“Canonical territory”

In recent years many Orthodox churches and the church media affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) have often used the term “canonical territory.” This term has proved to be a powerful shield, fending off all attempts by Ukrainian society to bring order to Ukrainian Orthodoxy, secure much needed autocephalous status, thereby restoring the single Ukrainian Church recognized by universal Orthodoxy. All efforts by Ukrainians are met with the same old line from the Moscow Patriarchate: “Ukraine is part of the canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church. Ukraine’s Orthodoxy is an integral part of Moscow’s.” What is this “canonical territory” that confines us?

ALL IS FAIR IN WAR

If you consult works by Russian theologians of the 19th and 20th centuries, you might notice an interesting fact: the term “canonical territory” is either not mentioned in them or used in completely different contexts. Most importantly, this term does not appear in the Bible or in the apostolic rules and decrees of ecumenical councils. This is no surprise, as the term “canonical territory” was introduced into common usage by contemporary Russian Orthodox theologians-politicians in the early 1990s, i.e., when the USSR vanished from the political map, thereby undermining the imperial positions of the ROC. Proof of this are the words of the Moscow’s Patriarchate’s Bishop of Vienna and Austria Ilarion Alfeyev, who declared in his well- known report that “this term originated recently, even though the ecclesiological model behind it has its beginnings in apostolic times.”

The Russian Orthodox Church is arguably the only structure to have survived the USSR’s breakup almost unscathed. To prevent both its disintegration and help raise the “Great Russian Empire” from the dead, the Moscow Patriarchate developed and introduced numerous strategic schemes, dogmas, new saints, ploys, formulas (such as the infamous “satanic identification code”), as well as the term “canonical territory.” All of these techniques have a psychological impact on Ukrainian believers, especially Russian-speaking ones, through the agency of parish priests and a powerful and well- organized system of Orthodox fellowships. That is the very reason why the term “canonical territory” is now widely used not just by the clergy, theologians, and pro-Russian politicians in Ukraine, but also by the most poorly educated parishioners of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.

We must give credit to the energy, inventiveness, and arbitrariness of the Russian church: it is using all possible means to preserve its integrity, universal status, and spheres of influence, which it apparently wants to preserve until Kingdom come. In its dealings with Ukraine it adopts a no-holds-barred tactic, because the complete separation of Ukrainian Orthodoxy would constitute a major historical defeat for the ROC. After all, this would reduce by half all the major parameters of the Russian church: the number of believers, priests, bishops, parishes, and churches. Moreover, the loss of Ukraine would force Russian theologians to rewrite the history of the Moscow church, which in no uncertain terms would diminish the role of Russian Orthodoxy in the international arena, not to mention the fact that Russia’s interest in the Ukrainian church is not limited to church matters only. Russia also uses religion as a tool of high politics, as evidenced by the last presidential elections in Ukraine.

Sometimes you get the impression that regardless of its size and power, the ROC is merely afraid of losing to multi-confessional competition in the “market of religions,” and is therefore trying to insulate itself from reality by means of various “feudal walls” or “canonical territories.” (It should be noted that only the Russian church uses this term). It doesn’t take a prophet to predict the outcome of this strategy in the not so distant future. After all, as the Reverend Serhiy Kyseliov (the Russian Orthodox Church abroad) put it, “the canonical territory of the Church of Christ is the whole world, as evidenced by the Old and New Testaments. There is no place in the world outside the Church’s jurisdiction. This stems from the fact that Jesus Christ wants salvation for all people. Outside of pure faith, canonicity has no power or meaning. Meanwhile, the Moscow Patriarchate considers the entire space of the former USSR its ‘canonical territory.’ Alexei II spoke about this, in particular at a meeting of the Moscow Eparchy on December 23, 1995.”

WHO DEFINES THE BOUNDARIES?

What is this “canonical territory” all about? The Moscow Patriarchate defines it as follows: “The canonical territory of a church is the territory within which the church traditionally exercises the sovereignty of church power with respect to believers that belong to this church and inhabit this territory.”

This definition gives rise to many questions. First, how is one supposed to interpret the word “traditionally” and measure the duration of tradition — in years? Centuries? Should we start reckoning the beginning of tradition from the 15th century, when the Moscow church was created, or from the moment Russia captured a certain territory? What does the phrase “sovereignty of church power” mean? Let’s say the Kyiv church was once the mother church of the Moscow church, but then became its “daughter.” Who possesses this “sovereignty”? Are there valid reasons to believe that the Ukrainian church, which was annexed by Moscow in 1686, is now on the canonical territory of Russia? Consider, for example, the Georgian Orthodox Church, which spent 100 years under Moscow’s very same “sovereignty of church power” before liberating itself from it. The same goes for several other churches that were once forcefully included in the ROC, but withdrew from it at the first convenient opportunity. This whole concept seems illogical. Isn’t this proof that the integrity of the “canonical territory” is something fictitious, artificial, situational, and, most importantly, imperialistic? If this weren’t the case, there would have been no such vigorous historical movement of churches into and out of “canonical” Russian territory, as if through a revolving door.

