Boomerang Thrown One Year Ago

Just a year ago, Oleksandr Moroz played in Verkhovna Rada the first installment of Major Melnychenko’s tapes, having thus turned one of the murkiest pages in new millennium’s history of Ukraine. This page which has not yet become history, will be closed only when its full significance becomes clear and eventually sinks in. Viewed through the prism of the cassette scandal, our society and its political elite cannot be divided into winners and losers as there can be no winners in the confrontation that smeared Ukraine’s fledgling image so much. With no party in the confrontation backing down, nor are there any losers. We should be fully aware of the fact that the cassette scandal became a kind of boomerang thrown by those in power during the 1999 presidential campaign and April 2000 referendum, only to return to them several months later. The losers in the 1999 election failed to take revenge in the fall-winter of 2000-2001. Nor could the winners build up their voter support in the wake of the election and implement their agenda in full. All this prompts one to draw a conclusion about the infancy of both the authorities and opposition which manifested itself in the former’s inability and lack of readiness to settle such conflicts in a civilized way and in the latter’s failure to offer a worthy alternative to the paralyzed authorities. Both parties made use of the lack of any adequate political and legal framework, something that helped the authorities to avoid answering many pointed questions and equally helped the opponents to look like a full-fledged opposition, if only on television. Still, the range of opinion on the lessons learned by Ukraine from its Tapegate seems wide, bordering from open pessimism to the conviction that our country will emerge from the crisis cleansed and more sophisticated. This is why The Day approached several experts with the question, “How does the cassette scandal look from today’s perspective and what objectives have been achieved by both parties in the confrontation?”

Yevhen HOLOVAKHA, Doctor of Philosophy, Chief Research Associate, Institute of Sociology:

The lessons learned by Ukraine in the wake of these events should be viewed from three perspectives, the lessons learned by the authorities, primarily by the executive branch, those learned by the opposition, and, finally, by Ukraine’s nascent civil society.

The scandal came as a major shock for the authorities. And the initial reaction of the executive was quite correct: they understood that exerting pressure on the mass media would be unproductive, with the upsurge of critical materials carried by many media outlets in the wake of the scandal prove that pressure exerted by the authorities will meet an equal counteraction from the media at moments most critical for those in power. This led the regime to send several signals to the media indicating that the future relationship will not be based on domination by the state or gagging the opposition or independent media. But the initial moves by the state aimed at reaching greater transparency and creating public media have now stopped. Part of the blame for this goes to the Ukrainian public for its failure to support these first timid steps toward the democratization of power, thus leaving the whole issue in midair.

On the other hand, the authorities have concluded that many manifestations of political life should be under their control. We can see how this control has tightened, especially with the election campaign gaining momentum. As political games become more active, will it help or harm society? Given the chaos and confusion in the ranks of suitors for seats in Verkhovna Rada, it is difficult to make any assessments now. As it is equally difficult to judge what objectives will be achieved by the executive and what will happen later.

The third lesson to have been learned by the executive from these dramatic developments, but which apparently it failed to learn, lies in the fact that censoring or disseminating false information is inadmissible in dealing with society. The tragedy of shooting down Russia’s Tu-154 has again laid bare the tendencies so strongly opposed by the public a year ago, with more lies given, more inhuman and clumsy explanations offered to create a smoke screen. All this has again delivered a huge blow to Ukraine’s reputation, both internationally and in the eyes of its own citizens.

In its turn, the opposition learned that it still cannot function in a constructive mode. It seemed that at the initial stages of the scandal the opposition had scored considerable success, psychologically shaking the regime and building up the wave of criticism in society and by riding which it could reap more and more dividends. But the moves by the opposition revealing elements of violence, demagogy, and lack of dialogue among its ambitious leaders, have demonstrated to the public that Ukraine’s political opposition, still struggling to adopt an antagonistic attitude toward those in power, is a mere rookie unable to offer any constructive alternative to them. Clearly, it should be central for the political opposition to realize that unification based on scandal is not productive. In the absence of a full-fledged constructive political opposition and constructive social conflict it is impossible to make those in power keep within the bounds of their authority and not provoke such scandals like this.

The cassette scandal was viewed by public opinion here not as a shocking event, but as a logical result of the decade of development of Ukraine’s executive and political structures. The likelihood of more scandals when (in the latest one) the authorities, accused of complicity in the contract killing of a journalist, demonstrate their low cultural and political standards, came as one of the most painful revelations for Ukrainians.

