The Colonel and His Generals

Vladimir Putin with a pilot’s helmet on in the cockpit of an interceptor fighter is soon to become as enduring as that of Boris Yeltsin on a tank. However, the difference between the two Russian Supreme Commanders- in-Chief is that in Mr. Putin’s case the military believe in him, while, under Mr. Yeltsin, the army was forced to believe. And what next? Will the nature of military and technical contacts change between Moscow and its CIS neighbors which depend to some extent or other on Russia? How is the Russian military elite going to use these levers now that they have a new Commander- in-Chief? And is it really worthwhile, say, for Ukraine to expect something new and pragmatic in connection with what is often associated with the name of Putin?

STRATEGIC SALUTE FOR THE NEW SUPREMO

For the army of new Russia, Mr. Putin is its second Commander-in- Chief. The first, Mr. Yeltsin, who, like Mikhail Gorbachev, had never served in and did not always trust the army, learned how to put the generals in their place. His phrase, “the generals get fat, while soldiers starve,” which he dropped in public, has become almost proverbial. While the military elite that surrounded Mr. Yeltsin got used to their master’s ways, the healthy military core could not help being irritated by Mr. Yeltsin’s “methods” of dealing with the army and the top brass. This began when Mr. Yeltsin, still a democrat at the time, made statements about the events in Tbilisi, Vilnius, and Karabakh, in which he accused the army and the military leadership of all sorts of mortal sins. Them Mr. Yeltsin insulated himself from all army problems with the impenetrable Pavel Grachev. He believed the loyal paratrooper minister that everything was OK in the army and that reform was underway there. In 1993, at the Commander-in-Chief’s behest, the army sank up to its neck in politics, as it had done in Tbilisi and Vilnius, starting a tank-aided showdown with Parliament. Then there was the first and incomprehensible war in Chechnya, when they would either throw untrained units into battle or declare cease-fires every now and then, thus bringing to nothing the success, however small, of earlier battles. And, from time to time, the superpower’s Supremo shocked the world with his improvised statements about a one-third cut in the nuclear forces, which sent shivers down military spines, or reminded his friend Bill that Russia was still a nuclear power and that he should not forget in general who he was dealing with.

The generals feel more at ease with Mr. Putin. He professes the principle the military understand only too well: all means are good to win a victory. And it does not matter much what the West is muttering about Chechnya. For the victors are above judgment, aren’t they? While Mr. Yeltsin used to reproach former Defense Minister Gen. Rodionov that governmental military expenditures had grown from 3 to 5% of GDP, Mr. Putin decided to allocate one and a half times more money than in the previous year for defense needs, including defense-oriented orders. While as of January 1, 1999, Russia kept 1.2 million men under the colors, the Russian armed forces’ strength jumped to 1,364,000 by February 2000. While still the acting Supremo, Mr. Putin managed to update the Concept of National Security. The 1997 Concept affirmed, “Analysis of threats to national security shows that the main threats are not of military nature at the moment and in the short term.”

The conclusion made in 2000 is altogether different. The following thesis has been spelt out in clear and unambiguous terms: “The level and scale of threats in the military sphere are increasing.” Russia’s new military doctrine also declares that Russia can resort to the first use nuclear weapons in an extreme situation. And it is quite symbolic that on the day when the results of presidential elections were made public the military conducted a test of two RSM-54 intercontinental ballistic missiles. The missiles were launched from Northern Fleet nuclear submarine Karelia and, as the naval press service reported, the warheads arrived at their targets 8,000 km away from the launch site.

However, it is Mr. Putin who was the first to reprove Marshal Igor Sergeyev, former strategic missile general, that he should not pull the budget blanket onto the nuclear forces alone. There are also conventional weapons. The more so that the war in Chechnya showed that the ground forces were weak and had to be urgently reinforced by the marines from all Russia’s fleets, including the Black Sea. Russian analysts assessed Mr. Putin’s statement on the priority of domestic problems over foreign ones as a program. This was followed by shifting emphasis to the preparation of the armed forces to repel domestic threats. This has sunk in to Mr. Putin since the events in Dagestan, when he, as a wartime premier, was forced to put into action the armed forces, police, and the security service, organizing counteractions against the aggression. Then the events in Chechnya, where the premier also came through.

It is on the grounds of combating terrorism that Mr. Putin came into contact with representatives of CIS countries and finally pushed through the idea of forming a counter-terrorist center on the basis of Russian Federal Security Service special-purpose units. “Only by gathering in one fist the forces of national security bodies and special services will we be able to effectively counter international terrorism and extremism on the CIS expanses,” Mr. Putin claimed. This somewhat resembles the idea of CIS collective armed forces, transformed in the mind of the secret agent Mr. Putin dreamed to become since childhood. The new body will begin its work by putting together a single data bank on terrorists throughout the CIS. Mr. Putin promised to help Russia’s neighbors to strengthen the logistics base of their army, police and security agencies, to supply them special equipment and armaments, and to train their personnel. And although there is no question so far about actually forming joint CIS special anti-terrorist structures, the Federal Security Service does not rule out even now the prospect of using, if necessary, the Russian special sub-units, such as Alpha, in CIS states. I do not know whether Ukraine will take advantage of Mr. Putin’s promises of aid, but Kyiv has already sent Security Service (SBU) deputy chief, General Vasyl Krutov, to Moscow for a stint in the mentioned CIS anti-terrorist center. Before taking over as SBU deputy boss, Gen. Krutov ran for a long time the Ukrainian Alpha or, to be more exact, Department A of the SBU. But these are narrowly departmental matters. What really matters is whether something new will be added to the direct relations between the military agencies of Ukraine and Russia.

