A Chance Not to Be Missed

After a certain hiatus resulting from the election campaign in Ukraine, the mass media have resumed publishing European and Ukrainian politicians’ assessments of Ukraine’s European integration prospects. The main question that such articles tend to overlook is what Ukraine has achieved in the past two years, as far as the Ukraine-EU relationship is concerned.

Let us recall what we expected in 2004 after the achievements of 2003. The European Conference, held in Athens on April 17, 2003, ended with a signed agreement to admit ten new members: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Cyprus, and Malta. Most of these countries are traditionally Ukraine’s reliable partners, primarily in the political, trade, and economic fields. The prospect of a revised trade arrangement with them after their admission to the EU caused some anxiety for our country. There were also fears that the European Union would “lock the door” for a long time while it absorbed the new members of the club, and avoid any discussions of Ukraine’s prospective membership.

Accordingly, we developed the formula “Mutual Challenges — Coordinated Actions in Response to Them,” which our European partners readily accepted. The other highlight of 2003 was the European Union’s announcement of the so-called European Neighborhood Policy. The positive fact for Ukraine was that this policy included a crucial element, prospects for applying the principle of four freedoms (free movement of people, goods, services, and capital) to Ukraine-EU relations.

This ambitious task was to be fulfilled through the Ukraine-EU Action Plan to be drawn up jointly by both sides. Demonstrating initiative, Ukraine formally presented the first draft of this document at the Ukraine-EU summit in Yalta on October 7, 2003. Its clauses were aimed precisely at introducing the four freedoms formula in the next 2-3 years. In other words, it was about the practical implementation of the task to transform the relationship with the EU from one of partnership and cooperation to that of integration and association. I can state this categorically because the EU normally applies the principle of four freedoms to countries that have signed association agreements with it.

So we entered 2004 with the hope that it would mark a turning point in Ukraine-EU relations. We were prepared for a difficult dialogue with the EU but still expected to achieve concrete results. @PZ ***

So we entered 2004 with the hope that it would mark a turning point in Ukraine-EU relations. We were prepared for a difficult dialogue with the EU but still expected to achieve concrete results. @PZ ***

What did 2004 mean for Ukraine-EU relations? It is difficult to give a straightforward answer because there were both positive and negative points. In my view, we must single out four main events that had an impact on our relations with the EU:

1) The admission of ten new members to the European Union on May 1.

2) The end of negotiations on a new EU constitution.

3) The end of the EU debate on the start of preliminary accession talks with Turkey and establishing a date for Bulgaria and Romania’s admission.

4) Drawing up the first seven action plans as part of the European Neighborhood Policy, including the Ukraine-EU Action Plan.

Enlargement of the EU (first event):

Ukraine contemplated two scenarios in terms of the consequences that EU enlargement might have for this country: a pessimistic one, whereby trade turnover with the EU, including the new member states, would drop considerably, and an optimistic one, whereby the entire range of relations would remain intact after the EU’s enlargement.

It is too early to say whether the current enlargement served as a catalyst for deepening the relations between Ukraine and the EU. At the same time, there is every reason to claim that skeptics were needlessly alarmed. But it was undoubtedly a positive point for Ukraine that our traditional and reliable partners, such as Poland, Lithuania, and Hungary, acquired new possibilities to lobby for us in the capacity of EU members.

The EU Constitution (second event):

Ukraine has been closely watching the drafting of a new EU constitution (to be more exact, the first EU constitution because nothing similar to it existed at the time). The very fact that a compromise about the constitution was reached is of paramount importance, for it confirmed the viability of the European Union as such. What is also important for us is the constitutional provision stating that any European state can join the EU provided it has met certain criteria. I think this is allowing Ukraine to look optimistically into the future because her European prospects remain open.

Turkey (third event):

It is difficult to recall a more heated and bitter EU debate than the one that preceded the decision to start negotiations on Turkey’s EU membership on October 3, 2005. I think these talks and the likely admission of that country will be a true survival test for the European Union. This decision had a somewhat unexpected positive effect on Ukraine. Many European politicians began to ask, “If Turkey can, why can’t Ukraine?” Interestingly, a poll conducted by the EU-REPORTER Web site showed that a vast majority of respondents — about 80% — favored Ukraine’s accession to the EU, which considerably exceeds the number of pro-Turkish votes.

