Catalyst of integration

In late January, when a Ukrainian government delegation was visiting the Slovak Republic, Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda gave his Ukrainian counterpart Yuriy Yekhanurov “Proposals on Helping Ukraine Fulfill the Ukraine-EU Action Plan.” This document, drawn up by the government of the Slovak Republic, contains proposals from Slovak ministries and other administrative bodies to their Ukrainian colleagues. It also takes into account the results of the large-scale project, “Partnership in Ukraine’s European Integration: Intensified Public Debates on EU Membership,” implemented by a number of Slovak and Ukrainian non-governmental organizations.

As conceived by the authors, the proposals should not be just “crib notes” for Ukraine but also a serious instrument of bilateral Ukrainian-Slovak relations. Meanwhile, besides its “applied” nature, this document has a much broader sense. The Slovaks would like the document to be thoroughly read by the European Commission, not just the Ukrainian leadership. Like other Central and Eastern European members of the EU, Slovakia is searching for a place of its own in the European Union’s various activities. It is natural for Ukraine’s neighbors to think that foreign policy pursuits should include the formation of the EU’s Ukrainian policy.

The 2003 Neighborhood Policy concept left many dissatisfied, including Ukraine and its neighbors to the west. On the other hand, this concept offered quite a few opportunities to search for new forms and instruments of cooperation. The country that has been the main developer and pursuer of a common European policy toward Ukraine since the days when the European Union was only preparing to admit former communist countries is Poland. That country still maintains the deepest and most intense relations with Ukraine at both the governmental and societal level. In 2002-2004 Poland assumed the role of Ukraine’s advocate. President Aleksander Kwasniewski was perhaps the only European leader who was not ashamed to associate with his disgraced Ukrainian counterpart. The Polish official stand on the necessity to accept the prospect of Ukraine’s EU membership still continues to irritate top bureaucrats in Brussels. Yet the “concept of advocacy” was too closely linked to specific conditions and personalities. What President Yushchenko needs at the Brussels talks is an interpreter, not an advocate. This would account for the stagnation in the Kyiv-Warsaw-Brussels triangle in 2005, despite a marked improvement in Ukrainian-Polish relations.

Slovakia decided to follow its own path. This country does not have as many political resources as Poland, which has been recognized as the de facto informal leader of the countries that joined the EU on May 1, 2004. Slovakia seems bent on becoming Ukraine’s “helper” rather than “advocate.” Thus, the “Proposals on Helping Ukraine Fulfill the Ukraine-EU Action Plan” are quite to the point. Naturally, it is not an ideal document, but the form of cooperation it suggests deserves quite a positive attitude. The Ukrainian government has therefore adopted a serious attitude to the proposals. The Slovak way to the European Union is most similar to the one that Ukraine intends to follow. Slovakia really began to pursue a course toward European integration later than the other new EU members. The required reforms were only launched in late 1998, when parliamentary elections brought to power the coalition government of Mikulas Dzurinda instead of Vladimir Meciar’s unpopular cabinet. The Slovaks claim that their situation in 1999 very much resembled the Ukrainian situation in 2005. The only difference is that Brussels unambiguously supported Slovakia’s EU membership aspirations, while it still takes a dim view of Ukraine’s.

Now there are two approaches: the Slovak one, aimed at taking maximum advantage of the opportunities furnished by the Neighborhood Policy, and the Polish one, which is aimed at going beyond the limits of this policy. Ukraine will only benefit from a tacit competition of these two approaches. Moreover, it would be in Ukraine’s interests to encourage other countries to join the EU debate on a Ukrainian policy. Naturally, it would be wrong to expect, say, France to show positive interest in the Ukrainian issue in the nearest future. Yet it is important for Ukraine that not only Poland and Slovakia but also other countries take an active part in shaping the EU’s Ukrainian policy. In the last while Lithuania has been making active efforts to this end. Let us hope that other states follow suit over time.