THIRD TERM

There will be no changes in the short term. Mr. Putin has left Minister of Defense Marshal Sergeyev in office, prolonging his military service by one more year. Before this, the 62-year-old Sergeyev had already had two such overtures from Mr. Yeltsin. Russian generals can only serve until they are 60. When this former commander of the strategic nuclear forces was appointed minister, many interpreted this as a temporary move. However, the cautious Sergeyev managed to maintain good relations with everyone and thus kept afloat. He is always calm and restrained in the relationship with his Ukrainian counterparts. However, it is Sergeyev who, when still the strategic missile force commander, asked Mr. Yeltsin to instruct the Foreign Ministry to make public a statement to the international community that Russia waives all responsibility for the safety of Ukraine’s nuclear arsenals and possibility of their unsanctioned deployment. Moreover, this happened after the presidents of Ukraine, the US and Russia had signed their Trilateral Agreement on Kyiv’s nuclear disarmament. Sergeyev’s discontent was caused by the decision by Ukraine’s then Defense Minister Vitaly Radetsky to make 43rd Missile Army personnel take an oath of allegiance to Ukraine.

He paid his first visit as Minister of Defense to Ukraine, where some Defense Ministry generals used to serve with him in the USSR’s strategic forces. Later last year, the strategic neighbors’ military ministers, Oleksandr Kuzmuk and Igor Sergeyev, signed a comprehensive plan on bilateral military cooperation. While it was planned to carry out 29 joint functions in 1999, more than 50 have been slated for this year. In general, everything is all right. We have shared our strategic bombers with Moscow instead of putting them under the American knife. The navies demonstrate showpiece friendship. And even Ukraine’s air defense personnel is expected to take part for the first time in the Combat Comradeship-2000 CIS air defense exercise on a proving ground near Astrakhan, which the Ukrainians had earlier visited as observers.

But this seems to be just the icing on the cake, the outside view of bilateral contacts, which not always reflects the inner friction which neither Gen. Kuzmuk nor Marshal Sergeyev, both experienced diplomats, want to show. Yet, the main thing is different. The longer Russia and Ukraine exist separately, the more the military elites of the two countries display in their behavior the idea that they represent really independent countries at meetings and negotiations, rather than temporarily alienated republics. Every passing year reduces the number of those in the military leadership of both countries who have known each other like the back of their hand since they as cadets would go AWOL or began their general’s career as lieutenants in faraway garrisons. Now the academies of Russia and Ukraine are turning out graduates without such common experience. And this is not so bad if independence is to be strengthened, especially if Ukraine tries to look West more than East.

But, before these graduates serve long enough to be ministers or chiefs of the general staff, today’s generals will have more than one opportunity to refresh in their minds what about they did together. And the expected replacement of Sergeyev — President Putin is unlikely to keep him on after another year of service — will bring to power a new wave of Russian top brass. However, these persons are well-known. In contrast to Ukraine, Russia keeps to the golden rule, whereby the office of minister or general staff chief is assigned to those who have work experience in these structures, without allowing anybody to make a breathtaking rags-to-riches rise. There is no lack of contenders for the post of Russia’s new Minister of Defense. Among the most often cited candidates are Andrei Nikolayev, chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee, and Anatoly Kvashnin, the current Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. The list also includes Andrei Kokoshin, former deputy minister of defense and Nikolai Mikhailov, the current state secretary and first deputy minister of defense. There even are two former commanding officers of the Kyiv military district: current Moscow oblast Governor Boris Gromov and Rector of the General Staff War College Viktor Chechevatov.

Gen. Chechevatov, who likes luxurious, but inexpensive for the family budget, things, such as Japanese-made Toyotas, evokes far from the best memories in Kyiv. This colonel general commanded the Kyiv military district from 1991 to January 1992. He refused to take the Ukrainian oath and showed a, let us say, condescending attitude toward the idea of independent Ukraine. It is Gen. Chechevatov who was considered Mr. Yeltsin’s favorite and the No. 1 candidate for Defense Minister immediately after the dismissal of Gen. Rodionov. However, he was offered chairmanship of the General Staff. The general took this as an insult and declined the offer, which surprised Mr. Yeltsin so much, and then the choice fell on the seemingly temporary Sergeyev. Had it been different and Gen. Chechevatov taken the post of General Staff chief, the military relations between Moscow and Kyiv would have also been different: beyond any doubt they would be much more tense.

