Ambitions eroding sense of responsibility for Ukraine

Acceleration of the constitutional process in Ukraine is the reason behind the following interview with former Prime Minister Yevhen MARCHUK, who has also held the posts of defense minister and secretary of the National Security and Defense Council (RNBO). The initiative of Ukrainian politicians to amend the Fundamental Law cannot fail to elicit concern. The results of the “constitutional correction” of 2004 led to the current imbalance in the government, which is damaging Ukraine’s international image. What should be done to correct this situation? Mr. Marchuk, in business they say that truth is born of competition. Speaking about competition and the conflict in Ukraine’s power institutions, what will be the effect of this on our country?

It is true that there can be competition among state structures, but I would like to stress that this kind of competition is not harmful to a country: for example, in the struggle for a quality level of understanding with regard to a given problem, effective performance, quality of information, and so on. However, in principle, it is not the best situation when state institutions are in a state of competition, because you can imagine how the current competition, confrontation, struggle affects the consciousness of rank-and-file staffers of some government bodies or other and, accordingly, its effect on their professional performance. In my opinion, it is necessary to reconcile oneself to a certain extent to the idea that we must go through this stage because it cannot be liquidated.

There is no denying the fact that this competition is having a negative effect on general national trends. I know the way certain decisions that are important to the state and its economy are being made, for example, how such decisions are made by big investors. Besides an analysis of all economic aspects (taxation laws and so on), I have seen a page and a half of text concerning the situation in Ukraine. When they study such documents, investors make up their minds whether or not to inject, say, 280 million euros into the Ukrainian economy.

Stability is the key formula of any analytical document on the situation in Ukraine. Of course, in their understanding, stability is not a frozen situation or clause. To them stability means stable positive trends, stable progress, a stable political process. Yes, it can happen that an extremely acute political struggle may take place in a country, yet it has a clearly defined development vector. I can imagine what kinds of analytical documents on the situation in Ukraine are being prepared by experts for strategic investors. No, this does not mean that investments will not be coming into Ukraine at all. It will get some by force of habit, but I don’t think that we can expect large, long-term strategic investments. Our investors will wait, but they will not make their final decisions in the nearest future.

Therefore, stability, in the good sense of the word, is the number-one value. The second one is our country’s reputation in the European club (EU, NATO). I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the reputation of a country costs a great deal, figuratively speaking. What do I mean? Let’s consider the recent NATO summit in Bucharest. Without a doubt, Russia pressured Germany and France, but the key argument was not Russia but Ukraine’s internal situation.

Speaking of the Bucharest summit, would you care to comment on the assessments of its results by Ukraine’s top leadership? President Yushchenko said that the summit’s outcome was Ukraine’s victory. Do you think this was an adequate assessment or wishful thinking?

Here not everything can be assessed unequivocally. Victory? Perhaps it was an emotional statement. I must say that after studying the declaration of the Bucharest summit - dozens of pages with the signatures of 28 heads of state, I realized that there are formulas in the concluding declaration about Ukraine and Georgia, which were never present in any previous NATO documents. For example, there is one formula stating that Ukraine will be admitted to NATO. Our country is paying a very dear price for this formula.

Why do you think this exception was made for the first time in NATO history?

There are several aspects. First, there was no consensus among the NATO member countries, so this formula was worked out in lieu of the Membership Action Plan. Also, the leaders of these countries are only too well aware of the fact that a negative response would give a strong impetus to pro-Russian moods in Ukraine. Second, for all those who are skeptical about Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration, the denial of the MAP would call into question Ukraine’s NATO membership, period. Without a doubt, NATO is not an ideal security structure, but it is a very effective one, so we must seek membership in it. On the other hand, we know that a NATO member can influence its decisions. For example, Greece showed its position on Macedonia and the decision was not made. However, getting back to the formula about Ukraine, I should say this is rather serious.

In other words, we can expect a positive decision about Ukraine during the NATO foreign ministers’ meeting in December?

No, I don’t think so. The important thing is to realize that NATO has never adopted such a formula in regard to Ukraine. As you know, I have taken part in a number of summits and studied this problem on a first-hand basis. This formula is rather strong in terms of prospects. Twenty-six heads of state signed the declaration, which clearly states that Ukraine will become a member of NATO. The questions of when and how are of secondary importance. There is, of course, the other side of the coin. While promoting the MAP issue at the Bucharest summit, President Yushchenko and his presidential team made the situation look as though the issue had already been resolved.

