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Between Two Realities

23 March, 00:00

By Viktor ZAMYATIN, The Day It has happened. It has so long been the subject of articles, speeches, and debates. Some shook their fists, others welcomed it, hoping to join later, still others pretended it had nothing to do directly with them. One of the dividing lines in Europe drawn by the Big Three in Yalta ceased to exist when the joining of NATO by Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary became juridically valid. It was only one line. For, at the same time, a new, more serious and deeper line with a wall stronger than the Berlin one is implacably being drawn by joint efforts. Confrontation, above all political, is the main condition under which the Russian Empire may still be restored. It is hard for Moscow to lose its clout, which seemed so natural for so long, over Central Europe. The politicians of yesterday simply cannot think in other categories, on the one hand, and play on the sentiments of the masses who also feel pain to lose the role of citizens of a superpower, on the other. "Yesterday's" politicians also exist in the West: this is why NATO fails to spell out the main principles of its reform in plain terms.

In spite of all the talk about indivisible security, the desire to put up a fence, to draw a line between the well-off and the worse-off is a reality. Also a reality is the desire to circle the wagons and continue to divide the world so as not to lose oneself in one's own eyes. It is an unenviable destiny to find oneself between these two realities, has happened with Ukraine. Especially, when one tries to carry out true reforms and create a normal civil society based on a solid, if still nonexistent, middle class, and not to reduce the common people to the status of a silent "electorate," if not slaves. There is nobody to follow the suit of the European Commissioners who collectively resigned, being unable to rebut accusations of corruption by functionaries, not ministers, i.e., what does not happen in Ukraine. There is nobody to explain simply and honestly that if we are to learn anything, it should not be from the East which has mostly taught us general knavery over the course of centuries.

Under these conditions it is not strange that Kyiv has again hosted Belarusian President Lukashenka with proposals, eternal as he is himself, to become a third party in a fraternal union that might give a rebuff to all those who would encroach on their brotherly unity. As a result, we cannot but continue to look Moscow in the mouth, while the train of Europe passes full speed ahead without even slowing down at the station called Ukraine. It is clear why Moscow studiously revives its confrontation with the West. It finds the role of feared and respected adversary natural and even comfortable. It is also clear why Lukashenka feels uncomfortable outside this line: he has no other field to play on. What is not clear is why Ukraine needs all this: it is historically bored with being a buffer, a bridge, or a part of Eurasia.

INCIDENTALLY

In terms of conventional arms, the force ratio between Russia and NATO in the European theater of war operations is now one to three in favor of the alliance. And, according to the Russian military, using the airfields of the new members it is now quite possible for the alliance to carry out massive air strikes of Smolensk, Briansk, and Kursk even using tactical aviation, which had been impossible when NATO was 650-700 km. away from Russia.

On the other hand, Polish, Czech, and Hungarian officials have repeatedly admitted that there was no need for stationing on their territory permanent contingents from other NATO members, as well as the Alliance's nuclear weapons. As for the latter, there were also declarations from the NATO leadership. The conventional arms of the three nations meet the Alliance's requirements only partially. The programs for their adaptation and upgrading have been designed for an average period of 10 to 15 years, after which the total number of arms will decrease. There is also little use of their 300 airfields, for they cannot receive NATO airplanes due to their navigation equipment and the flight preparation procedures. And modernizing all those airfields is a too costly a business to be treated seriously.

Newspaper output №:

№11, (1999)

Section

Day After Day