The absence of shock or emotional explosion in the mass conscience of Ukrainians was the reason why the reaction to the political conflict was that of indifference. Most of the people had their opinion on the case but they were reluctant to make their voices heard using the means available in society. This is why, bereft of mass emotional support, the protest actions staged by the political opposition merely failed.

On the one hand, it is good that the public has demonstrated its basic rule of thumb for the present moment, that a bad peace is better than a good war. True, given the present unstable and shaky situation in society, aggressive attitudes are very dangerous and could have grave consequences for Ukraine. As a result, Ukrainians did not support the aggressiveness of some political forces. On the other hand, the conflict has revealed the lack of civic initiative and the need to develop it among Ukrainians. Aware of this low civic initiative potential, Ukraine’s public leaders like the mass media, democratically oriented politicians, and the country’s intellectual elite, should be spurred in their efforts to nurture and strengthen such potential by engaging in steadfast and painstaking social work within the framework of voluntary associations of citizens, as opposed to aggressive spontaneous protests and demonstrations. This is the main lesson to be learned by Ukrainian society, should it wish to develop in the democratic environment envisaged by the Constitution.

Oleksandr YAREMENKO, Director of the Ukrainian Institute For Social Research:

The tape scandal demonstrated cyclic fluctuations in the attitudes of Ukrainians toward the authorities, with President Kuchma’s rating first dwindling and then gradually recovering. Today, his popularity is the same as before the scandal, indicating that he has yet again safely passed the rocks and is still sailing.

It will not be stretching the point to say today that the initiators of the cassette scandal have met with a defeat, with their tactics and methods failed to gain support from Ukrainians. The lessons we drew are those of political tolerance and intolerance, as well as of morality in politics. The lesson for the whole of Ukraine is in how the immoral rules of waging political struggle were accepted. No matter how you look at it, Major Melnychenko is an oath-breaker who violated his soldier’s duty. Unruffled by this, many politicians did not turn their backs on him; on the contrary, they chose to shake his hand, interview him, and be photographed with the major. Many showed keen interest in the case materials placed on the Internet, with no one ever proving their validity. Whatever is said about the president, he is the one we elected. He is our president and that is why we must show him respect. In his turn, the president must use the power vested in him by the people. One year has passed and the elected administration continues in office. Ukraine is still moving along its declared course and there are positive developments in the economy. Another lesson from the cassette scandal is that the present authorities have survived and are able to survive similar crises.

We are in the process of building a new society where any radical fluctuations could threaten serious aftereffects. Understandably, such consequences are beneficial to a number of politicians, but in the final analysis Ukrainians long for a quiet life, with optimists predominating in society now. Consequently, the more often such situations happen, the more harm they will do our society. The fact that most Ukrainians did not support the organizers of the cassette scandal indicates that the people proved to be more farsighted than some of our politicians.

Sergi MARKOV, Director of the Institute of Political Research (Moscow):

The cassette scandal became a turning point in the Ukrainian politics. What immediately strikes the eye is that it looks like an attempt to stage a quiet coup d’etat, clearly outlining several aspects. First, the countries of the West as guarantors of Ukrainian independence are disposed very critically toward the highest echelons of power in Ukraine, claiming that there is a high rate of corruption amid government and departure from accepted democratic standards. Second, in the course of the cassette scandal two players on Ukraine’s political field came into the open, the countries of the West backing Yushchenko and Russia siding with Pres. Kuchma. Europe urged Ukraine to abide by the principles of democracy and was reluctant to become involved in the conflict, while the United States was all set to do so. The White House handled the issue with kid gloves but several media outlets and foundations threw their weight about in the Congress and Senate to make waves. These forces opted for the following scenario: President Kuchma resigns due to mass protests and Prime Minister Yushchenko becomes caretaker president. Later on, with his now vast administrative resource, the anti-Russian oriented Yushchenko easily becomes president.

Third, the scandal revealed Ukrainians’ lack of trust in their government and more specifically for President Kuchma, although Ukrainians turned their backs on whom we call democratic schizophrenics in Russia (there is a softer term, the furies of the revolution). It was obvious that their lineup did not change in the course of the scandal and their protest actions received financial support from outside.

There is no doubt that by rejecting the protest actions the Communists became beneficiaries. Russia also stood to gain as the US (the foundations mentioned, to be more precise) tried to interfere without ceremony in Ukraine’s domestic affairs and define Kuchma’s role as that of a sacrificial sheep, and this not to mention that the international reputation of Ukraine, of its president, and its top leaders has suffered.