In many respects, the situation looked as though the Ukrainian leader were convinced that Ukraine would be granted the MAP status with the help of such powerful allies as the United States. However, the world today has many dimensions and even the US, with all its might and capacity, cannot accomplish everything — at least in this sense. Most importantly, it cannot do what we have to do ourselves. In fact, before the Bucharest summit our government accomplished few practical pragmatic things that would have helped Ukraine obtain MAP status — for example, informing the public about the advantages of NATO membership — not about NATO, because not everything is cut and dried here. On the one hand, yes, Yugoslavia and Afghanistan were bombed, but on the other, you have to realize that little Slovakia is 100,000 times better protected than Ukraine, which is much larger.

As for the Bucharest summit, let me repeat that the Ukrainian side raised the boiling point of expectations, although it was clear that nothing would come of this. By the way, in an interview with the journal Ukraine three months before the Bucharest summit I summed up the pragmatic reasons why they wouldn’t respond in the affirmative. Neither were there enough internal arguments for obtaining MAP status. Why? There is no political consensus in the country, so how can we expect to receive MAP status? Add here the fact that Ukraine is facing a complicated constitutional issue. Also, 30 something percentof Ukrainians who support NATO membership is not much for a country as large as Ukraine, so there is no way to avoid a referendum. In addition, the Ukraine-NATO target plan for 2007 was not fully implemented. At the same time, we must admit that Russia did a great deal of work before the Bucharest summit — and I’m not just talking about Putin’s travels abroad.

Do you think that Russia’s aggressive policy toward Ukraine and its NATO course will change with the new president of the Russian Federation?

I don’t think so. Their rhetoric may become somewhat milder, although I find this hard to believe. Russia is a very serious and systemic factor.

How do you assess Ukraine’s response to all those militant statements by Russia’s top-level officials?

I think that under the circumstances Ukraine gave a more or less adequate response to the harsh statements of Russia’s top-ranking officials by addressing a statement to the United Nations. By the way, what Putin told Yushchenko during their meeting in Moscow — that he was having nightmares about Russia targeting its missiles at Ukraine — this looked, on the one hand, like pressure being exerted on Ukraine. On the other, it should be remembered that this statement was made by the president of a big nuclear power.

What did he actually mean? The president of Russia, just like his Ukrainian counterpart, is commander in chief of the armed forces. The military leadership knows that every year Russia’s president approves a strategic plan for the armed forces. This plan is drafted by the general staff. This is a very serious, top-secret document that exists only in one or two copies. What is this plan for? The armed forces must have several scenarios to meet various challenges. These can include a regional conflict, a border conflict, and so on. It is meant to prevent the top military leaders from stargazing or looking up at the ceiling whenever a critical situation develops.

Today it is easy to predict that there is little likelihood of a direct, frontal war or attack against a territory. Something else can happen. Russia, as a big nuclear power that is taking part in the mutual international nuclear containment effort, also takes part in designating potential targets, and Putin, as president and commander in chief, knows these targets. Such is the cynical and, regrettably, true logic of the very existence of the armed forces. There is something like this in the United States. Obviously, Putin blurted out that phrase. He was right when he said that we all know what will happen after NATO installations appear in Ukraine.

At the same time, it is necessary to bear in mind that this technology is not meant for public consumption, so I think that Putin made a serious mistake here. Let me repeat: on the one hand, the Ukrainian political leadership did the right thing by turning to UN structures. On the other, Putin’s statements, which were then echoed by Russia’s military, are proof that Russia cannot be ignored. As for the summit in Bucharest, the MAP, and our future in NATO in general, it cannot look as though we don’t care how Russia will react. Yushchenko was formally correct when he declared that issues, such as NATO membership, are decided upon by the nation.

However, today’s realities are such that for the time being 70 percent of the nation is not eager to join NATO. While it is true that the nation determines national security issues, it is necessary to bear in mind that percentage of people who do not want NATO membership. What we need is a strong domestic policy. Difficult and dull work with Russia must be conducted on all levels, including on the level of experts. We must determine what makes the Russian Federation worried about Ukraine’s NATO membership and proceed to discuss these concerns with the Russians in detail. These questions with the Russian side are extremely difficult to resolve (but they can be); it is difficult even to begin this process. We cannot simply ignore Russia’s position. There are many complex problems that cannot be disregarded; for example, the border problem, the Strait of Kerch, the Azov Sea, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet based in the Crimea, and many other questions.

