scale attack. Now it is a wrong time for Russia to do so, all the more so that they themselves are preparing and regrouping. Unfortunately, the Ukrainian side is not making a 100-percent use of this time to create strategic factors of deterrence. The point is that the entire security sector is trying to solve the short-term problems and get prepared for an airtight defense. But Putin views this as weakness and is going to take full advantage of it.”

To what extent has the staff placement problem been solved today, for we know that there has been no RNBO secretary at all for a long time?

“If we take the military sector, things are more or less good here. Naturally, there are questions about some of the past actions. For example, we all remember Ilovaisk. But, as far as I can see, the military-political leadership has decided the question of responsibility should be answered later, when there will be a lower risk of the Kremlin’s full-scale war. But, on the whole, there is a shortage of staff.

“There is also another problem which does not allow fulfilling the governmental defense order in a proper way and preparing the strategic elements of deterrence. Unfortunately, I must say that the defense management lacks professionalism in what concerns the reform of this sector, proper fulfillment of the governmental defense order, and military-technological cooperation. It seems necessary to establish a single vertical chain of defense production management at the level of, say, vice prime minister. It was an erroneous decision to entrust this problem to the Ministry of Economic Development. This will lead to new risks because the defense production sector lays the groundwork for the formation of a viable army. Regretfully, the state has taken so far no adequate approaches to this matter.”