Another question is who defines, approves, and endorses the boundaries of the canonical territory of any particular church? What right does a church have to privatize territories “on its own initiative and for all eternity?”

Historical facts prove clearly and consistently that this “mystical” (according to individual representatives of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate) canonical territory is defined not by the church or the Holy Spirit but by the political borders of the church’s home country. Even the most cursory knowledge of Russian history is enough to see that one and the same mechanism is at work at all times: first this country (the Principality of Moscow, the Russian Empire, and the USSR) expands its borders, and then Orthodox priests follow in the soldiers’ footsteps to occupy the conquered “canonical territories.” What they do there is illustrated by the events in 1946 in occupied western Ukraine. (The Moscow Patriarchate still considers Ukraine’s west to be part of its “canonical territory” only because these parts were once forcefully included in the USSR). Now that the Soviet Union is long gone, the “canonical territory” of the Russian church has miraculously remained intact.

The same happened in reverse order whenever Russia lost wars and lands. Then the canonical territory would shrink like drying leather, the alleged “tradition” and “sovereignty of church power” notwithstanding. This happened after Russia lost the First World War: then several Orthodox churches became totally independent of Russian Orthodoxy, but not the Ukrainian church, unfortunately.

FREEDOM AT LAST

Below are brief histories of the process by which several national Orthodox churches withdrew from the Russian Orthodox Church, which had tremendous losses of “canonical territory.”

Finland. After Finland broke away from Russia in 1919, the Council of the Orthodox Church of Finland appealed to Patriarch Tikhon, requesting full independence (autonomy), which the church obtained in 1921. The Finnish government, however, insisted on breaking the Orthodox “canonical shackles” that tied Finland to the Moscow Patriarchate. The government also demanded that the church adopt the Gregorian calendar; Archbishop Seraphim was also instructed to learn the Finnish language and pass a language test within three months. When the archbishop didn’t comply, he was defrocked and confined in a monastery. He was replaced by Bishop German (Aav), a native of Finland, who was appointed not by Moscow but by the Ecumenical Patriarch Meletius IV. This meant, as we know, that the Finnish church passed to the jurisdiction of the Constantinople patriarch; Moscow duly condemned the action as “uncanonical” and unauthorized. The Moscow Patriarchate recognized Constantinople’s jurisdiction over the Finnish church, which had abandoned the “canonical territory,” only 30 years later.

Estonia. In 1917, after the patriarchate was restored in Russia, Patriarch Tikhon granted broad autonomy to the Estonian Orthodox Church. However, in 1923, at the insistence of the Estonian government the church’s head, Archbishop Aleksandr, traveled to Istanbul without Moscow’s permission and received a thomos (patriarchal decree) establishing the autonomy of the Estonian Apostolic Church under the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Constantinople. This was followed by the adoption of the Gregorian calendar, thus marking the beginning of the active “Estonization” of church life.

Poland. The history of the independent Orthodox Church of Poland deserves special mention. After the country gained its political independence, the Polish Ministry of Religious Confessions told Russian hierarchs that interference by foreign church leadership (the Moscow Patriarchate) in Poland’s church life was unwelcome. In 1921 the Polish government dispatched an envoy to Moscow, notifying Patriarch Tikhon that it was interested in securing autocephalous status for the Polish Orthodox Church. Patriarch Tikhon was ready to concede and “granted” autonomous status to the Polish church. However, at a meeting of the Eparchial Synod in Warsaw in 1922 it was decided with the Polish government’s active participation that “in view of church havoc and collapse in Russia, there can be no objections to the autocephalous status of the Polish Orthodox Church.” The Polish Synod sent this decree not to Moscow but to Constantinople, where it was endorsed by Patriarch Meletius IV. 1923 saw the enthronement of Metropolitan Dionysus as head of the Polish Orthodox Church. All bishoprics were headed by archbishops who were ready to cooperate with the Polish government. Even though Patriarch Tikhon sharply criticized the unauthorized separation of the Polish Orthodox Church from the ROC and its acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Constantinople Patriarchate, Ecumenical Patriarch Gregory VII and the Holy Synod blessed the creation of the autocephalous church in Poland (1924).

