Ukraine cannot stand another decade of political waffling

The fourth parliament of independent Ukraine is at work. Already the first plenary sessions are evidence that political rather than legislative issues come first, and that there are more such problems than effective and realistic solutions.

Verkhovna Rada has no operating strategy, living according to the principle that we hear what the cabinet has to offer, and fill the intermissions (often longer than deliberations) with political brawling. There are a number of reasons for all this, the main one being the absence of a national concept of the underlying principles of our domestic and foreign policies. The parliament has since 1993 practically never shown a comprehensive approach to the strategic fundamentals of those policies, just as it has never defined this country’s foreign policy course. Rather than cope with these tasks (as a constitutional obligation and authority vested in parliament), the deputies engage in fruitless discussions, trying to determine who has to do the job, the parliament or president. As a result, Ukraine does not have any clearly formulated and readily available domestic or foreign policy principles allowing for world development forecasts.

At present, Ukraine remains undefined (e.g., incomplete political formulas) with regard to many global problems and this without doubt seriously damages the national interests.

Consider several examples.

We hear from various politicians (depending on the situation) that Ukraine is a neutral country outside any blocs. But please tell me what document is there to this effect? Has Verkhovna Rada passed a single resolution to this effect? No, it has not. Is this Ukrainian stand recognized by the international community? No, it is not. If so, what makes them make such statements?

Likewise, our stand toward the CIS remains to be clearly formulated. Ukraine did not sign the CIS Charter, just as the president did not sign the Minsk Convention on the CIS interparliamentary assembly of May 26, 1995. Nor is Ukraine a member of the CIS defense alliance, even though we are a member of the CIS parliamentary assembly (peremptorily pushed through by a parliament resolution), sign military agreements with Russia, pay CIS membership fees, and so on. Where is the logic here? How can this extremely peculiar Ukrainian stand be understood in the East and West? I think that even our domestic politicians are hard put to understand it. Hence, the first and foremost task of the fourth Ukrainian parliament (in keeping with Article 85 of the Constitution of Ukraine and allowing for the eleven years of experience in building an independent state, new world realities, and changes in the alignment of forces) is to adopt its domestic and foreign policy principles. This document must specify Ukraine’s strategic positions with regard to the market economy (all market economy components), CIS, European structures, and Euro-Atlantic ones. We must clearly define our status: Who are we? A non-bloc neutral country or one aspiring for NATO membership?

This can be defined as a strategic political course, as this country’s prospects for decades of well-planned consistent work by all state agencies, parties, and political organizations. NATO is concerned with defense and security. How can a country truly participate in all- European security arrangements without being a NATO member?

It is time we stopped waffling between East and West, because this moving to and fro will get us nowhere. This country cannot live according to the formula, full ahead, steer astern. If we want to be respected, we must make our stand perfectly clear, we must make the European choice. We must announce that we are determined to join all the European structures, forward the appropriate applications, and adopt an action plan to carry out this historic task.

It is important to emphasize that for the past several years the dynamics of relations with certain partners, particularly in the West, has been declining, as has our rate of approach to the European standards of state building, and as has the integration process. For the most part our stated European choice, slow, but sure movement toward Europe remains on paper. Practical steps in that direction have been replaced by the ambiguous notion of some multivector policy, which mainly implies the equivalence of Ukrainian relationships in the international arena, but actually means running with the hare and hunting with the hounds.

In short, this approach is nothing more than an attempt in the realm of official foreign policy to reconcile two hostile pro-Russian and pro-European camps within the Ukrainian political elite. In reality, such a multivector policy means an equivocal foreign policy, an ambiguous Ukrainian geostrategy, indefinite maneuvering on the continent and elsewhere in the world.

Under the circumstances, Ukraine cannot but fall under some external influence or another, depending on the situation. Yet a policy of balancing between the East and West cannot be an active foreign policy course. It is a time-serving policy with an eye to the world situation but often turning a blind eye to the national interests.

An active foreign strategy means that Ukraine takes a stand on all the key issues of world politics and conducts its own policy concerning neighboring countries; it means taking a stand in time on any local or world military and/or political crisis, and being able to implement this stand.

Thus, as an independent state, Ukraine must define its position along the said lines. There is a fierce struggle among the political parties and in the public domain, between those supporting the Western and Northeast vectors. Determining Ukraine’s national interest here is its strategic choice. Making this decision will determine Ukraine’s destiny for many years. We must finally and unhesitatingly set a political course conforming to our national political interests.

There has been lively debate of late concerning Ukraine’s membership of the Eurasian Economic Community and the to Europe-with-Russia doctrine. Some have even built a Moscow-Brussels-Kyiv bridge. I think this philosophy should be discarded once and for all. Ukraine has been an independent state for over a decade; it cannot be someone else’s playground or training ground. Also, the Europe-with-Russia formula is vague, leaving far more questions than answers.

