By Yevhen ZAKHAROV, Kharkiv Human Rights Monitoring Group
Yesterday the CE Parliamentary Assembly session opened which will hear
a report of the Committee monitoring the performance of member states'
commitments, particularly those Ukraine undertook when admitted to the
Council in November 1995.
Without doubt, the Ukrainian parliamentary delegation is in for a hard
time, as evidenced by the late November PACE's draft resolution prepared
by the experts Tunne Kellam of Estonia and Anna Severinsens of Denmark.
The only thing positive it shows is Ukraine's amicable settlement of disputes,
avoidance civil war and large-scale conflicts, along with the fact that
the new Constitution was adopted within one year from Ukraine's accession,
whereupon Ukraine became a party to a number of CE conventions. The rest
of the document is in an expressly negative vein.
Among other things it is pointed out that the executive authority continues
to exercise control and is resolved to achieve political power and retain
it, at times acting contrary to the law, which could have a negative effect
on the future presidential elections; that decisions made by the Constitutional
and Supreme Court are not carried out, just as corruption and crime continues
to rise; that this resolution must be submitted to the European Parliament,
European Commission, World Bank, IMF, and the Congress of Local and Regional
Authorities of Europe, proposing to take this document into account when
cooperating with Ukraine, so as to help this country solve certain problems.
Numerous unpardonable delays in solving specific problems are mentioned
such as the absence of progress in reforming the judiciary and prosecutorial
systems; absence of careful investigation into cases of police/militia
brutality, torturing detainees and prisoners; lack of effective supervision
of the militia by independent institutions and judicial authorities; conspicuously
drawn-out procedures to transfer management of the penal system to the
Ministry of Justice; absence of precise differentiation between state administrations
and bodies of local self-government, the new status of Kyiv and Sevastopol,
Constitution of the Crimea, Crimean Tatar participation (i.e., those having
permanent residence on the peninsula) in the presidential campaign, October
1999, etc.
The draft resolution stresses that Ukraine has frankly ignored its obligations
concerning capital punishment; official sources have it that from November
9, 1995 to March 11, 1997, 212 persons have been executed. The authors
of the draft consider that bodies of state authority of Ukraine, including
Verkhovna Rada, are to a considerable extent responsible for not complying
with the commitments Ukraine undertook when joining CE, particularly in
terms of enacting, within one year, a framework document on Ukraine legal
policy with regard to human rights, one on legal and judiciary reform,
new Criminal and Criminal Procedural along with Civil and Civil Procedural
Codes, and a new law on political parties. If these documents are not put
into effect, and if the death penalty is not abolished before the PACE
session opens in June 1999, the draft resolution envisages the initiation
of proceedings, as per PACE resolution, to discontinue the Ukrainian parliamentary
delegation's authority until such time as all these commitments have been
fully implemented; the Council's Cabinet of Ministers will further be advised
to begin proceedings to terminate Ukraine's representation.
In other words, Ukraine has practically failed to carry out its CE obligations.
CE experts agree that the country's power elite is to blame, for theirs
was a typically Soviet approach: sly, ambiguous, relying on the old principle
of come what may. They made many pompous declarations and formally reaffirmed
their adherence to the newly signed international accords. This did not
work and is a major inference of Ukraine's three years of CE membership.
The Council dispatched its experts and the latter turned out well-versed
in the Ukrainian bureaucratic routine. Indeed, they appreciate honest and
diligent cooperation, openly discussing all problems; they really are eager
to help us reach European standards.
Unfortunately, this CE pressure on our administration fails to meet
with proper understanding in Ukraine. But how could it have been otherwise,
considering that the general public lacks information about all the specific
commitments undertaken by its government? Even worse, people do not even
seem much interested. At the time Ukraine was admitted to CE there was
much official pomp, and no one seemed to stop to think whether Ukraine
would actually be able to comply with its obligations. On the other hand,
who knew what they were all about except a handful of top-level bureaucrats?
CE Summary #190, listing all of Ukraine's official promises, appeared in
print (published by non-governmental organizations) only after Ukraine's
admission and was no longer publicly discussed.
Obviously, this situation is unpleasant for all those in power, especially
in the executive branch, as is the fact that after publishing the PACE
draft resolutions steps have been taken in the right direction (e.g., enactment
of the Crimean Constitution, President Kuchma's submission to Parliament
of a bill to ratify the European Convention's Sixth Human Rights Protocol,
that is, abolition of capital punishment. Unfortunately, this activity
is shown only when threatened with CE sanctions. Once again the demanding
question is whether Ukraine can comply with CE's strictly democratic requirements
in the near future? Or perhaps we are merely deceiving ourselves? The draft
points to the positive aspect of the new Criminal Code already accepted
by Verkhovna Rada in its first reading. Yet the fact remains that it is
even harsher than the previous one, inevitably resulting in an increment
in the prison population, which, in turn, will make prison conditions worse,
considering that Western experts believe Ukrainian penitentiaries expose
their inmates to tortuous conditions. Unless Ukraine carries out its commitments
in terms of fundamental human rights (e.g., freedom of expression, testimony,
and protection against tortures and brutality), it will be unable to implement
the European Social Charter for at least another several decades. So why
sign it in the first place? This and many other questions remain to be
answered.
EDITOR'S NOTE
The problem broached by Mr. Zakharov deserves the most serious attention.
Indeed, sometimes external pressure seems the only way to make our government
act along the lines of European civilization. Ukraine's participation in
various international organizations offers an excellent opportunity for
precisely such pressure. On the other hand, without a civilized opposition
inside the country, such pressure from without will inevitably prove abortive.
The Editors welcome all expert views in the human rights and international
relations domains, as well as opinions voiced by all others who have something
constructive to say on this subject.