In the past few years Ukraine has repeatedly declared its intention of gaining NATO membership. Why, then, have Russia and Ukraine still not discussed this issue on the expert level that you just mentioned?

There have been discussions, but not on the level I mentioned. Kuchma was not an out-and-out supporter of Euro-Atlantic integration, but he didn’t interfere with the people who were involved in this process. Why didn’t he interfere? Because he had to play his game with the West (including the unpopular decisions on Iraq) after he found himself isolated. However, the Russians knew for sure that Ukraine would not become a member of NATO under President Kuchma. It was understandable that Kuchma was flirting with the West rather than actually trying to gain admission to the NATO club.

The situation with Yushchenko is more serious, especially now that Ukraine has come so close to getting MAP status. Now, what is the Membership Action Plan all about? It means semi-membership. When the Russians realized that Ukraine could actually obtain the MAP, naturally, it stepped up its efforts in this direction. MAP status does not simply envisage closer cooperation with NATO but many other pragmatic things. The Russians know this, and that is why they launched vigorous counteraction, although I am convinced that this is not the most active phase.

Continuing the topic of Russia’s position in the international arena, how do you view the current Russia-Georgia conflict in Abkhazia? What will be the outcome?

I think that nothing serious will happen, although tensions will be quite high. By the way, this is also a problem for us. We are marching in tandem with Georgia, even though we are at different stages of cooperation with NATO. The worsening situation in Abkhazia will be a serious factor against granting MAP status to Georgia — and to Ukraine as its partner.

Do you think it would be worth uncoupling Georgia’s “NATO car” from Ukraine at this stage?

Not in the direct sense, because this would make Ukraine look undignified in Georgia’s eyes. Under the circumstances, we must concentrate on the fact that our further course is quite complicated and that December may prove ambiguous in terms of a timeframe. It may mean one deadline for Georgia, while in Ukraine the coalition may fall apart, the cabinet may resign. So it’s not worth counting the MAP in December. We must follow our own path. In fact, we have a much greater potential for cooperation with NATO.

With all these pros and cons, when do you think Ukraine will become a member of NATO?

Given the domestic and international situation, I would say seven to ten years from now, at best.

How will relations between official Kyiv and Moscow change on the level of Prime Ministers Tymoshenko and Putin?

I don’t think there will be any essential changes. Also, we must not forget that Putin will remain de facto president. In other words, he will match Medvedev in terms of political influence.

You mentioned Ukraine’s shaky stand when you commented on the predictable unpredictability of Ukrainian politics in the context of the Membership Action Plan. It would be naive to assume that the current coalition is unaware of this. In your opinion, what makes the parliamentary majority leaders care so little about the unity of the coalition camp while they issue statements about the possibility of its collapse?

These people are in the middle of a pitched political battle. Mind you, this struggle is not taking place among opponents but among allies, so in many respects its fervor dictates their public conduct. Unfortunately, they have no time to think about the country’s prospects for the next 5, 10, or 15 years. The statements in which the coalition representatives are criticizing each other harm themselves first of all, and second, their supporters. The people see everything, they analyze things. They say, “We’re sick and tired of your squabbles; we placed our confidence and hopes in you so many times, but you still can’t come to terms with each other. Even worse, you use every opportunity to threaten your comrades in arms with the coalition’s collapse.”

In view of the permanent conflicts within the coalition, how long do you think the Verkhovna Rada’s majority in the BYuT+NU-NS format will exist? And what about the sixth convocation?

I would say that the coalition’s prospects are not bright. I don’t think that the coalition will last long in its current format.

When will its de jure collapse take place?

It’s hard to answer your question unequivocally; one can forecast certain systemic phenomena, but the current domestic political situation is such that, unfortunately, there are no systemic principles. Instead, the individual character traits of the key political players are very important.

What’s going to happen next? Will there be a so-called reformatting of the coalition or early parliamentary elections?