There are practically no political forces in Ukraine opposing mutually advantageous and pragmatic relations with Russia. On the other hand, the objective need to uphold Ukrainian-Russian cooperation is impeded by the Russian political elite’s claim to hegemony in the post-Soviet region. Contrary to the Russian leadership’s assurances that they allow for the CIS partners’ interests in their foreign policy, particularly those of Ukraine, far from all in Moscow realize the necessity of equal relations with Kyiv. We must give a straight answer to the straight question: Are we with or under Russia? If we are with Russia as an equal partner, this can only be welcomed, for it serves the interests of both nations.

It is a matter of choice, of designating strategic targets. Where are we? In Europe or in Asia? Who is there to say no to trade exchanges with Russia if we have something to sell? Do such exchanges and economic relations necessarily imply political relations? Is it an alliance with Russia or a Eurasian economic one?

Should economic relationships and integration be made dependent on political loyalty and various kinds of alliances, this trend would be of little use to us. I do believe that President Putin’s pragmatic approach will allow Russia and Ukraine to construct their relationship in keeping with international standards.

The European choice does not mean folding up economic, cultural, and political relationships with Russia and the other CIS states. These relations are warranted by economic and political expedience, by the historical past and current realities of both peoples. However, I am convinced that Ukraine and Russia must also think of the future, scientific and technological progress, civilized and democratic living standards. We all know that this standard exists in the West. In other words, setting a foreign policy course means choosing the future for the nation.

The European choice does not mean acting contrary to Russian interests, unless Russia takes a stand against Europe and for a special way of development. Russia has made its European choice. There are nuances, of course, but they are not crucial. Therefore, we must not falter in defending our interests in a civilized manner just because Moscow knits its brow, for if we do we might well come up empty-handed.

As for the West, the most Ukraine can expect to achieve at this stage is gradual integration into West European structures. Such is the current reality, and we must reckon with it. However, this does not mean dim prospects. Ukraine’s future is its European choice. This formula must be superimposed on the action plans of Verkhovna Rada, the president, and government. In the absence of such plans and of foreign and domestic political principles, with foreign political vectors constantly shifting, it makes no sense to discuss our foreign policy course or expect understanding from without. In this situation it is not worth reducing Ukraine’s involvement in the world process to choosing between Russian and Western orientations. In both cases it is necessary first to adequately develop our domestic potential, upholding equal relationships with other countries, based on mutual corporative interests rather than the need to support one side or another.

We must discard the thesis that Europe is waiting for us. No one waits for the weak. No one waits for those who have no sense of self.

Naturally, we must enter Europe strong and economically advanced, which means that the southeast foreign political sector is quite promising in that it contains a sizable market for Ukrainian goods, progressive technologies, and investment; here we can earn enough to buy ourselves a good dinner jacket to feel confident at the European party.

Characteristically, the Ukrainian political community lacks unity and agreement on foreign policy priorities. Practically all political parties formally support Ukraine’s integration into the European and world communities, emphasizing that Ukraine’s national interests are the underlying principle of shaping and implementing its foreign policy.

Simultaneously, none of these parties has it own concept of the national interest and Ukraine’s place and role in the international arena, as evidenced ever so clearly by the party programs concerning NATO and EU membership.

Their stands range from the Communist vociferous condemnation of NATO to the People’s Movement (Rukh) of Ukraine’s demand that Ukraine immediately apply for membership. In fact, even parties of the same election bloc do not show a common stand on the issue.

Unless we all set ourselves the single task of building a strong economy and advanced national culture meeting the European standard, unless we proceed to build all this and secure a political system capable of guiding this society along the democratic road, it is no use to discuss Ukraine’s place in Europe and the rest of the world.

European and Euro-Atlantic integration must be approached as a single package including Ukraine’s involvement in regional, international political, economic, financial, and other organizations and bodies, such as the OSCE, Council of Europe, and European Union. As for the latter, it is clear that there are certain distinctions and specifics on the road to EU and NATO integration.

Within this context, Ukraine must honor its commitments and bring its legislation into conformity with Council of Europe norms and standards as quickly as possible, speeding up its democratic and socioeconomic reforms in all spheres, further integrating the Ukrainian economy into the European and world economic frameworks, securing freedom of expression along with other rights and freedoms for Ukraine’s citizens..

To solve these problems in a timely fashion, it is worth studying the possibility of another agreement at the July Ukrainian-EU summit in Copenhagen, so as to raise the existing accords on associate EU membership. Passively waiting for an EU signal could have a negative effect on the very political idea of Ukraine’s European integration as one of the most important factors of Ukrainian social consolidation.

Time is knocking on the door. Ukraine cannot stand another decade of political waffling. Rather than an independent, prosperous, and democratic country, we will become subordinate to the interests of other states, and they will have corresponding attitudes toward us. We will then have not what we have but what we deserve.