Stanytsia Luhanska, a zone of high tension

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) has officially clarified, albeit rather belatedly and not without pressure from the Ukrainian delegation, its position on a number of key moments. They admitted that Russia is an aggressor and, therefore, is responsible for its criminal actions in the Donbas and during the occupation of Crimea. Undoubtedly, the West never gives this kind of definitions just to be with it. Indeed, Kyiv pledged in February 2015 to hold elections on the occupied territory on condition that, first of all, fire is ceased, which has not been done up till now. Then elections should be held and, within 24 hours, the Russians, together with their tanks and kokoshniks [traditional Russian women’s headdress. – Ed.], should leave the Ukrainian land. Of course, this algorithm looks utopian. However, we exist in these virtual worlds of diplomacy and the absolutely real conditions of war.

The central event of the past week was a Normandy Four summit. Some of the world leaders have said bluntly that, to make it possible to take further constructive steps to settle “the Donbas conflict,” in fact Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, it is necessary to finish the withdrawal of forces and facilities, which would guarantee de-escalation at least at some segments of the front. After all, we heard pst Thursday about another four disengagement areas (in addition to the previous three). This raises a logical question, however: should the forces and facilities be disengaged in the places where Russia must in any case withdraw to the positions stipulated in Minsk-1? Maybe, it would be better first to accommodate the line of confrontation under the agreements Russia has violated again and only then to speak about disengagement in Debaltseve.

The Russian side has done its best to break off negotiations and put the blame on the Ukrainian side. What came in handy was the murder of a criminal nicknamed “Motorola,” which touched off a wave of comments in the internet, and regular shelling of the Ukrainian territories at night, when OSCE prefers to see dreams rather than Donbas realities. Russian TV literally flew into a fit of hysterics again, turning the situation, as usual, upside down. But the Four still managed to meet. Obviously, what became a guideline for it was disengagement of forces and facilities in two points of the frontline as a sign of the Ukrainian side’s readiness to behave constructively. And if the West really wants to settle the conflict at least to some extent, it should exert strong pressure on Russia which invaded a foreign territory, bluffs at negotiations, and in fact flouts the obligations it assumed.

Therefore, carrying out the Minsk Agreements is also a guarantee that the West will continue to impose sanctions against Russia and render various (including diplomatic) assistance to Ukraine. Let us look at some messages from world leaders past week. Frank-Walter Steinmeier at last doubted holding elections on the occupied territories. Francois Hollande “hurt” Putin in connection with his aggression in Syria, after which the latter began to get his back up and threaten not to take part in the October 19 meeting. In his turn, French Foreign Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault said earlier past week that the Normandy Format Berlin summit would be aimed at persuading Ukraine to speed up granting the Donbas “special status” and passing a law on elections on the occupied territories.

Meanwhile, the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group on disengagement of forces and hardware in some areas, signed in Minsk on September 21, 2016, continues to be implemented. This writer, a Luhansk resident until recently, took a dim view of this disengagement. The reasons are as follows: firstly, the very phrase “disengagement of forces” jars on the ears because this is occurring on our territory; secondly, Russia has repeatedly used diplomacy to cover up its aggressive steps. The Debaltseve situation is a good example of this. But the framework decision may be a way to show the world that Ukraine is doing its best to break the stalemate without losing its positions.

This agreement helped, not without problems, to disengage forces and hardware by two kilometers on two Donbas positions – in Petrivske and Zolote, but the process foundered in the third point. The Day’s correspondent went to a village on the Luhansk frontline to see with his own eyes and touch with his own hands and feet the local realities.

Stanytsia Luhanska, an urban-type village, is, so to speak, a stone’s throw from Luhansk. But, to paraphrase a Stalker character, “the throw should be long enough.” In early July this year, there were 3,000 ruined unlivable buildings in Stanytsia (local abridged form of the name). Hundreds of them were razed to the foundation. Tree tops slashed away by rocket fire, checkpoints at every turn, packs of stray dogs, and wild hemp along the road… Plus recollections of locals about attacks with Grad and Smerch rockets from Luhansk and Russia, respectively. They say this unwillingly, tiredly, with eyes that look leaden because of regular nighttime explosions. This zone is not for sleeping.

