Borys Tarasiuk: Ukraine Can’t Export Revolution

The former and current Foreign Minister of Ukraine, Borys Tarasiuk, sounded optimistic in his first interview with The Day after the presidential election, predicting the fruition of Ukraine’s plans as a regional leader and the creation of the Democratic Choice coalition. He is also opposed to the exportation of revolution and feels sure that European integration is a vital need rather than an idОe fixe. In a year’s time these plans will correspond to reality, all the more so as society will give its vote of confidence or non-confidence in the new state leadership during the parliamentary elections.

REGIONAL LEADERSHIP

Is it possible to predict changes in Ukraine-US relations following President Yushchenko’s visit?

Tarasiuk: It is difficult to overestimate the importance of this visit. I believe that it will truly mark a new stage in US-Ukrainian relations, that it will give a fresh impetus to our strategic partnership. Ukraine and the United States are placing big hopes on this visit. America has given Ukraine a great credit of trust; I became aware of this during my working visit to Washington in March.

Is there a possibility of setting up a commission similar to the one that was established during the Ukrainian-Russian summit?

Tarasiuk: The American side doesn’t care much for structures resembling those of the previous administrations. We’ll have to wait and see. We have a vehicle for cooperation, but we don’t have anything like the Kuchma-Gore structure.

Are there any changes in Ukrainian foreign policy worth being discussed at this stage?

Tarasiuk: In the past, the Ukrainian president would mostly visit Russia and other CIS countries; nobody visited us. Now the situation is essentially different. Today, we pay official visits and are visited in return. Our foreign policy is also changing; it will keep on changing, not in essence but in terms of political vehicles. Ukraine will discard empty declarations and wishful thinking, replacing them with pragmatic implementation of stated objectives. We must convince our partners that a new state has emerged with a different attitude to cardinal domestic issues, one that is capable of guiding domestic development into the current of universally recognized standards, where there is equilibrium between the branches of government, and where the essence of governance is conducted in conformity with these democratic standards of governance.

Ukraine must initiate the formation of what may be described as the coalition known as Democratic Choice. In fact, it already has two members, Ukraine and Georgia.

As for our foreign political guidelines, outwardly they look the same: European and Euro-Atlantic integration, with a major emphasis placed on relations with our strategic partners, such as Russia, the United States, and Poland. Yet there are changes in implementing these foreign political priorities.

As a result of its foreign political endeavors, Ukraine must assume the status of a regional leader, and Ukraine is fully equipped to do just that.

Would you specify the region where Ukraine could take the lead?

Tarasiuk: Ukraine has every opportunity to take the lead in any post-Soviet region. Of course, we can’t get ahead of Russia; any hopes in this respect would be naїve. There are clearly defined and understandable priorities in our relations with Russia: constructive and mutually advantageous strategic partnership relations, while playing the game by the new rules. These relations haven’t been strategic, but they must be constructed as such.

Ukraine remains a key player, particularly in terms of GUUAM. This status must receive fresh impetus. Whereas the Ukrainian political leadership previously relied more on the East [i.e., Russia — Transl.], now we have objective conditions in which we can implement the idea of Ukraine’s regional leadership. Of course, this is something other than damaging relations with the Russian Federation. Trying to damage these relations would be a logical mistake as bad as trying to juxtapose Ukraine’s European and Euro-Atlantic integration against its relations with Russia.

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: NO IDEEE FIXE

Opponents of the new Ukrainian government insist that excessively rapid and accelerated European integration harms Ukrainian national interests. How can you prove them wrong?

Tarasiuk: We never had either slow or fast European integration. The new government has finally set about reaching the targets designated by the previous regime, so the process can hardly be described as excessively rapid integration. Too much time has been wasted and we must catch up on things. We’ve wasted ten precious years. Had we followed the same course as all those Central and Eastern European countries, we’d have joined the European Union. But we were too busy debating Ukraine’s EU membership, with some saying we should go East and others urging us to move westward. We’ve spent the years of our independence marking time. So what we have is a zero effect.

Now we’re in a position to state that European integration isn’t our idОe fixe, meaning that Ukraine’s EU membership isn’t uppermost on our political agenda; that we can place this task on a par with others that we have to solve in terms of domestic development. It’s the only approach. Our domestic progress must determine our foreign political priorities, not the other way around. Then all our projects will stand a chance.

Is it true that, by adopting the EU’s social protection, welfare, and cultural standards, we will meet our domestic political interests? This is another priority that tallies with EU membership criteria. It’s an objective process, not an artificial one. Our WTO and EU membership is objectively determined by the domestic evolutionary process.

