Back to “Multivectorism”?
Ukraine is ready to share its sovereignty within the “Single Economic Space” (SES). This shocking conclusion stems from Viktor Yushchenko’s statement made during his two-day visit to Kazakhstan.
“Everybody realizes that, sooner or later, when we see an effective mechanism of SES economic relationships, and wanting these relations to further evolve, our agenda will include delegating some functions to supranational institutions,” said President Yushchenko. This statement took everyone by surprise, especially in view of Mr. Yushchenko’s critical remarks concerning European integration while he was leader of the opposition. How can one explain this statement by the current Ukrainian head of state? Delegating any part of Ukrainian sovereignty within the SES network is at odds with both Ukrainian foreign policy priorities (especially in terms of EU integration) and the Constitution of Ukraine. Unfortunately, the government has not been able to implement its own call to submit documents to the Constitutional Court to study the SES initiatives. The SES card will very likely be played more than once during the parliamentary campaign, in order to win the largest possible number of votes next year. Has the new Ukrainian leadership figured out the consequences of this political flirtation?
By making such SES declarations, the current president is contradicting his own statements concerning Ukraine’s EU integration. His vague statement during the visit to Astana about the SES having to begin with a free trade zone is not likely to gladden the hearts of all those who support Ukraine’s European integration. What will happen in the second and third phases, a customs union? But a single country cannot be a member of two customs unions, and this is something the new Ukrainian government should be aware of, because even the Ukrainian foreign ministry under the previous administration made clear statements to this effect. So the question is, “Where is Ukraine heading on its current integration course, Europe or Eurasia?”
Of course, after the president’s return to Kyiv, we will likely hear refutations of some of his statements that were incorrectly interpreted. The president did say that “right now it would be a mistake to shift the emphasis to the organizational aspect (of SES formation — Ed.); the people must sense the advantages of what we have created, but this takes time.” This statement, however, doesn’t mitigate previous statements about a supranational body, which is sending vague signals to the European partners. And all this is happening before the so-called mini-Davos scheduled for June 16-17. Some 300 delegates have been invited, most of whom are potential investors in the Ukrainian economy. Will they be in a hurry to invest in this economy after these SES signals?
There is, of course, the possibility that Mr. Yushchenko is trying to play up to his Kazakh counterpart, whom the other SES partners probably entrusted with the mission of feeling out Ukraine’s moods. The Ukrainian leader’s position was noticeably weakened by the recent gas crisis. His SES statement can probably be explained by his desire to arrange for Kazakh oil supplies to Ukraine, whereupon he acted against his own priorities. In the end, Mr. Yushchenko heard what he wanted to hear: Kazakhstan is interested in a continuation of the Odesa-Brody oil pipeline project and is prepared to act as a shareholder in this project. Nazarbayev, Putin, and Lukashenko also received responses that could keep them satisfied under the circumstances. There is only one inference, however: Ukraine is back on a foreign political course that this country should have discarded after the Orange Revolution, an ignominious course called multivectorism.