I had already been here two years before, in September 2014. I crossed the line of confrontation to leave Luhansk for a long time against my wishes. You can imagine how surprised I was to learn that the militants, who had been stationed beyond the Siversky Donets at the time, were now on the territory we were supposed to control. The first question is: aren’t there too many territories that are infected with Russian plague in contravention of the Minsk Agreements? What immediately springs to mind is the lost Debaltseve which the Russian troops “did in” three days after Minsk-2 was signed. Obviously, Moscow is not planning to stop. Moreover, the militants (those on the frontline are usually militiamen, while the Russian career military are positioned on the next lines to prevent the retreat of “cannon fodder”) who stay on the now three-tier concreted position on our side of the Siversky Donets have placed, right under our noses, three 120-mm mortars, two antiaircraft installations, and two BM-2 armored vehicles. I say again that these “pieces” “look” at us pointblank from our own territory. In response to this, the Ukrainian positions were reinforced, and they are now checking further expansion in our zone which many wrongly call “gray.” It’s not a “gray zone” but a zone of continuous, permanent, tension. The very fact of a so heavily armed installation says that the aggressor has not dropped an intention to launch a new offensive, and the presence of a fire emplacement on our river bank is an attempt to step on our flank – with one foot so far.

Undoubtedly, a formula of “relaxation” is needed under the circumstance. And an attempt to disengage forces could be this kind of scenario. But, after studying the particularities of this locality, I’ve come to the conclusion that this scenario is very difficult, and a number of important factors are standing in its way. Firstly, it is geography. Secondly, it is mentality of the local populace. Thirdly, it is the work of observers’ missions. And, fourthly, it is the aggressor’s intentions.

Some servicemen and I are standing near the checkpoint and studying the geography of the zone across which, in theory, troops should be withdrawn under the framework agreement. We can see clearly the green span of a hill over the Siversky Donets skyline. The enemy is there. Behind him is the native “alien” land – Luhansk is just 10 km away, while Stanytsia Luhanska is here, under my feet and the enemy’s eye. The invader holds a dominant position not only because he is on an elevation, but also because he fully controls the locality that consists of country houses, basements, and woodlands. The military claim that militants have even dug out tunnels from which they come out to pound Ukrainian positions and then go back into them without running the risk of being hit by retaliatory fire.

Speaking of this hill, it is difficult to imagine a mission of any mandate that could really monitor the withdrawal of forces on it, where there is not only a powerful system of forces and facilities, but also endless ways of camouflaging. The impression is that we are on an open palm of the hand.

This is the cause of an incredible ruination of Stanytsia. The enemy literally practices all kinds of attacks on us. Farther to the east, you can clearly make out the famous monument to Prince Ihor, now a fortress for bandits. But, in addition, the enemy has begun to build another reinforced concrete emplacement with bunkers 500 meters to the west of the monument. All this proves that the aggressor is bent on reinforcing his already favorable positions over the Siversky Donets. The first thing that comes to mind is: those who speak about “special status” should live for at least a few days here, where almost every tree is permeated with special tension.

A serviceman says he is sure the withdrawal is possible, but it will be different at each segment and will not, as a rule, exceed half a kilometer. More than this is dangerous. Asked whether it will be possible to regain the initial positions if militants go on an offensive, the officer says the military do not rule out the possibility of an immediate return. “So what’s the problem?” I ask in surprise. The eyes in the narrow opening of the balaclava “answer”: the question is at what price. He pointed to a railway embankment that literally blocks both the bus station and the checkpoint from the east. Indeed, withdrawing eastwards will mean “cutting yourself” from this embankment’s cross point, which, accordingly, will let the attacker complicate our defense.