Is the other side (e.g., EU member countries and EU structures) prepared to meet Ukraine halfway?

Tarasiuk: Yes. Ukraine is currently being given a great deal of “confidence credit” from the international community in general, and the European Union in particular. Perhaps not the kind of credit and steps that we would like to see, but the fact remains: Ukraine has this credit of confidence and we must do our best to measure up.

If the new government can demonstrate progress in terms of reform, this credit will surely be enlarged and materialized as steps will be taken to reciprocate.

After the previous government adopted the Action Plan- which had a number of shortcomings-I personally criticized the cabinet’s decision. With the emergence of a new government and new democratic processes in Ukraine, the European Union has updated the Action Plan, adding 10 clauses with an eye to the future. EU agrees that Ukraine must determine the priorities on the Ukrainian-EU-membership agenda, and that they must tally with established EU standards. This Ukrainian president’s initiative will materialize before long in the form of joint approaches to priority tasks for 2005. In fact, we’ve moved very close to adopting a document that contain such priorities; the latter will be regarded as priorities by both the Ukrainian and EU sides; behind them will be the same political will aimed at implementing them, on the part of both the Ukrainian government and EU structures.

As an ordinary Ukrainian, I’d appreciate being spared the humiliating exit/entry visa procedures when visiting European countries.

Tarasiuk: Fortunately, it’s one of the priorities concerning which Ukraine and EU have no differences; both sides agree that simplifying visa procedures should be negotiated in the first place.

Liberalizing visa and readmission procedures, as well as employment and solving the problem of illegal immigrants, are parts of a complex issue that must be resolved jointly.

In fact, efforts are being made to resolve it. We have asymmetrical visa regulations with three EU members: Poland, Hungary, and Lithuania. We suggest that the EU extend this experience to all the other member states, so that our citizens can obtain free entry visas; we would then be happy to welcome people in Ukraine without any visas. Visa procedures should also be gradually made easier for certain categories of Ukrainian citizens: students, artists, journalists, businesspeople. It would be good to start with these people, so that the broadest possible Ukrainian circles would feel the advantages of European integration and never feel isolated.

So far we’ve heard from various EU structures that they aren’t prepared to consider this proposal.

Tarasiuk: They are prepared. There’s a mandate being prepared for talks between EU and European Commission delegations in April. Let’s hope that this process will be completed. So the European Union will be ready to join the roundtable with Ukraine. That was what President Yushchenko emphasized during his meetings with the EU leadership, saying it was necessary to pay attention to these priority groups of Ukrainian citizens. The ultimate goal should be canceling visas for Ukrainian nationals. This won’t happen overnight; we must travel down this road, passing through certain stages. The first stage is an asymmetrical visa regime that would be extended to all EU countries; the second stage is simplifying visa procedures for certain categories of individuals; the third stage is 60 to 90-day visa-free entry for Ukrainian citizens traveling to EU countries, as practiced in the early 1990s by Poland as an aspiring EU member, for example. The final stage is visa-free entry, but this will be determined by Ukraine’s membership in the EU and accession to the Schengen Accords.

What is your advice on the correct attitude toward certain contradictory statements made by the President and the Prime Minister of Ukraine concerning Euro-Atlantic integration? Are these statements meant for different audiences?

Tarasiuk: Can you give me an example?

Yulya Tymoshenko said early this year that Ukraine must join NATO only with Russia.

Tarasiuk: She made this statement before being appointed prime minister. We must abide by the priorities drawn up by the President of Ukraine who, according to the Constitution, is entitled to represent Ukraine in the international arena and control its foreign policy.

With regard to NATO, we must focus on the year-by-year objectives laid down in the Ukraine-NATO Action Plan, rather than political declarations. Ukraine has been accused of failing to comply with the Action Plan’s objectives, in terms of democracy, balancing the branches of power, rule of law, and human rights. These problems have been solved and we’re proceeding to engage in pragmatic cooperation with NATO.

We cannot avoid taking into account the Ukrainian public’s attitude to NATO membership. We must keep this factor in mind; we have to bide our time. We have to conduct active campaigns to explain our targets to the people and fill in information gaps concerning the EU and NATO. Polls show that such data was received by over 86% of the population via national television channels. This proves that the government and government-run TV channels have failed to discharge their principal function of keeping the general public adequately informed. Society can’t be punished, but you can help society figure out the situation. Herein lies the main task of the political elite, the government, and the mass media.