Alexander RAHR: German capital is so far marking time outside Ukraine’ s door
Late last year it became particularly obvious that Ukraine has found itself on the sidelines of the processes taking place in Europe. For the most part this was caused by the country’s internal problems, but also by the fact that the West did not perceive its European nature, not to mention the fact that its geopolitical role as a bridge between the West and former Soviet republics is looking more and more theoretical. Simultaneously, it is difficult to evaluate other than a breakthrough the changes for the better that are beginning to appear in the relations between the West and Russia. The last visit to Russia of FRG Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, exclusively informal in character, only underlines the fact that the West, while not delighted by some actions by the Kremlin, nevertheless sympathizes with Putin and is not hampering his attempts to restore Moscow’s status of one of the centers of the world politics. Attempts by Kyiv to integrate into Europe against the background of the revival of Moscow’s geopolitical strength, especially confirmed by the recent relative success of Gazprom in the negotiations on construction of the pipeline to the West bypassing Ukraine, could come to naught. Sometimes it looks as though the West is completely indifferent to Ukraine. However, Alexander RAHR, leading expert of German Society on Foreign Policy toward Russia and CIS states, thinks that this is far from true and Ukraine has to undertake efforts to be heard.
Does it look to Europe that Ukraine has achieved anything?
I think Ukraine’s biggest achievement is having gained and strengthened its independence. Its biggest success is that it has become a European state, not an EU member so far, but a state with a tendency toward European and moving toward democracy and a market economy. Albeit with great difficulty, it is moving in this direction. The Ukrainian people and Ukrainian elite can view this with pride.
What is in store for Ukraine? The first task is to fix its economy, and this is quite difficult. Obviously, it is more difficult here than in other states, for reasons not always understood. Second is to strengthen its relations with both Russia and the West and to become a stable democratic Slavic state in Eastern Europe. I think Ukraine must understand its identity as a heir to the empire with positive attributes, precisely Slavic ones, not imperial, and precisely with this to enrich European culture and the entire European region that is to be created by mutual effort in the twenty-first century. I think Ukraine can and is ready to do this. Nobody will encroach upon Ukraine’s independence. At least, not Russia in the next hundred years.
Who or what then do you think can prevent Ukraine from fulfilling these tasks?
I think it might be clan wars that so far have not happened. Naturally, Ukraine is addressing the same problems as most other of the postcommunist countries of Eastern Europe. I think one cannot yet say about either of them, Russia and Belarus included, that these countries can return to the times of communism or build a communist empire. I think what is much more frightening is, as they think in the West, that these countries could become Mafia states that would threaten Europe’s overall development. One must avoid such a negative development. I hope Ukraine will succeed in creating a civil society — this is the only weapon against the country’s turning into a Mafia state. Civil society will not only strengthen democratic principles, democratic institutions in Ukraine, but also help Ukraine treat judiciously all its neighbors, environment, help it find it place in the general European home. Still, such a danger exists, it threatens, it could lead not only to a split among clans, but to splitting the society into East and West.
Here many people assume that because of the recent scandals Ukraine’s international image has suffered greatly. What is your opinion?
The cassette scandal is an internal scandal, which is certainly so serious that it cannot pass unnoticed by other countries. But Germany has had scandals of its own as well. When, for instance, there was the scandal with Kohl, we thought one could not get into a worse mess. Still, in Paris, Moscow and Kyiv I was told, “Don’t make a mountain out of a molehill. All the same, Kohl will remain a first- rank figure in history.”
One can say the same about the cassette scandal. This is not a scandal able to shake the state system of a country so much that nobody would want to communicate with it. In Germany people do not see in this scandal such harsh negatives as to break relations with Ukraine. Moreover, in terms of Realpolitik it cannot mean much, since the question is not even Kuchma, but in the West’s interest in keeping Ukraine in our common European home.
At present, in your opinion, are relations between Ukraine and the West, in particular the EU, better or worse than a year ago?
I think they are neither better nor worse. Ukraine need not fear a threat from the direction of Russia, its independence took place, and there is certain stability. There are certain rules of the game, according to which Ukraine plays in the political and economical realms. At the same time, Ukraine has also stopped making the almost hysterical cries we heard two years ago about immediate entry into the European Union. The EU and NATO were able to convey recently to the Ukrainian elite, to Ukrainian leaders, the notion that here there will be no fast breakthrough, special relationships notwithstanding, Ukraine cannot count on anything more. The West was saying so two years ago as well, but Ukraine counted on more. I think that now the talk from the both sides have lost their hysterical overtones and are proceeding in a more pragmatic direction. The same applies to the problem of Chornobyl, which, to be sure, is still with us.
Is the fact that Ukraine cannot count on more in its relations with the EU a temporary phenomenon, depending on the fulfillment of obligations, or a settled state of affairs?
My personal opinion is that it is temporarily. I belong to those who think that Europe has no other alternative than to expand to the East and Southeast, incorporating Ukraine. I can’t imagine Europeans unanimously stating that this is where the future border of Europe will be. I for one even can’t imagine that this border will be traced along the Caucasus. Europe now does not know itself where the border will be drawn, but it understands what expansion is: full economic and political expansion is currently also impossible. This is why there is playing for time.
Is it possible to say that the West is indifferent to contemporary Ukraine in general?
No. The West is not indifferent to Ukraine at least because not only NATO but the EU also have developed their own geopolitical interests. Five or six years ago it was not the case.
Perhaps the biggest mistake of Ukraine, and of Russia also, was that they regarded Europe as the stage where nation-states appeared, while today old Europe continues to move away from this idea, looking forward to the diminution of national sovereignty and bringing legislation into conformity. The Poles, Hungarians, and Czechs proved to be ready for this. Russians and Ukrainians did not. There was historical incomprehension on both sides.
What do you think about the planned visit of President Kuchma to Germany?
I think there should be an attempt here to create as good relationship between chancellor Schroeder and Kuchma, as the one that has been established between Schroeder and Putin. Kyiv must not remain indifferent to the fact that relations between Berlin and Moscow have recently become very warm and cordial. Besides, Germany is a key state in the process of EU expansion eastward, and Ukraine can participate in this historic and important process. That is why today such a visit would be very much to the point, so that Kuchma can make agreements with Schroeder and obtain in him a reliable partner.
Incidentally, German capital has reached positive agreements concerning the possibility to own stock in Russian enterprises and so on. Still, German business has great expectations in this sense from Ukraine as well. German capital is so far marking time outside Ukraine’s door and expects this door to open a crack. If it can come to an agreement with the Ukrainians along the same lines as with the Russians, the results would be even more successful.