And what is west of the checkpoint? There are mostly vegetable gardens and deserted summer houses there. The territory is now mined and will have to be cleared of mines in case of a withdrawal. Let us imagine a scenario when bandits have violated the framework decision. On the one hand, our troops in the east begin to assault the embankment but come under fire from the opposite dominating bank of the Donets. On the other hand, the response on the western flank will not be much hampered by the terrain, which, of course, does not rule out attacks from the other bank. So the risks of losses are high, especially if you take into account the enemy’s likely acts of sabotage in Stanytsia itself.

We meet OSCE mission representatives at the bus station. Clean white jeeps, helmets, bulletproof jackets… I ask them to comment on their role in the probable disengagement of forces on this territory. An OSCE man explains with a noticeable Russian accent that he is not going to make any comments. There is a serious and fundamental question: why can villagers see a sufficient number of OSCE jeeps on the streets of Stanytsia at the daytime and see none at night, when the long-suffering village is being fired at? The official OSCE position is that they need guarantees of security. This position calls into question the reasonability of having a weak-sighted entity that employs a lot of Russians, i.e., the aggressor’s flesh and blood. An a priori oxymoron is: why on earth is this kind of monitoring mission needed if there are guarantees of security?

As for work with the local populace, I would say several people shoulder this burden. I can’t help but note the patriotism of District Administration Chairman Yurii Zolkin. There is enough proof of the sincerity of his position. But his hands are also tied up, for he in fact… exerts no influence on staff placement. Firstly, there is a law that prohibits rotation of officials in the ATO zone. Secondly, there is an acute shortage of personnel in all the spheres of life. As a result, many positive decisions are either sabotaged or distorted in the course of fulfillment.

The checkpoint near the Stanytsia bus station is also noteworthy. A notice board displays a social advertisement against “sexual slavery,” a commercial advert of lawyer services, and a call to turn in arms voluntarily. Not a single motivational poster, no work for the brains of those who not only live in Stanytsia Luhanska but also, what is more, cross the line of disengagement... I must note that, on the opposite side, bandits have made, with Russian help, certain propagandistic efforts. But the question is not in advert boards. There is no Ukrainian television in a village located in the zone of military operations, except for the households that have dish antennas, while the Ukrainian radio… is being jammed by the Russian side! In other words, the invader has found money for “jammers,” whereas we are struggling to finish the construction of a TV tower as far away as in Novoaidar.

At the same time, there is a church, of the Moscow Patriarchate, of course, in Stanytsia. The Ukrainian church is present here in the person of chaplains only. The Muscovite priests, who used to bless portraits of Yanukovych in 2010, have already gone on record as saying that the “junta” and the “Banderaites” douse their brethren with gasoline and burn them alive. Old women believe it. And the children who have begun to come back to the village and go to school usually come across pro-Russian teachers. Under the “ATO law,” these teachers cannot be dismissed. And who can substitute them? The state, which has been at war for more than two years, has not even drawn up a law to encourage the arrival of fresh pro-Ukrainian personnel in this region. It is volunteers who keep things going in education and medicine. “If everything remains as it is, we will have a Nagorno-Karabakh,” says Natalia Zhurbenko, a local activist and volunteer. “People get accustomed to war, which is not normal. Ukraine must exert strong influence on the populace at least in the Kyiv-controlled areas. We in fact feel abandoned.” Villagers and the Luhansk residents who come here by bus are saying that “this war is here to stay.” But the most tragic fact is that everything has been done in the occupied lands over the past two years, also due to powerful Russian propaganda, to embed the idea of the occupied territories’ subjectiveness into the minds of Luhansk residents. The abbreviations LNR and DNR have begun to catch on, and kindergarten and school children already study a “new” history by Russian textbooks.

It is also true that local sentiments were shaped, to a considerable extent, by the events of 2014 and 2015, when the Tornado, Chernihiv, and Golden Gate battalions held sway here. To tell the truth, most of the locals have changed their attitude to the Ukrainian military now because discipline has improved in the past year. But the aftertaste still remains. And it is not the state but volunteers that help get over this aftertaste – many patriotic initiatives rest on the enthusiasm of the latter. A small detail: on Intercession of the Holy Virgin Day, the military were handing out candy to all the bus passengers who were arriving at Stanytsia.