This is the same context in which we must view the end of negotiations between the EU, Bulgaria, and Romania concerning the conditions for admitting these countries to the EU on January 1, 2007. This decision resulted in Ukraine’s moving closer to the EU, and also partially explains why the EU was avoiding giving a straight answer to Ukraine’s question about its European integration prospects. Since the EU always takes logical and consistent steps, and in most certainly values its reputation, it was chary of speaking about Ukraine without the certainty that the union would be prepared for another wave of enlargement after admitting Turkey.

The Action Plan (fourth event):

From the very outset, Ukrainian negotiators of the Ukraine-EU Action Plan expected it to be an additional instrument, supplementing the existing one, to qualitatively update relations between the two parties. Unfortunately, the EU refused to satisfy Ukraine’s well-grounded demands that the document include the formula of “transition from a relationship of partnership and cooperation to one of integration and association.” In spite of this, we continued to work on it in the hope that its substance would be a major step forward in achieving that goal. In our negotiations with the EU, we concentrated our efforts on adopting concrete measures aimed at the gradual introduction of the principle of four freedoms in Ukraine-EU relations.

I have to admit that the result fell short of the Ukrainian side’s expectations. None of the ten points of Ukraine’s position, which were presented to the EU at last year’s Ukraine-EU summit in The Hague on July 8, was fully reflected in the Action Plan. At issue here are practical matters, such as launching talks on a free trade zone, signing agreements in various fields aimed at gradual integration into the EU, signing an agreement on a liberalized visa regime for Ukrainian and EU citizens, legalizing the status of Ukrainian migrant workers, etc.

Incidentally, the overwhelming majority of items in the current version of the Action Plan are strictly unilateral, and the new government will have to fulfill them in any case. The Action Plan is essentially going to duplicate the future program of Ukraine’s Cabinet of Ministers. Neither does the Action Plan identify the sources of funding for these coordinated measures. The trouble is that the document in its current form meets neither the national interests of Ukraine nor the expectations of Ukrainian society. The Action Plan was the greatest disappointment of the year. I believe this document will acquire importance if it meets two fundamental requirements.

Firstly, it should be regarded outside the context of the European Neighborhood Policy. Ukraine will never accept the terms “neighbor,” “neighborhood,” and “neighborhood policy” because geographically, culturally, and historically, Ukraine has always been in Europe, not outside.

Secondly, the plan should be essentially beefed up by increasing its significance. Moreover, it should clearly state that it is aimed at the eventual signing of an association agreement between Ukraine and the EU.

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Then what? There is a heated debate going on in the Ukrainian and foreign media about Ukraine’s prospects in Europe and the way this country can achieve its strategic goal of EU membership. I believe 2005 will be a year of difficult decisions and continuing discussions with the European Union about a new pattern of relations.

A unique prospect is in fact being opened up for us. None of the European leaders dared to openly say “No” to Ukraine, for it showed its democratic spirit and Europeanness during the Orange Revolution. Yet, our country may have to traverse a long and rocky road before it hears an unambiguous “Yes” to its prospects of European integration. To forestall this kind of scenario, the new leadership of Ukraine should quickly solve the following problems by:

1) Revising its relationship with the European Union. The sorest point will be to withdraw from the European Neighborhood Policy, which in fact has taken the question of Ukraine’s EU membership off the European agenda for a long time.

2) Forming a team of “Eurointegrators” capable of persuading the EU to adopt, not just declare, a truly special attitude vis-З-vis Ukraine. To do so, we don’t have to reinvent the Ukrainian wheel but rather borrow a page from our Western neighbors’ playbook. It is only by concentrating resources and centralizing the decision-making process that this team can be formed to work effectively. In essence, this calls for establishing a central executive body vested with broad powers in the field of European integration, as well as for a considerable increase in the number and competence of staff members of Ukraine’s Representation at the European Union.

3) Reviewing the existing structures, including those that are responsible for coordination, with the aim of creating streamlined horizontal and vertical systems of offices responsible for the European integration aspect in Ukraine’s official policy. In my opinion, staff recruiting will be the most complicated problem because there are not that many experts in Ukraine who can easily deal with this issue, while managers capable of organizing the whole process may be counted on the fingers of one hand.

4) Finding ways to persuade the US, Russia, and EU member states to really support Ukraine’s aspirations to European integration. The countdown has begun. We must not play for time because Ukrainian society will not forgive the politicians and diplomats if they fail to seize the chance that has been offered to Ukraine.