“Bravo to Ukraine!”

The West reacted positively to the results of the presidential election in Ukraine. Some politicians have already congratulated Petro Poroshenko on winning this race. However, Russian President Vladimir Putin has neither made any comments nor sent congratulations yet, although we all remember how the master of the Kremlin twice congratulated Viktor Yanukovych on his victory after the second round of voting in 2004. In the meantime, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that Moscow was ready to dialog with Poroshenko. The Day turned to senior researcher at the Carnegie Moscow Center Lilia SHEVTSOVA for comments on the possible reaction of the Kremlin to the presidential election results, as well as on the success of the right-wing parties in elections to the European Parliament.

“THE UKRAINIAN PEOPLE OPTED FOR SOVEREIGNTY AND FIGHTING FOREIGN MEDDLING”

“There has been no official reaction from Putin’s Kremlin to the recent presidential election in Ukraine yet. It is quite natural. They will delay formulating their stance as late as possible. People in the Kremlin are now take great pains to develop that wording. Its formal response is likely to be shaped along the lines of Putin’s rhetorical passage already proposed at the recent Saint Petersburg Forum, which boils down to this: Russia will respect the choice made by the Ukrainian people, Russia will cooperate with the authorities, which will be formed as a result of the presidential election. However, this passage, confirmed by Putin as well as Dmitry Medvedev, will naturally be cushioned in a lot of ‘buts,’ which Putin has also warned about quite frankly. These ‘buts’ concern, first, the Kremlin’s uncertainty about whether Poroshenko is a real president with a long perspective or to what extent he is only a transitional figure. It is the term used by Putin. The Kremlin will again raise the issue that the dialog with Ukraine and its new president should be linked to its government’s ability and willingness to comply with and implement Russian conditions, including the same old mantra, that usual song about the federalization of Ukraine, its neutral and nonnuclear status, the Russian language rights, and termination of the anti-terrorist operation (ATO). The whole package of Russian demands will continue to be put as a Kremlin’s precondition to resume dialog on vital issues. It is unlikely that Russia’s stance on these issues will change. When it comes to specific policies of the Kremlin, then I think that firstly, under Putin’s new doctrine of survival, which requires containing the West, both in Russia and outside Russia, including in Ukraine, Putin will only use his set of tactical approaches. They will naturally include a continued effort – maybe not as bold, maybe not so cynical – to destabilize south-eastern Ukraine. The Kremlin can always say that it has no control over pro-Russian separatist forces, though. They can even tell the truth now, as these groups have already begun to squabble with each other.

“Secondly, the Kremlin will try to put various kinds of pressure on Ukraine. The first kind of pressure, which is regarded by the Kremlin as mortal threat, is the gas issue. I mean that requirement to pay 3 billion dollars as the precondition of Putin agreeing to sit at the table with Poroshenko, as well as gas supply prepayment. My feeling is that this gas war is one of the most important means of pressure on the new Ukrainian government and Ukraine.

“Thirdly, Putin discussed his tactics quite frankly. He referred to the impending constitutional reform, new parliament elections, and in this regard, the Kremlin will naturally try to use the remaining pro-Russian forces, which are in a state of amoebic disorientation in Ukraine. However, Russia will try to consolidate them, ranging from communists to Viktor Medvedchuk, use these pro-Russian forces to create perhaps a new pro-Russian faction or group in the new Ukrainian Rada. That is, as I understand, funds and political strategists will be used to bribe or find other ways to have influence, to have their representatives in the parliament, which has now become a really important factor of political life in Ukraine, and in this way influence the formation of the new Ukrainian government. Putin has already mentioned it, too.

“And finally, there is another kind of tactics, which is trying to do a deal between the Kremlin and, via pressure or even blackmail, new rulers of Ukraine, including both the president-elect and the future prime minister. After all, in fact, the Kremlin thinks that Poroshenko, at least, can be influenced because he has property, assets in Russia. All of these tactics will naturally be employed and much depends of course on how the new Ukrainian president, and the emerging new Ukrainian authorities will respond, on how quickly will they be able to create the basis for a really full-fledged reform of the Ukrainian political system, which would make it independent of the various foreign encroachments. A lot will also depend on how quickly and efficiently will the new Ukrainian government be able to complete the ATO and restore the state sovereignty.”

“THE UKRAINE CRISIS HAS ALLOWED THE ANTI-LIBERAL RIGHT AND THE ANTI-LIBERAL LEFT TO FIND A COMMON IDENTITY FOR THEMSELVES”

It is already known that far-right parties did very well in the elections to the European Parliament. In France, the UK and Greece, they were even winners. Why did it happen and how can it affect the EU’s foreign policy?

“Europe has just seen a surprising situation emerge, which I would define as an anti-liberal coalition. It became so evident, so open on the European political scene, by the way, thanks to Ukraine. Ukraine was a major factor in the consolidation of anti-liberal coalition, which includes on the one hand, Russia with its desire to strangle Ukraine, on the other hand the European right are not necessarily fascists, but the far right nonetheless, and finally, the European left who joined the coalition because of their hatred for the United States. The European right joined this anti-liberal coalition because of their hatred for the EU project. All these three forces manifested themselves in support of the Russian pressure on Ukraine. The Ukraine crisis has allowed the anti-liberal right and the anti-liberal left to find a common identity and designation for themselves.

“Now to the European right, who so clearly manifested their success in the course of the election campaign for the European Parliament. As it turned out, firstly, the European right are far more numerous and far more influential than their Ukrainian counterparts, who would hardly have got more than one percent of the vote. The European right’s strength is primarily in the current EU model crisis, the inability of the serving political elites to cope with this crisis, as well as America’s inability to come back in some other capacity on the world global stage. Naturally, as expected, the European right will have more than 40 seats in the European Parliament. The assembly’s salvation, though, is the fact that the European right will continue their squabbling there as well. It will probably be difficult to get them to have a consolidated position on many issues. In any case, they are becoming an anti-liberal force, which, incidentally, can be used to Russia’s advantage, and this fact should be borne in mind.”