As a result of all these factors, some activists began to hold protest actions at the moment when the abovementioned disengagement of forces was to be carried out. These protests could have been avoided if the authorities had been in touch with the activists. Yurii Harbuz, chair of the Luhansk Military-Civilian Administration, said at the time that “the security of local residents must not be ignored” during the withdrawal of troops. Indeed, not only activists, but also ordinary villagers are saying straightforwardly that they are afraid of any movements on the line of confrontation because, in their view, this can in reality only provoke more active hostilities. Harbuz’s statement touched off a wave of misunderstanding. For example, when I unfolded a map of the district to some Luhansk administration officials who were directly responsible for communication with the populace, they sometimes pointed a finger at the steppes, saying that the Stanytsia Luhanska district administration was situated right there. This means that work is disorganized in such a subtle and surgically sensitive matter.

Yet a lot of politicians were heard broaching this subject. Some media threw in a string of headlines with the phrase “withdrawal of troops FROM Stanytsia Luhanska, which made readers get a distorted idea of disengagement which, let us stress it, is not about cities and villages and must proceed along a broken curve, not in the radius. Activists noticed that when it was announced about signing the framework decision, some geodesists appeared in some streets of Stanytsia Luhanska. This, so to speak, finished the picture of the certainty that the withdrawal will touch upon concrete human settlements and in fact open the door to Stanytsia. But no officials came to the place for explanation – except for one councilor who showed a video that features the Stanytsia streets that are allegedly within the radius of disengagement. Against the backdrop of speculations about “withdrawal FROM Stanytsia,” this further complicated matters. The pro-Russian forces immediately took advantage of the vagueness of this situation and began to overtly threaten Ukrainian citizens with reprisals “during the seizure of the village.” This finally raised the degree of alarm to a critical limit.

Let us not forget that society has shown deep mistrust towards the government this time again. Moreover, this mistrust was also noticed among the military who took a dim view of this fuzzy-worded “instruction from above.” For, should the situation develop negatively, the military will be the first to shed blood. In the situation with such a painful and very sensitive problem as the line of disengagement near Stanytsia Luhanska, the accumulated “mismatches” resulted in misunderstandings, speculations, and banal hype.

At the moment, we must draw a number of conclusions about the situation in the vicinity of Stanytsia Luhanska.

FIRSTLY, one should pay attention to the situation near a ruined bridge over the Siversky Donets, namely, to the abovementioned enemy position on our side. The existence of this position runs counter to the Minsk Agreements. The withdrawal of troops means that Russian bandits should abandon this position and the bridge should be repaired so that ordinary people can cross the line of disengagement more easily. It should in no way be a major repair, for this would enable the enemy to surmount this obstacle, just “rolling down the hill,” and reach very quickly the approaches to the key populated place. The enemy will spare no human lives because, as I said above, the cannon fodder of militiamen is in the forward line, while career servicemen follow them.

SECONDLY, there should be round-the-clock presence of the observation and monitoring missions, with the Ukrainian side being able to monitor every nook, every house and basement, every tree and shrub that hangs over the Siversky Donets and is part of the withdrawal zone.

THIRDLY, bandits of the so-called “LNR” will never drop the goal to “append” Stanytsia – a point that is not always clear to non-locals. Moreover, Stanytsia itself is full of “agents” and bunkers for collaborationists. So, undoubtedly, the general public should view the withdrawal of troops as a demonstration of progress in carrying out the Minsk Agreements (which, incidentally, the invader violates with regular gunfire) and of the Ukrainian side’s constructive attitude. But this withdrawal must be made with due account of the particularities of the terrain so that the Ukrainian troops do not get into a trap. On the other hand, stronger counter-sabotage measures should be taken in Stanytsia Luhanska itself.

FOURTHLY, official Kyiv should at last make a ceaseless and all-out effort to meticulously explain the situation to the local populace, for its information policy has so far suffered a defeat in this sphere.