I don’t expect that the Verkhovna Rada will be dissolved, so the most realistic scenario will be reformatting, which will look like a forced move on the BYuT’s part. Yes, the Party of Regions will agree to cooperate, but questions will arise because for the BYuT to form a coalition that would include the communists would be tantamount to death. If Yushchenko’s team keeps helping this process (the way they’re doing now), a coalition alliance between the BYuT and the Party of Regions is a very distinct possibility, although if the Presidential Secretariat takes over the initiative of cooperating with the Party of Regions, the situation may change. However, cooperation with Our Ukraine is not very good for the Regionals in the electoral context. But with the Party of Regions, cooperation with the BYuT means, above and beyond everything else, a constitutional majority.

Can one expect a political lull in 2010 after the stormy situation of recent years? In other words, is there a chance that the end of the presidential election will mark the starting-point for stabilizing the situation in Ukraine?

There will be three major contenders in the presidential race. I think that Yushchenko will take part. Tymoshenko will be there, of course, and so will Yanukovych in all likelihood. I think that each of them stands a chance of winning the race, even though Yushchenko’s prospects appear to be rather dim today. But he may well win the second round, although that will be an extremely difficult task. I believe that Tymoshenko stands the best chance. Now let’s imagine that she wins the elections. The political situation won’t become any easier or, in other words, less aggravated than now. Why? Because the constitutional structure of the entire state administration will not have stabilized by that time. Second, the same political figures will be present.

Assuming that Tymoshenko wins, how will Ukraine change under her presidency? While she declares her democratic approach, we all know that her political camp is ruled by iron discipline.

Here everything will depend on the form of state power. The current form can have one kind of Yulia Tymoshenko, but in another one there will be a completely different Yulia Tymoshenko.

Lately, the question that is being heard increasingly often in expert circles is the need for an iron hand in Ukraine at this stage.

I agree with this to a point. But we missed the boat. What will an iron hand do now that democratic institutions, political parties, and civic structures have been formed?

Here a lot also depends on the structure of the government and, of course, on the leader’s personal qualities. We all remember the many complaints about Yushchenko’s performance, but he did push the early elections bill through the Verkhovna Rada last year, even if it was with Tymoshenko’s help.

An iron hand, as it is understood by the people (discipline, order) is correct. But today it is technically very difficult to return to such a political system without violating democratic norms. I would say that this is practically impossible — and unnecessary.

Some political scientists call Mrs. Tymoshenko “Putin in a skirt” or the Ukrainian Margaret Thatcher. How valid are these analogies in your opinion?

To a certain extent they are accurate. Yulia Tymoshenko is truly aspiring to this image. The thing is both Thatcher and Putin faced problems that were of a different caliber from what we have here. In fact, our problems can create conditions that will temper a political leader. Frankly speaking, Yulia Tymoshenko’s evolution over the past seven to eight years is clearly apparent. There is a big difference between the Tymoshenko of 2000, when she lost the premiership, and the Tymoshenko of 2008. She is evolving from the standpoint of conformity to her high state position. It takes unbelievable willpower to refrain — and for so long — from responding to criticism from President Yushchenko and Viktor Baloha, which at times was very offensive. What does this prove? It proves that Tymoshenko has held her emotions in check in order to reach her political goal. Now she has the moral right to respond to all the challenges from Bankova Street, telling them, “See how much I have endured, and for how long?”

Speaking about contemporary politics, it is impossible to overlook another important subject: the mayoral elections in Kyiv. What has prevented the democrats from agreeing on a single candidate?

I think that Chernovetsky will win because he works systematically; he doesn’t work with the help of verbal agitation but with actions. He is using the City Council’s apparatus, not to mention the local media. It is naive to expect that Tymoshenko’s charisma will automatically extend to Turchynov. His failure during the mayoral elections will be a heavy blow to Tymoshenko’s prestige, her political ambitions, and ratings — or what they call electoral positions.

It will also be a heavy blow to the democratic force in general because people will conclude that there is no sense in voting for the democrats because these people cannot reach an understanding with each other. Unfortunately, that’s the kind of formula that’s taking shape these days. Also, there is this immediate historical retrospection: ambitions very quickly eroded the political leaders’ sense of responsibility for Ukraine’s future. Willy- nilly, one is reminded of the popular saying, “Take two Ukrainians and get three hetmans.” We all know what this led to in Ukrainian history. The people who can change this practice will have a future.