The list mentioned also includes politician Generals Nikolayev and Gromov. They are somewhat similar, without excessive ambitions and with an ability to keep the upper lip in very complicated situations. Mikhailov and Kokoshin, highly educated, if a bit non-ambitious, professionals, have managed to fill a niche of their own. They can contend for the role of minister as civilians. But this can also be an option for Nikolayev and Gromov.

The current General Staff Chief, Anatoly Kvashnin, stands out against the general background. He took over simultaneously with Sergeyev, leaving the hot seat of commander of the perennially warring Northern Caucasian military district. The West considers the general a typical hawk. The point is he still has the thorn of the lost first Chechnya War in his side. Now he has a chance to get revenge, which he is amply using. And not only in Chechnya. It is Kvashnin who initiated the decision to send Russian paratroopers to capture the Pristina airfield, enlisting the support of President Yeltsin, and he did not even inform the Minister of Defense who came to know about it only afterward. There has been no love lost between Sergeyev and Kvashnin ever since. This hidden rivalry plays into the hands of Mr. Putin who simply has no time to deal with military affairs. His pre-election achievements in this field are still sufficient, while the situation on the economic, financial and corruption fronts is far more tense. It will take much more sweat.

Even if Kvashnin becomes Russia’s Defense Minister in a year, this will not pose any major threat to Ukraine, in spite of all his hawkishness, if only because the war in Chechnya is unlikely to end in a year. On the other hand, if the Russia- West differences over Chechnya and peacekeeping operations in Kosovo deepen, the bellicose attitude of Defense Ministry and General Staff could provoke more confrontation between Russia and NATO. And while Mr. Putin, when asked if Russia would ever join NATO, said, “Why not?” the Russian generals have their own answer: “Yes, we will — as far as the Netherlands.” Against this backdrop, Ukraine will have to experience all the charms of being a real buffer state. This is, so to speak, the medium-term prospect.

WE HAVE SETTLED SCORES WITH THE WAR. WHAT NEXT?

Let us turn now to the long term when the Russian army’s leading posts will be occupied by the third wave of generals and officers, those who are now fighting in Chechnya. Gaining combat experience in the second campaign there, they have had a real taste of front-line freedom and have been, perhaps for the first time, embraced by the authorities. This intoxicating cocktail will form (if it has not already) a stereotype in their imagination that it is best to solve problems by force rather than negotiation. These people enjoy popularity in the army. Even today, they are acquiring the halo of heroes. They are being promoted ahead of schedule. The names of generals Troshev, Kazantsev, Shamanov, as well as that of Kvashnin, are on everyone’s lips. Their faces beaming from the television screens.

“A strong team of Russia’s true patriots was formed around the General Staff during the first Chechnya War. These are healthy forces whose involvement can change quite radically the linear course of history. The military usually use force, but sometimes both force and brains. They are sure to gain civil recognition after the war. Who was always the first in this country? KGB? It no longer exists. What is practically left is the army and the General Staff. This is the only place dealing with geopolitics as a science, a technology.” This was a quotation from the interview of Russian political scientist Viktor Minin, published, for some reason, in Kievskie Vedomosti under the strange title “Kyiv Rus’ and Russian Kyiv.” Incidentally, he also found a place to assess the Ukrainian situation. “Ukraine has had no wars, its military is a nonentity, its troops are, by all accounts, a quartermaster corps. They mean almost nothing in terms of resources and politics. The military gain authority only in wartime.” Feel the difference, to cite a phrase?

Or, for example, the popular Russian film-maker Nikita Mikhalkov, so much admired by both the man in the street and the intelligentsia, stated, “Even now I feel the revival of the Russian army, such that the Russian officer corps is taking on a kind of inner assurance and dignity. And this pleases me so! And the point is not to line all up and introduce a militarist spirit. No. This is my bulwark. In Russia the army was not so much the instrument of defense and offense as of our way of life and tradition.” It is worth remembering the phrase, “way of life.”

The Chechnya cohort, like the previous Afghanistan one, has a chance to turn into a clan that influences the determination of not only the military but also the political prospects of Russia’s relations with the outside world. The authorities can, under certain conditions, bank on them. And they are already approaching the authorities politically. For instance, with the advent of Putin, Gen. Shamanov was appointed commanding officer of the Moscow internal security forces district. One should keep in mind that all appointments in the Moscow region are of both a military and political nature. The units scattered around the Russian capital and forming the Moscow military and internal security districts bear a historic marking — from the times of Beriya and removal of Khrushchev to the shelling of Yeltsin’s White House carried by tanks from the elite Taman division.

It is the coming to power of this new Chechnya cohort that holds the greatest unpredictability for Russia’s neighbors. Feeling their strength, will they resist the temptation to put everything in the framework of the reliable Cold War period bipolar pattern? Such a pattern would have no place for neutral and nonaligned neighbors, even if this neighborhood has been pronounced strategic. The more so that the word “strategy” has an entirely different meaning in military terminology.