Breaking Point
Who are Candidate X and his supporters?
It is clear to all those keeping track of the presidential campaign that the outcome of the elections depends on the “undecideds.” All the efforts of political spin masters, all the lavish TV publicity, billboards, and leaflets are aimed precisely at them. Who are they? What is the difference between them and those who have already moved in to tip the scales of the pre-election “polling contest?” In trying to answer these questions, our sociologists divided Ukrainian society into three groups: potential voters for each of the two current presidential race leaders Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych (judging by the respondents’ intention to support one of these candidates in the second round), and those who haven’t decided for whom to vote. Valery Khmelko, president of Kyiv’s International Institute of Sociology, prefers to call the latter “undecideds” because the experts included three groups of respondents in this category: those who said they would not vote (“They can still change their minds”), those who said they would vote against both candidates (they can also change their minds), and those who chose not to answer when offered “silence instead of sincerity.” In total, the “undecideds” account for almost a third (32%) of Ukrainian voters.
Answering identical questions on the survey list, these three groups sometimes showed different visions of the current situation and developmental trends in the Ukrainian state. To a large extent this is due to essential regional differences between the main candidates’ electorates. The differing attitudes in western and eastern Ukraine, especially to foreign policy objectives, are well known, and national politicians not only do not try to correct them but exploit them with pleasure.
The overwhelming majority of undecideds are not happy with the state of affairs in Ukraine. In this they differ little from those who intend to support Yushchenko (78% of them are disgruntled) and even those who plan to vote for Yanukovych (60%). The majority of our compatriots (in the three groups under review) are also displeased with the way their life is going. In all probability, this is the proverbial “everything is bad” syndrome. Incidentally, this trend is the least pronounced among Yanukovych supporters-63% of them “complain about life”, as opposed to 70% of Yushchenko’s electorate and 69% of the “undecideds.”
As for strategic issues, most respondents in the three polled groups think that Ukraine should create equal opportunities for a state-regulated economy and private entrepreneurship (36% of respondents have made their choice and 29% of the undecideds).
Complete or decisive domination of the state in economic matters is favored most of all by undecided respondents (44%) and least of all by Yushchenko supporters (35%). Nevertheless, nearly the same percentage of voters for the two leading candidates (16% of Yushchenko supporters and 17% of Yanukovych supporters) favor the development of private entrepreneurship, while undecided voters are less inclined to give business the green light. Incidentally, the “undecideds” comprise the largest number (14.5%) not only of those who haven’t decided on which candidate they will support in the runoff but also about the economic system that Ukraine should have.
There are more essential differences between the electorates in foreign policy preferences. For example, most of Yushchenko’s prospective voters (43%) believe that Ukrainians will be better off in the European Union. Conversely, 60% of those who plan to vote for Yanukovych favor Ukraine’s alliance with Russia and Belarus. Fifty-seven percent of undecideds also support this viewpoint.
Another watershed between the electorates is the status of the Russian language. About 40% of respondents in these three groups favor a “neutral” solution to this problem. They think Russian should be the second official language-but only in regions where the majority of the population wants this. At the same time, 33% of Yushchenko’s supporters want Russian to be stripped of official status throughout Ukraine (only 7% of Yanukovych supporters and 10% of “Candidate X’s” supporters share this point of view). Conversely, 54% of those ready to vote for the current premier believe that Russian should be the second official language. A lot of undecided respondents (43%) and those from Yushchenko’s camp (22%) also support this proposal.
As far as socio-demographic factors are concerned, the three electoral groups in question differ very little. Our Ukraine leader’s electorate is a little younger, with under-40s accounting for 45% (in Yanukovych’s case this age category makes up 35%). Among undecided voters, those aged between 18 and 40 account for 38%.
Neither of the top candidates can boast that most of his supporters are people with higher education. People who failed to complete secondary school (19% among Yushchenko supporters, 18% of Yanukovych and “Candidate X’s” voters); have only completed secondary school (29%, 29%, and 30%, respectively); those who have a specialized secondary education (29%, 31%, and 27%); and university graduates (23%, 22%, and 24%) are distributed almost equally among the three electoral groups.
What mostly divides the top candidates’ electorates is the language of communication and place of residence. For instance, most pro-Yushchenko people (64%) find it easier to speak Ukrainian, while Yanukovych supporters (66%) opt for Russian. Among “undecided” respondents, 39% prefer Ukrainian and 45% Russian. The latter category comprises the largest number of individuals who have an equally good command of both languages (16% against 9% of Yushchenko supporters and 15% of Yanukovych’s electorate). The language of communication is also a factor closely linked with the electorate’s regional status. Sixty- six percent of those who intend to vote for Yushchenko in the runoff reside in the Ukrainian-speaking western and west-central regions. Conversely, 67% of Yanukovych’s supporters live in southern and eastern Ukraine. Most of the undecideds (29%) live in Ukraine’s west-central regions. A large number of them also reside in the southern (21.5%), east-central, and eastern (19% in both) regions.
Rural residents form the bulk of Our Ukraine leader’s electorate (42.5%), while most of Yanukovych’s voters and the undecideds live in big cities with a population of over 500,000 (48.5 and 47%, respectively).
As we can see, undecided voters differ very little from their “committed” compatriots. Why then is it difficult for them to make a choice? Mr. Khmelko says that, in contrast to the voters who have made a choice, this electoral group is full of inner contradictions. As far as their assessment of the socioeconomic situation and their basic persuasions are concerned, they lean toward Yushchenko’s electorate, but with respect to Ukraine’s foreign policy strategies (attitude toward Russia, NATO, and the European Union, as well as the status of the Russian language), they gravitate toward Yanukovych. “Figuratively speaking, this segment of voters is in the position of Buridan’s ass-they find it difficult to make a choice. And it is hard to say what they will finally opt for,” Mr. Khmelko concludes. It is quite likely that some of them will be unable to take anybody’s side and will not show up at all, while others will make their choice right in the poll booth. It’s not a cow we’re choosing, right?
P. S. The electorates were analyzed on the basis of a nationwide representative poll conducted by Kyiv’s International Institute of Sociology and the Democratic Initiatives Foundation on August 25-September 3 among 1,980 respondents over 18 years of age.
COMMENTARY
Viktor NEBOZHENKO, head of sociological surveys at the National Institute of Strategic Studies, expressed his views on the “architecture” of the main candidates’ electoral resources at a press conference last Thursday. He maintains that in Viktor Yanukovych’s case, it resembles a star: “The epicenter of grassroots love for the candidate is in Donetsk oblast. From there it gradually spreads all over the country.” In Yushchenko’s case, this architecture “has the shape of a western Ukraine-Kyiv axis, and his headquarters are mainly engaged in battles to the right and left of this axis.”
According to Mr. Nebozhenko, the two candidates’ resources are also comprised of different socio-demographic groups. It is expected that “public-sector employees, workers at state-run businesses, non-left-leaning pensioners, the Russian-speaking population, and engineers at industrial enterprises will back Yanukovych. Yushchenko will receive votes from rural residents, youth, the petty bourgeoisie, and a very low-paid segment of the population, including the unemployed.”
