Indiscernible march

Ever since the SPU and the CPU joined the Party of Regions in a solid alliance of labor and capital, the left flank of Ukrainian politics has turned out to be vacant even theoretically. That numerically strong and socially disorganized electoral niche we are accustomed to identifying as the proletariat, including all hired workers, has been left without its own even largely nominal leaders.

Most likely nothing will be left of that small degree of trust with which leftist parties concluded their last political race until the next elections. They gave an excellent performance in their role as a controlled buffer in the transitional period of restructuring the post-Soviet economy. After receiving a bit of power as a prize, they can finally heave a sigh of relief, having transferred the “protection” of millions of “small Ukrainians” to the shoulders of the next, more modern but opportunistic and controlled project, namely Yulia Tymoshenko’s personal political project, the BYuT.

Unlike its “red” and “pink” predecessors, this bloc is more personalized with fewer rigid ideological restrictions. This allows it to be socially omnivorous and politically mobile, and at the same time a more ideal quasi-opposition screen at this new stage of the political structurization of society.

Proclaimed as the single solidary mouthpiece of the interests of broad strata of Ukrainian workers and petty bourgeois, the BYuT is solving two main problems facing the current government. On the one hand, it is picking up the opposition baton, with the aid of which the communists managed to keep the disillusioned masses nostalgic for socialism within the bounds of social peace in the 1990s. On the other, it is called upon to play the role of a political “blood clot” that is temporarily blocking the influx of new faces and ideas to the Ukrainian opposition field. Thus, it is prolonging the life of the existing political government that is so effectively mimicking its eternal movement toward the standards of Western democracy. (A real movement toward these standards will leave no stone unturned in its business, which is swelling thanks to budget schemes.)

Therefore, by its functions the opposition in the Ukrainian political structure resembles one of the phases of a multistage space rocket, whose objective is to keep the ruling elite in power. To this end it will hardly be surprising if rumors of a new opposition project being developed in the quiet offices of power turn out to be grossly exaggerated

Since nature abhors a vacuum, Ukrainian society, especially its left-wing segment, is again faced with a choice: to accept what is being offered or to draft its own political project. The Day asked its political experts to comment on how realistic such a project is in contemporary Ukraine.

Yevhen HOLOVAKHA, Ph.D., deputy director, Institute for Social Studies:

Any movement must have a leader. Otherwise, we could be talking about the activities of discrete dissatisfied individuals or groups. As for the activities of these individuals, it must be acknowledged that over the past six years there has been a substantial improvement in the Ukrainian population’s social health. The number of desperate people has noticeably decreased. Proof of this is found in our monitoring data. Whereas in the 1990s the social condition was worsening, with leftist forces increasing in strength, beginning in the 2000s there has been active economic growth. True, this has nothing to do with the talents of our leadership but with certain macroeconomic trends.

At the same time, there is a sufficiently large part of the population that feels not only defeated but also unprotected. It includes pensioners, unskilled workers, or employees of governmental spheres. Although numerically strong, these strata are the least socially active, so it will be difficult to impose on them some forms of resistance to the government or generally to economic and social relations that have taken shape. Considering the rather high percentage of these population groups, one could have expected that someone would seriously fight for this part of the electorate, but this is not happening for one reason. The corporate egotism of the elites, regardless of their ideological orientation, is turning out to be stronger than their own interests connected to obtaining additional votes.

Proof of this is the fact that the material status of absolutely all forces has acquired a painful character from the standpoint of normal social organization, namely, multiple salary increases for bureaucrats, incidents of secret bribes for votes, which constantly come to our attention, and switching from one faction to the next. All this shows how remote these people are from real political life and from the real electorate. Their interests are simply incompatible with voters’ interests. Just look at the limousines used by representatives of all factions, including those who protect the interests of the disenfranchised.

Therefore, I think there are no political leaders capable of revealing themselves honorably in this spectrum of the political field, except for political marginals, who cannot be allowed to wield power at all.

In view of this, we must acknowledge just one fact. We have a corporate, de-ideologized elite that is using any kind of slogan to achieve its interests.

Kost BONDARENKO, political scientist, Garshenin Institute for the Study of Problems of Administration:

With a working class numbering millions and a sufficiently large number of employees in Ukraine, we have all the prerequisites and a positive opportunity for the creation and activation of a leftist movement. However, the classic left-wingers are demonstrating their inability to head a new leftist movement. In the words of Lenin, the communists are not standing on the positions of Marx — they are sitting, and even lying on, Marx. They have forgotten about the need to modernize and adjust to the realities of the times. The socialists are mainly oriented toward the electorate in the center and south of Ukraine, where there are few industrial enterprises and where there is an agrarian base for a leftist movement. Vitrenko’s project is one that is designed for election to election; the BYuT’s is simply a speculative project.

The new left may emerge in two ways: by branching off from projects that are classic to Ukraine, and by breaking away from other political parties, Orange as well as White-and-Blue. For them the nutrient medium will be the labor movement in southeastern Ukraine, which is gaining momentum, and the trade-union movement that may replace the current union federation, which has no future whatsoever. It is also worth remembering that land may well become a commodity in 2007, and this will serve to increase the number of malcontents, who in turn may liven up new leftist political projects.

So far there are no new and promising leaders in this segment, just claims to leadership. However, there is no doubt that a leftist project will come to pass. Ukraine is certainly about to see new leftists.

Nor should it be forgotten that the Orange revolution failed to solve the tasks of both the left and the right, so the future revolution is not far off. In this revolution the new left and new right will form a temporary alliance as to their objectives, but then they will part company forever.

Uliana KYRYIENKO, deputy director, Institute of Global Strategies:

The results of the last electoral cycle, the presidential elections in 2004 and the parliamentary elections in 2006, show that the left-wing CPU and SPU, after obtaining rather low electoral results, nevertheless succeeded in turning them into political dividends by joining the coalition with the Party of Regions. In this situation the party field is transforming, and the left niche that was traditionally in opposition in Ukrainian conditions is becoming vacant. The lowering of the ideological level of the communists and socialists and the rise in their political pragmatism were facilitated by both the change in the format of the political regime — now that they do not have their main opponent in the person of a strong president (ex-president Leonid Kuchma was the main opponent of both the CPU and the SPU) — and changes in the political competition. After the Maidan our society became divided according to political colors. Changes also took place in the strategic priorities of the parties, which have become noticeably directed toward entering the government, and the ideological resource was sacrificed for leadership and organizational resources.

What are the likely prospects for a leftist niche? First, party programs are likely to form around the socioeconomic activities of the government, which is demonstrating the hallmarks of a strict liberal course. This indicates that there is a need for a leftist ideological opponent, but the prospects of one appearing outside the party coalition field are illusionary. Second, reformatting the party field in the ideological and political aspects will directly depend on who will fill the opposition niche.

Two forces are laying claim to it: Yulia Tymoshenko’s bloc and Our Ukraine. If the latter does not join the coalition but proceeds to build another rightist party project, this niche will be occupied by the BYuT — and the niche will once again be an opposition one. If Our Ukraine joins the coalition, the BYuT will try to work according to a maximum azimuth, from left of center to right of center.

As for the likelihood that new party projects with a leftist ideology will appear, they are likely to be regionally, socially, sectorally, and demographically targeted rather than national in scope, e.g., parties championing the rights of pensioners, miners, teachers, etc.