Coalition of Discussions

After statements by First Vice Speaker Viktor Medvedchuk, Regional Rebirth fraction leader Oleksandr Volkov, and Trudova Ukrayina (Labor Ukraine) leader Serhiy Tyhypko about the government having to keep its promise and become a coalition, we all heard Premier Viktor Yushchenko’s emotional response. This is understandable; he has never been so close to being replaced.

Mr. Medvedchuk declared that the Yushchenko cabinet can survive only if a coalition is formed, its membership to be agreed upon among the president, parliament, and cabinet. Mr. Yushchenko described his statement as “a good prologue to destabilizing the situation in this country” and as “one attempt to change Ukraine’s future.”

The Prime Minister further declared that on behalf of the government he would request President Kuchma initiate a tripartite meeting of the head of the state, premier, and vice speaker, so they can discuss the domestic situation in the aftermath of Mr. Medvedchuk’s statement.

Mr. Yushchenko stressed that his government would never agree to ultimatums from any political force, but that the cabinet is interested in a close and effective cooperation with Verkhovna Rada, because this was how last year’s significant progress in the economy had been made. Commenting on the government’s attitude toward Medvedchuk’s statement, he said, “We are convinced that this is a purely clan approach to the organization of Ukrainian politics, that this is a public posture meant to impress the public, in order to form, using the media, a distorted and untrue public notion of the processes underway in Ukrainian government, as well as in the relationships between the government and parliament.” Mr. Yushchenko is convinced that it was “a demonstration of surrogate force.” In his words, the government is convinced this is “an obvious attempt to destroy the parliamentary majority, because the only way to head parliament lies in ruining the majority.”

The premier is quoted by Interfax Ukraine as saying, “By employing this policy one can quite effectively continue to gather the administrative and information resources of the executive branch to build a platform for the 2002 elections, and not only for the year 2002. Frankly, I see this as yet another camouflaged attempt to change the future of this country.”

Mr. Yushchenko says he will not allow “the government and its activities” to be regarded by “political forces or certain political figures as a testing ground for the future of Ukraine.”

He believes that even better economic results could be achieved this year compared to last, and that “the only way” to fail to do so under the circumstances is all that talk about forming a coalition government, which in the present situation is “the first step, the apple of discord” on the road leading to the destruction of the current “fragile majority” in the parliament.

Medvedchuk told The Day, “I honestly am inclined to attribute all those many improper words, devoid of logic and association, addressed to what I had to say at the news conference Monday, to Viktor Yushchenko’s being overtired; being premier is a hard and nervous job, and [his] political advisers are markedly biased, prone to panicky responses.” Mr. Medvedchuk is sure that “carrying such a tremendous amount of legislative work without effectively cooperating with the government is impossible.” In his words, as earlier, the best form of such cooperation would be creating a coalition government, “in other words, a government whose policy would be coordinated with all the majority fractions, such that they and the cabinet would assume joint responsibility for that policy. By the way, this idea is shared by people from a number of majority factions and they have said so in public on more than one occasion. That’s the way governments in most European countries live, work, and incidentally do fine without any laws on a majority.”

As for coalition membership, Mr. Medvedchuk considers this a matter of discussions, not necessarily meaning that all majority factions must be represented in the cabinet: “From what I know, none of the majority factions supporting the coalition idea has come out with any preliminary conditions relating to its membership.”

The first vice speaker also sees a ray of hope in what the premier had to say: “Viktor Yushchenko has once again confirmed his interest in resuming the parliamentary majority’s activities. I am also prepared to reaffirm what I stated at the news conference; it is time Mr. Yushchenko switched from being interested in words to actually working with those fractions he can influence and which have for the past three months blocked normal work in parliament, calling into doubt the very existence of the non-Left majority, accusing majority partners now of being oligarchic and then of supporting a criminal regime.”

“The premier stated he is going to initiate a meeting between the president, premier and either speaker (UNIAN) or first vice speaker (Interfax). I would like to say that there is no need to initiate anything. We simply have to meet. Personally, I am prepared to meet at any time under any format,” said Medvedchuk.

The Yushchenko-Medvedchuk tussle did not pass unnoticed by Communist leader Petro Symonenko. He believes that all talk about a coalition government is “a pure and simple attempt to solve the issue of the presidential succession following the well-known Russian scenario,” reports UNIAN. According to Symonenko, the Communist attitude toward the coalition government idea “has not changed after Viktor Medvedchuk’s ultimatum, because it was formed not on the basis of such statements but a realistic assessment of the situation in Ukraine.” Obviously, Comrade Symonenko knows what he is talking about; he is already thinking moves ahead — to whom he will place himself in his traditional uncompromising opposition.

The conflict between the part of the parliamentary majority not aligned with the premier and government, it should be noted, has simply entered the visible phase, naturally aggravating prior to the cabinet’s progress report in parliament. This conflict was inevitable, rooted in the fact that the relationship between Verkhovna Rada and the cabinet did not conform to the normal practice of governmental responsibility. The forces supporting the president and forming the majority a year ago (albeit in a nontraditional manner), logically can and must set the government’s course, demand a progress report, and not only influence, but also participate as much as possible in its work. Accordingly, these people should answer for the record to the voters. Otherwise the very existence of the majority comes into question; why make this first step toward a normal parliamentary coalition?

Today, a full-fledged coalition government is unlikely to be formed; many agree that the only way to make the first step in building a mechanism to do so can be discussed under the circumstances. Incidentally, the premier hinted at being prepared to begin consultations with parliamentary fractions early this year. However, as soon as a number of majority factions showed they were no longer content with just talking about a coalition, the premier plunged into anti-clan rhetoric aimed at garnering popularity.

