Year of Strategic Opportunities

It is perhaps impossible to give an unambiguous answer to the question whether the last year was successful in terms of Ukraine’s foreign policy. Kyiv has not reached any stunning breakthrough in its relations with the West: the United States, leading EU countries, key international organizations, membership in which has been announced as Ukraine’s strategic goal such as the EU and NATO. However, one can speak about certain progress, which might result in intense development. Though entering the World Trade Organization is postponed for at least one year, it is obviously moving to its logical completion, and the only party able to impede this is Ukraine itself. The Ukrainian-Russian relationship looks even more tangled; it is difficult to find any evidence of a systematic, consistent, and considered policy in this direction. Ukraine appeared not completely prepared for the change in the quality of its relations with its western neighbors and the Baltic states, which are to become EU members this year. Simultaneously, Ukraine succeeded in closing the so-called Volyn theme as a political issue in Ukrainian-Polish relations. Appointing the new foreign minister, as forecast, did not have any considerable effect on the declared course of Ukraine’s foreign policy. Speaking about forecasts for the new year, it can equally justify optimistic expectations or once again reverse even our existing level of relations with both Russia and the West, achieving which has taken much effort. While Ukraine has managed to find a way out of the international isolation it had created for itself, it enters the new year with traditional domestic problems that might substantially hamper its initial successes on its way to EU and NATO.

Among Ukraine’s undoubted attainments for the last year is unfreezing its relations with the United States. The small steps policy that Washington proclaimed in late 2003 has proven fruitful. However, as before, for the whole year an official meeting between the two presidents has remained out of question. Washington has been sending clear signals of its interest in returning the relationship to the level preceding the cassette scandal and in its further development. However, this is possible only if Ukraine meets a number of clear requirements. It was no accident that it was precisely in Washington that a conference on Ukraine-NATO relations was held last May or that a decision was made in Kyiv after that forum to send its military contingent to Iraq. Washington, though admitting that this decision largely influenced the gradual normalization of its relations with Ukraine, has frequently reminded us that this alone is not enough. Further decisions will be made only after reviewing the election campaign along with the results of the 2004 presidential elections in Ukraine.

In addition, next year Ukraine will have to solve the issues involved in signing a protocol with the US on mutual access to the market in goods and services, which is an indispensable condition for further movement toward the WTO. Meanwhile, Washington requires primarily adjusting the legislation on intellectual property (which in this case means CDs) and production certification to the generally accepted level.

Much will depend on the US attitude toward Ukraine’s movement toward NATO. The United States does not speak openly about whether Ukraine can expect support to its plans to join the Membership Action Plan during the Istanbul summit. Simultaneously, it does not call this scenario impossible either. Washington has always spoken about the level of Kyiv’s dedication to the democratic values as major criteria for its future decision on Ukraine. There are already problems with this, since many in the West are worried about the Donetsk scandal and the development of the political reform.

On the other hand, Ukraine-NATO relations have already got out of the last year’s tight spot, when Ukraine was supported by one country and a half, as they said in Kyiv at that time.

There have been no breakthroughs so far in relations with the European Union either. Though in the EU officials’ vocabulary the term, neighbor, is gradually replaced with talks about “broader Europe,” all of 2003 was spent to simply let these talks make sense.

At present there already are indications that the talks have become more concrete: a first meeting on the Ukraine-EU Action Plan is scheduled for January. This plan, according to the EU representatives and Ukrainian diplomats, should bring Ukraine closer to the EU four freedoms: the free movement of goods, services, persons, and capital across borders. However, Brussels is still unprepared to specify to what extent the Action Plan might bring Ukraine closer to starting negotiations over association with the EU and the possibility of ever entering it. Brussels implies that the political status of the relationship will depend on Ukraine itself. The change in the rate of the relations starting from September (visits by Commissars Verheugen and Patten, the international conference, etc.) provides hope that the further intensive development will conform to both sides’ interests.

The relationship with Poland, which insists on the strategic character of its relations with Ukraine even after joining the EU, has come through a complex period: both presidents took part in commemorating the sixtieth anniversary of the Volyn tragedy, preceded by heated discussion in both countries. On the practical level, Ukraine and Poland went through introducing visa regime according to the so-called Polish model, which will probably serve as a transition stage in the relations with many new European Union members (free visas for the Ukrainians and a non-visa regime for the Poles). One could also notice that last year the contacts between Presidents Kuchma and Kwasniewski became less frequent, which might have resulted from various reasons.

Instead, Ukraine’s activities in the CIS and Russian directions was much more noticeable. Take, for example, the unexpected decision to create the Single Economic Space (SES) between Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. It seems that Moscow and Kyiv were speaking about different spaces, with the former pointing out the need for suprastate bodies, a de facto customs union, and possibilities for introducing a single currency, and the latter insisting that this is nothing more than a free trade zone based upon WTO principles that will last only as long as prospects for Ukraine-EU relations are not defined. Now that the SES formation is in full swing, Ukrainian diplomats are inclined to admit that this was not the last reason of the EU reviving its actions concerning Ukraine. Later there was the incomprehensible Tuzla crisis and then an unprecedented in its essence agreement, defining the Sea of Azov and Kerch Strait as internal waters of both countries.

The situation concerning a natural gas transport consortium remains uncertain. The only thing obvious is that very soon one can expect debates on passing gas pipelines and underground depositories to a concession, which could leave far behind all the decisions that so far promoted Ukraine’s becoming closer to the West. The policy toward Russia and the CIS seems to lose signs of transparency, which can be called a dangerous symptom on the eve of the elections.

Obviously, in a year it will become possible to speak about successes and failures in terms of both strategy and tactics. Today we can only say that strategic chances traditionally are imposed on the issue of another key election. Here Ukraine faces an already traditional problem: its foreign movements are restrained by its internal problems.