Roughly the same scenarios were played out in the wake of the 1917 revolution in other regions of the former Russian empire.

Also telling are events that unfolded after the Baltic nations were “annexed” to the USSR in 1940 (in agreement with Hitler). The canonical territory of the Moscow church expanded as though by magic. At an expanded meeting of the Synod of the Estonian Orthodox Church a decree was passed “to restore the canonical relationship with the Russian mother church.” The church was mercifully included in the Baltic Exarchate of the Russian church. Other defectors (but not all of them) also repented and returned to the “lap of the mother church.”

It is interesting to read a letter written in January 1941 by Metropolitan Sergey Stragorodsky (then head of the Russian Orthodox Church) to one of his bishops in the bountiful days of Soviet expansion: “There is much work. Bessarabia is waiting to be put in order. Bishop Aleksey has been dispatched there. Bishop Nikolai has gone to western Ukraine and Belarus as an exarch (temporarily). Now we are dealing with Latvia and Estonia. Our Archbishop Sergey has been dispatched to Latvia and Estonia: Latvia has repented already, but we don’t know about Estonia yet.” Clearly, dynamic, businesslike, and cynical expansion of the canonical territory of the ROC was taking place in the wake of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (this church’s ends justify its means). It should be noted that the term “canonical territory” had not been coined yet.

The next transformation of the canonical territory of the Russian church took place after the collapse of the USSR. Estonia, for example, currently has two Orthodox churches: one belonging to the Moscow Patriarchate and the other to the Constantinople Patriarchate.

ORIGINS OF THE TERM

Bishop Ilarion, quoted above, says that the Russian church has “theorists of the canonical territory,” who are searching for the origins of this notion within the scheme of the church system in the earliest centuries of Christianity. An important rule of this ancient model is the principle of “a single city — a single bishop — a single church,” i.e., the principle of attaching a certain church territory to a single Christian bishop (archbishop, metropolitan, patriarch). Allegedly, this very principle is the source behind the contemporary notion of “canonical territory,” even though it is eminently clear that present-day reality cannot be regulated by rules dating back 2,000 years.

As we know, the principle of undivided authority is essential to the effective functioning of any command structure, both religious and secular, and has to do with the internal hierarchy of any church, a fact that Alfeyev does not deny either: “Like before, the principle of canonical territory remains the cornerstone of Orthodox ecclesiology (study of the Christian church) and is used in practice, though not always and not everywhere.” (That’s some cornerstone).

Also recall that after the first major schisms in Christendom (451) the principle of a bishop’s undivided authority was undermined radically and forever: “parallel” hierarchies began forming on the same territories — bishoprics of different churches, which often have the same title. This situation has lasted to the present and is becoming even more complicated as new Christian churches appear or old ones expand their spheres of influence. For example, the US now has parallel jurisdictions of the Constantinople, Russian, Antiochian, Romanian, and Serbian patriarchates. The Holy Land, Jerusalem, is home to three patriarchs — Orthodox, Armenian, and Latin. The same is true for Ukraine whose “canonical territory” is currently home to several Orthodox churches with their own “first bishops” — the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, Russian Orthodox Catacomb Church, Old Order churches of various trends, and many others. The undivided authority of any bishop in his “canonical territory” is out of the question, especially considering that the structure of world Orthodoxy is in constant movement.

Apparently, the tragedy of the Moscow Patriarchate is due to the fact that, regardless of the changing historical situation, its claims never change. How can it possibly live in peace with its neighbors when it still believes that the canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church comprises Orthodox believers in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania? Interestingly enough, the Moscow Patriarchate is constantly establishing new parishes or bishoprics in many countries, including those that already have Orthodox churches belonging to a different jurisdiction, thereby encroaching on the “canonical territory” of another church.

In conclusion, it should be stressed that “canonical territory” is not the only notion created in recent times to justify and support the Moscow Patriarchate’s imperialist policies. Consider this popular thesis: “Changes in the state borders (of Russia) do not necessarily lead to the fragmentation of churches.” In other words, the breakup of the USSR has not caused the breakup of the ROC, which has retained its “legal” right to all former “colonial” churches, despite the fact that it is obvious that this thesis is openly in conflict with the traditional, generally accepted Orthodox notion of “Individual, or Particular church.” This notion can be interpreted as “a single church — a single Orthodox independent church,” which is an important imperative for Ukraine and other countries in a similar situation.

The Russian priest Yakov Krotov writes tellingly, “Questions of territorial integrity were and still remain relevant for the ROC, all the more so as the ‘expansionist trend’ of the Russian church’s canonical territory, which was observed in the 18th and 19th centuries, has changed to a shrinking trend in the 20th century.”