Alternative friendship

A new organization has emerged in the post-Soviet space. At least its organizers wanted to present it this way, although it should be described as a somewhat altered structure of the existing GUAM with its nearly 10-year history.

The new formation is known as “GUAM: for Democracy and Economic Progress.” Judging by official statements, it will mostly deal with matters relating to the transportation of energy sources. It may also pave the way for further initiatives aimed at resolving frozen conflicts. During this year’s GUAM summit President Viktor Yushchenko submitted Ukraine’s plan for resolving the Transdnistria question.

In addition, Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova are going to coordinate their integration efforts. This obviously implies, above all, NATO membership. “We are united by common values, joint objectives, and a desire to occupy an honorable place in Europe,” President Yushchenko emphasized on May 23. President Valdas Adamkus of Lithuania, who attended the summit as a guest, declared: “I am here to voice my heartfelt emotions, hoping that one day our countries will be bound not only by dynamic economic and cultural cooperation but also by ties existing within Euro-Atlantic institutions.” Vice-President Angel Marin of Bulgaria said that this organization will help the member countries integrate into European structures.

GUAM has experienced unhappy periods in its history. Several years ago Uzbekistan announced it would no longer take part in certain GUAM projects, and experts immediately started discussing the possible demise of the alliance. Beginning in 1997, the GUAM countries have not been able to agree on a number of issues. Georgia, for example, has seen its priority in the peacekeeping sphere, while Ukraine has focused on energy supplies.

Often domestic political problems in member countries have served as obstacles to the continued existence of the organization. Leonid Kuchma’s weakened presidency resulted in a situation where GUAM was rarely mentioned, and when it was, its goals were not the most ambitious. During that period the Ukrainian political leadership’s attention was concentrated on heading the CIS.

GUAM was revived by the Orange Revolution. Russian policy may also have played a role in this. No matter how hard the leaders of the four countries tried to prove that GUAM was not an alternative to CIS — or a response of sorts to Russia’s dominant status in the post-Soviet space — the history of this four-country alliance attests to the contrary. In fact, the very creation of GUAM in October 1997 was a response to the union of Russia and Belarus. There is nothing coincidental about GUAM’s increasing role today, when Russia is openly applying various levers of influence on the post-Soviet states. This is primarily true of Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. Azerbaijan is not under such pressure because of objective reasons (although at one time Baky’s GUAM membership was practically determined by Russia supplying weapons to Armenia).

Apparently the four countries have decided to step up their cooperation, but for reasons that have nothing do with a desire to spite Russia. In this sense it is safe to believe President Ilkham Aliyev of Azerbaijan, who said: “Our organization is not confrontational. It is not directed against anyone. We did not gather here to plot against anyone. We have gathered to cooperate and advance our joint projects.”

But that’s precisely the crux of the matter: will the four countries be able to consider past mistakes under the current conditions and create an effective organization that will become influential in the region?

So far, the presidents’ declarations offer nothing new. There are desires, and there are objective hardships forcing these countries to join together to resolve them. Will they succeed? President Mikhail Saakashvili of Georgia correctly stated on May 23 that GUAM was formed to help solve joint problems that exist in the four countries on the road to progress: “We are not targeting anyone at our meetings; we have concrete problems, and we are trying to solve them with other countries or one on one, if no resolution can be found with other countries.”

The Day asked a Carnegie Center expert to share his opinion of Moscow’s attitude to GUAM and its effectiveness.

COMMENTARY

Nikolai PETROV, Carnegie Center, Moscow:

I would not say that people in Russia paid much attention to the GUAM summit. Moscow was obviously more nervous about the presence of US and EU officials there, regarding this as an attempt to break up the CIS. Will GUAM prove effective under these circumstances? I doubt it. Our countries rather heavily depend on each other economically, and whether they want it or not (especially Russia), they must build their relations not only on the basis of personal friendship or unfriendliness but also on the basis of the colossal interdependence that is rooted in the Soviet period.

In this sense excessive politicization of relations (especially if these relations are aggravated, as is often the case between the Ukrainian and Russian leaderships and the Russian and Georgian leaderships) will not benefit anyone. The GUAM member countries objectively have a number of matters to discuss, including economic and energy issues that they can try to resolve jointly. Personally, I would caution against excessive politicization and radical statements aimed against Russia, which do not play any positive role anyway.

The most radical statements have been made by Mikhail Saakashvili. He must be in the most difficult situation compared to the other GUAM leaders. Partially his actions are forced by circumstances. After all, Ukraine does not allow itself this, although relations between Kyiv and Moscow are more balanced, if only because the scope of both countries is comparable, as is their interdependence. In this sense, I think the Moldovan leadership’s position is wiser, although even there emotions often prevail over rational ideas. Today the emotional factor appears prevalent.

As for Russia’s relations with the post-Soviet countries, they are marked largely by reactivity rather than initiative. I believe that the gas war was Russia’s response to Ukraine’s position, which the Russian leadership does not regard as fully conforming to Russia’s national interests. Naturally, these countries are using all possible means of influence in their relations. Nevertheless, I believe that there is a possibility for rational compromise.