The majority’s claims to participate in the handing out of ministerial portfolios are quite logical, especially considering that Viktor Yushchenko simply disregarded the leading factions’ preferences when forming his government. Any parliament would be unlikely to agree to assume responsibility for a government it had no part in forming.

President Kuchma stated on March 1 that “the task of the government today is to prevent the existing parliamentary majority from falling apart,” reports UNIAN. He also reminded his listeners that he had repeatedly said, “if the parliamentary majority falls apart, no prime minister will be able to work for the good of Ukraine.” Mr. Kuchma believes that the majority, formed early last year, should have been “maintained with jealous care and treated with utmost consideration.” He further noted that a legal framework is required for the formation and operation of a coalition government.

COMMENTARY

A dialogue is needed and possible. The problem is how to start it. Who should be party to it? What are its objectives? How can these objectives be achieved?

The very fact that circumstances have confronted the Ukrainian political class with these and many other questions is evidence that Ukrainian politics is growing up.

Although, as before, two opposed politicians find it hard to sit down at the same table, let alone keep their vocabulary civilized, the process is underway (Mikhail Gorbachev’s pet phrase), even if not entirely headed in the direction desired and not without some of the key players becoming hysterical. But it is underway.

I think that all attempts to start a general dialogue between the regime and opposition — or between the key political forces, as in the case with the Spanish Moncloa Pact or Polish round table — will prove futile. For many reasons (although even one would be enough). Indeed, we have a regime, but what about an opposition? Is Premier Yushchenko the regime or opposition? If the former is true, should Medvedchuk be regarded as opposition? What about Pynzenyk’s Reforms and Order, since one of the party’s leaders is the premier’s adviser and another a noted National Salvation Front figure? What about Udovenko’s Rukh with its minister and its leader, allegedly, having nothing to do with the Ukraine without Kuchma action, but with its members being among the most actively involved in it? What about Speaker Ivan Pliushch? At first glance he wields power, but a closer look shows that it is not power, nor is it opposition, not yet in any case.

Opposition here means people not as yet in power, but who might get there tomorrow. Can anyone picture a coalition cabinet made up of Moroz’s Socialists, Pynzenyk’s National Liberals, friends of the Lady Oligarch, and UNA-UNSO guerrillas? Not me.

An attempt to figure out Ukrainian political forces or parties presents just as unfocused a picture.

Does this mean that we have no one to conduct any talks? Indeed, we do not have “clean” parties for talks between the regime and opposition or between the main political forces. But this does not mean that a dialogue between politicians representing the regime and influencing it, on the one hand, and politicians describing themselves as opposition together with those influencing (financing) them, on the other, is impossible.

What might be the goal of this dialogue? I think there are plenty of subjects. Which of them will be chosen depends on who takes part. For example, the Verkhovna Rada majority factions could negotiate its resumption. Considering that the essence of parliamentary majority implies the existence of a government it supports, it would be only natural for the prime minister to take part. Preferably (but not necessarily) he would be authorized to represent the fractions that support him unquestioningly; this would make the technical procedures much simpler. If deadlocked, the premier would have to be replaced (just an assumption) by someone capable of balancing the interests of all the fractions. It is a matter of principle that a premier, no matter how good, can always be replaced (don’t worry, gentlemen); however, it is impossible to form another non-Left majority given the current Verkhovna Rada composition. For this reason, we are faced with the following scenarios:

l the parliamentary majority falls apart, and parliament becomes incapacitated until the next elections, while cabinet initiatives are blocked;

l the majority is revived and guarantees coordinated performance with the cabinet and president, provided Yushchenko retains office; loath as he is to come to terms with all legislative fractions, he will have to;

l the majority is revived and guarantees coordinated performance with the cabinet and president, provided the premier is replaced;

l parliament is dissolved and the premier’s destiny is in the president’s hands.

To paraphrase the Latin tertium non datur, there is no other option, much as this is craved by some.

The above is an example of how a dialog can be built. Of course, countless other options could be proposed by other parties pursuing other goals serving not only their political but also the public good. The main thing is to keep calm. Don’t worry, gentlemen!

MEANWHILE

On March 2 the premier continued his at first glance paradoxical line in respect to the parliamentary majority. The formation of a coalition government is not within the jurisdiction of the current government but that of the parliamentary majority, Interfax-Ukraine quotes Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko as saying at a Kyiv press conference. “Nobody has given the government the political authorization to form a coalition government. This is also illogical. We will be ready to take part in this process after the existing parliamentary majority makes a decision to form a coalition government,” he said. The premier quoted the Brockhaus and Yefron encyclopedia (1895) as saying that a coalition established in parliament by the majority is also to form a coalition government.

“We want to formalize our relations with parliament. But this should be done with the participation of the president of Ukraine, chairman of Verkhovna Rada, the majority, and the cabinet,” Mr. Yushchenko emphasized.

The ultimatum-style wording and too early deadline (the premier apparently means April 5, the date when the government is to report on the implementation of its program — Ed.) look like politicking, he noted. Mr. Yushchenko stressed the formation of a coalition government also requires political stability inside the country and in the parties themselves. Mr. Yushchenko also reiterated that Ukraine lacks laws on parties, the opposition, majority, and cabinet, which could clarify the procedure for the formation and functioning of a coalition government. Nor are these issues clearly formalized, in his opinion, in the existing Constitution of Ukraine.

Thus a string of the premier’s coalition statements spells out quite a clear tactic: to offer the majority a coalition as bait and then to slow down the process, making it impossible within the majority, and hoping that the pro-premier factions will undermine it, the more so that there are quite enough legal loopholes for avoiding real steps toward forming a coalition government, while playing on the divisions within the majority.